TELEGRAM

1978 NOV 22 PM 1341

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO
11502

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION:

POL-3

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USICA
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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 11502

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, IR

SUBJECT: ALI AMINI MOVES

1. BOSTON GLOBE'S STEVE ERLANGER (PROTECT) IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF SAID FORMER PRIME MINISTER ALI AMINI TOLD HIM NOV 20 THAT OPPOSITION WAS COMING TO AGREEMENT ON COALITION GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT NAMING INDIVIDUAL, AMINI SAID CANDIDATE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN CHOSEN WHO HAD BEEN OUT OF POLITICS FOR 15 YEARS BUT WAS A RESPECTED INDIVIDUAL WITH CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE. AMINI SAID HE WAS MEETING WITH BAZAARIS NOV 23 TO DISCUSS SUPPORT FOR SUCH A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IDEA INCLUDED CONCURRENT NAMING OF ADVISORY COUNCIL TO SHAH WHICH WOULD CONSIST OF OLDER OPPOSITION LEADERS, LEAVING ROOM IN PROPOSED CABINET FOR YOUNGER, MORE DYNAMIC OPPOSITIONISTS AS WELL AS SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD SERVED AS UNDERSECRETARIES IN MINISTRIES. AMINI WOULD NAME NO NAMES.

2. IN COURSE OF TWO-HOUR CONVERSATION, AMINI SAID SHAH MUST

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:JDStempel:lab	11-22-78		DCM:CWNeas

CLEARANCES:
POL:GBLambrakis

50152-101

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

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OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

STAY, NOT ONLY BECAUSE HE IS NATIONAL LEADER, BUT BECAUSE "ARMY WOULD FALL APART" IF HE LEFT. ERLANDER ADDED THAT HIS OWN MEETINGS WITH A FEW SELECTED MIDDLE-GRADE OFFICERS TO WHOM HE HAD BEEN INTRODUCED THROUGH FRIENDS CONFIRMED FACT THAT ARMY WAS BASICALLY LOYAL TO SHAH. IF HE WENT, HOWEVER, JUNIOR OFFICERS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY FEEL CONSTRAINED TO LINE UP WITH THEIR ~~SENIORS~~ SENIORS. (COMMENT: WHILE EMBASSY DOES NOT AGREE WITH AMINI STATEMENT THAT ARMY WOULD "FALL APART" BASIC LOYALTY OF SENIOR OFFICERS REMAINS WITH SHAH, AND ANY SCENARIO WHICH PUT HIM IN SERIOUS TROUBLE WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE INTERNAL STRESSES AMONG IRANIAN MILITARY.)

SULLIVAN

2

OPTIONAL FORM 152
(Formerly FS-413
January
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SECRET

23 Nov 78 2:30Z

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OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #6190 3270320
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230106Z NOV 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 3652
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 9986
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 9909
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 3563
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 7307
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 3331
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4005
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 6506
RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4221
RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9257
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
BT
S E C R E T STATE 296190

STUTTGART FOR ELG, KUWAIT PASS BRAZEAL PASS BLUMENTHAL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO 22, 11/22/78
ALL ADDEES TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION
1. OIL PRODUCTION INCREASED NEARLY ONE MILLION BARRELS TO ABOUT 5.2 MILLION BARRELS, OF WHICH 4.5 MILLION BARRELS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT. A FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IS EXPECTED TOMORROW, WHICH WILL BRING PRODUCTION ALMOST BACK TO NORMAL LEVELS. A TENTATIVE LABOR TRUCE WOULD THUS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED, AT THE COST OF MAJOR ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS PROMISED.

2. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER GENERAL AZ[redacted] RECEIVED MAJLIS VOTE OF CONFIDENCE 191 TO 27, 6 NOT VOTING, AFTER TWO DAYS OF DEBATE. AZHARI MADE [redacted] SPEECH TAKING SAME CONCILIATORY LINE AS HIS [redacted] AFTER TAKING OFFICE, UNDERSCORING OPPOSITION [redacted] COME SO LONG AS THEY ACT WITHIN CONSTITUTION, I.E. [redacted] WORD FOR MAINTAIN THE SHAH ON THE THRONE.

[redacted] GROUP OF BAZAAR MERCHANTS MET BRIEFLY [redacted] [redacted] EXPRESSED BRIEF [redacted] FROM AYATOLLAH [redacted] SEEK A MORATE SOLUTION, INCLUDING [redacted]

[redacted] THE CONSTITUTION. THESE BAZAARIS CLAIM THEY ARE [redacted] TO PRESS KHOMEINI ON THIS OUTCOME.

[redacted] COMMUNICATION FROM KHOMEINI CALLS FOR MASS SUPPORT [redacted] THE STRIKING OIL WORKERS. THIS INDICATION THAT OIL [redacted] MAY NOT BE OVER HAS LED TEHRANIS TO DESCEND ON GAS [redacted] TO STOCK UP.

[redacted] CONSULATE SHIRAZ REPORTS THAT NOVEMBER 19 SHOOTING INCIDENT, ALTHOUGH RECEIVING INTERNATINAL PRESS COVERAGE, IS MUCH EXAGGERATED WITH NUMBER DEAD PERHAPS TEN PERCENT OF OPPOSITION CLAIM OF 200.. WHATEVER THE FACTS, INCIDENT WILL PROBABLY BECOME THE JALEH SQUARE OF SHIRAZ. MONDAY AND TUESDAY THE BAZAAR AND HALF OTHER CITY SHOPS WERE [redacted], AND TODAY VIRTUALLY ALL OF SHIRAZ IS CLOSED IN [redacted].

TELEPHONE AND TELEX FACILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING AT [redacted] FRACTION OF CAPACITY BECAUSE OF STRIKE INTERRUPTIONS. [redacted] NOT CLEAR THIS INTERRUPTION IS DELIBERATE SINCE [redacted] MAINTENANCE INEVITABLY INVOLVED. RUMORS THAT [redacted] OUTAGES ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED SEEM TO BE TRUE.

[redacted] WILL BE NO SITUATION REPORT TOMORROW (THANKS-[redacted]) UNLESS EVENTS WARRANT. AS THIS CABLE IS DRAFTED, [redacted] PRESS REPORTS OF SERIOUS FIGHTING IN THE TEHRAN [redacted] VANCE

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TELEGRAM

1978 NOV 25 AM 8 27

INDICATE
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11520

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	SECRET

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

11520

SECRET TEHRAN

ACTION: LIMDIS

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH SHARIF-EMAMI AND ALI-AMIMI

1. I MET SEPARATELY AND CONSECUTIVELY AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 24 WITH EX-PRIME MINISTERS SHARIF-EMAMI AND ALI-AMINI. THE TWO MEN OFFER AN INTERESTING CONTRAST. SHARIF-EMAMI IS THE HEAVY, SLOW, GERMAN-TRAINED ACOLYTE OF THE SHAH, WHO HAS HANDLED THE ACCOUNTS OF THE PAHLEVI FOUNDATION AND WAS THE SHAH'S CHOICE AS THE LAST LEADER IN HIS CAMPAIGN OF LIBERALIZATION. ALI-AMINI IS AN ELFIN LITTLE MAN, FRENCH-EDUCATED, PERSONALLY WEALTHY, IRREVERANT ABOUT THE SHAH, AND THE FAIR-HAIRED AMERICAN PROTEGE OF THE KENNEDY PERIOD.

2. SHARIF-EMAMI, WHOM I MET ALONE IN THE HOME OF THE ZIAI BROTHERS, GAVE ME A LONG RECITAL OF A PROPOSAL MADE TO HIM BY MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT. IT WAS THE

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AMB:WHSullivan:bks	11/25/78	1600	AMB:WHSullivan

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FAMILIAR CALL FOR A REGENCY COUNCIL WHICH WOULD REPLACE THE SHAH AND PASS THE AUTHORITY FOR FORMATION OF A NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT ON TO SOME VAGUELY DEFINED GROUP WHO WOULD THEN HOLD FREE ELECTIONS AND ASSURE THE RETENTION OF THE MONARCHY FOR THE CROWN PRINCE.

3. I GAVE HIM A FEW WELL-CHOSEN GROUPS ON THE UNREALITY OF THIS PROPOSAL AND TOLD HIM THAT IT HAD BEEN MADE TO ME INDIRECTLY AT LEAST THREE TIMES. I STRESSED THAT THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISE WITH KHOMEINI, THAT THE SHAH HAD TO REMAIN AS BOTH KING AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND THAT THE NATIONAL FRONT HAD TO FACE THOSE FACTS AS REALITY. I WAS PARTICULARLY HEAVY HANDED IN MAKING THESE POINTS, PARTLY BECAUSE I THINK SHARIF-EMAMI IS NOT VERY BRIGHT AND PARTLY BECAUSE I THINK HE MAY HAVE BEEN PUT UP TO THIS INTERVIEW BY THE SHAH TO TEST OUR STEADFASTNESS. AT ANY RATE, I MADE HIM REPEAT THE LESSON POINT-BY-POINT AFTER I FINISHED MY LECTURE TO BE SURE HE HAD IT RIGHT.

4. AFTERWARDS, I URGED HIM AND THE ZIAI BROTHERS, WHO LATER JOINED US, TO WORK ON BAZAARIS, INDUSTRIALISTS, AND MULLAHS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SHAH WAS SINCERE IN SEEKING A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE AND TO DEFUZE TENSIONS IN THE PERIOD OF MOHARRAM. I STRESSED THAT THE SHAH WAS WILLING TO MEET ANY DOUBTERS PRIVATELY AND THAT THEY SHOULD HELP RECRUIT THOSE WHO WOULD BE INFLUENTIAL TO MEET WITH HIM.

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5. SUBSEQUENTLY, I SAW ALI-AMIMI, WHO TOLD ME HE HAD ALSO BEEN DELUGED WITH THESE SAME OFFERINGS FROM THE NATIONAL FRONT AND HAD TOLD ALL OF THEM TO GO BACK AND GET THEIR HEADS RIGHT BEFORE TRYING TO PURSUE THEIR AMBITIONS. HE SAID HE HAD FOUND ONE SENSIBLE NATIONAL FRONT TYPE WHOM HE WAS BRINGING TO SEE THE SHAH THAT SAME EVENING. (I UNDERSTOOD IT TO BE FORMER MOSSADEQ MINISTER SADIQI, ?, ALTHOUGH AMIMI SEEMED A LITTLE CONFUSED ABOUT HIS FIRST NAME.) AMIMI CONSIDERS HIM HONEST, REALISTIC, AND SENIOR TO SANJABI IN THE FRONT CONSTELLATION. HE BELIEVES THE SHAH COULD NAME HIM PRIME MINISTER IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. HE SAYS THE BAZAARIS SUPPORT HIM AND THAT HE HAS THE SYMPATHY OF SHARIAT-MADARI.

6. AMIMI ALSO TOLD ME OF HIS MEETINGS WITH UNIVERSITY, BAZAAR, AND INDUSTRIAL TYPES WHOM HE HAS BEEN ROUNDING UP TO MEET THE SHAH. HE WILL BRING THE UNIVERSITY GROUP TO SEE THE SHAH ON SATURDAY AND HOPES TO GET THE BAZAARIS TOGETHER BY MONDAY.

7. I TOLD AMIMI THAT I HAD DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH THE SHAH THE PROBLEM OF DISTRUST IN WHICH THE POLITICIANS AND BAZAARIS APPROACH THE PROBLEM OF REACHING AGREEMENTS WITH HIM. I SAID THAT MOST OF THEM WERE TRYING TO GET THE UNITED STATES TO ACT AS THEIR GUARANTOR IN ANY DEALS THEY MADE WITH THE SHAH. I POINTED OUT THAT SUCH GUARANTEES WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR A FOREIGN POWER TO MAKE. HOWEVER,

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I SUGGESTED THAT HE, ENTEZAM , AND WHATEVER OTHER NOTABLES MIGHT BE APPOINTED BY THE SHAH AS HIS "PRIVY COUNCIL" COULD ACT AS GUARANTORS. AMIMI SAID HE HAD BEEN THINKING OF THE SAME THING. HE AND HIS GROUP, WITH GENERAL PUBLIC CONFIDENCE, COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE SHAH AND THE POLITICIANS. IF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENTS, THE COUNCIL COULD DECLARE A FOUL. HE FELT THIS WOULD BE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE TO BOTH SIDES, SINCE HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD BE ABOVE REPROACH AND REPROOF.

8. FINALLY, WE TALKED ABOUT THE NEED TO ASSURE AGAINST CONFRONTATIONS DURING MOHARRAM. I SAID I HAD SENT GENERAL GAST TO TALK WITH GENERAL OVEISII ABOUT THE NEED TO WORK OUT PRECISE GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES AND THE MULLAHS WITH RESPECT TO PROCESSIONS, ETC., DURING MOHARRAM. I EXPRESSED A FEAR THAT TUDEHI PROVOCATION SQUADS WOULD INFILTRATE THE FAITHFUL AND PRODUCE CONFRONTATIONS.

9. COMMENT: THERE IS A GLACIAL AMOUNT OF MOVEMENT BACK TOWARDS SOME SENSE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE SHAH AND THE OPPOSITION. IF AMIMI AND OTHERS CAN CONTINUE TO STIMULATE THIS AND AT THE SAME TIME THE SHAH CAN KEEP THE MILITARY FORCES STEADFAST, THERE MAY BE A POSSIBILITY TO PRECLUDE SOME OF THE WORST POTENTIALS OF MOHARRAM. I INTEND TO WORK ON SOME OF THE MILITARY ACTIVISTS IN

THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO CHANNEL THEIR ENERGY INTO CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS.

SULLIVAN

[redacted] 33[redacted]47

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[redacted]NOV 78

[redacted].WASHDC

[redacted]OPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

[redacted]ASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

[redacted]BASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 3769

[redacted]BAS y TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0142

[redacted]/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4077

[redacted]A/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 3673

[redacted]DC/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 7452

[redacted]ALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 3461

[redacted]/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4321

[redacted]HR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 6573

[redacted]

[redacted]/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4239

[redacted]L/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9269

[redacted]AA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T STATE 302290

CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR CRAWFORD WITH CODEL BYRD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 26, 11/29/78

1. ALL IRAN IS GIRDING FOR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION DURING THE MONTH OF MOHARRAM. BBC'S PERSIAN LANGUAGE SERVICE HAS REPORTED KHOMEINI'S CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE ON DECEMBER 2. ELECTRICAL WORKERS IN ISFAHAN THREATEN A 24-HOUR BLACK OUT THAT DAY WHICH WOULD ALSO CUT WATER SUPPLIES. IN EFFECT, HOWEVER, THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION HAS ALREADY BEGUN. A RESURGENCE OF STRIKES IN CUSTOMS, POSSIBLY IRAN AIR AND RADIO AND TV WORKERS, AND SPORADICALLY IN POWER DISTRIBUTION HAVE SERIOUSLY IMPACTED ON LIFE IN THE COUNTRY. LABOR PROBLEMS AT SHIRAZ AND TEHRAN REFINERIES (WHERE TROOPS MOVED IN) HAVE RESULTED IN LONG LINES AT GAS STATIONS AS AUTO OWNERS SEEK TO STOCK UP. RELATIVELY SMALL DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE OCCURRED IN TEHRAN AND OTHER CITIES.

2. THE EMBASSY REPORTS THAT CHANCES OF ARRANGING A CIVILIAN COALITION GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO ASHURA (DECEMBER 11) SEEM REMOTE. RECENT VISITORS TO THE SHAH DESCRIBE HIM AS VERY DEPRESSED.

3. AN AMERICAN WHO IS IN TOUCH WITH KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS TOLD A DEPARTMENT OFFICER TODAY THAT OPPOSITION FORCES IN IRAN ARE DELIBERATELY SHOWING RESTRAINT IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS AMERICANS IN IRAN BECAUSE KHOMEINI STILL HARBORS HOPE THAT AMERICANS WILL REVERSE THEIR POLICY OF "TOTAL SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH." SHOULD KHOMEINI ABANDON THAT HOPE, AMERICANS COULD EXPECT FAR MORE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN IRAN. SAME SOURCE DESCRIBED SPLIT DEVELOPING BETWEEN KHOMEINI FORCES AND NATIONAL FRONT POLITICIANS WHO HOPE TO WORK OUT COMPROMISE DEAL WITH THE SHAH. HE DESCRIBED KHOMEINI BACKERS AS EAGER FOR CONTACT WITH THE USG. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, OFFICER WAS TOLD BY LARGE AMERICAN FIRM THAT ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN A PROVINCIAL IRANIAN

CITY (KERMANSHAH) WAS WARNED BY THE POLICE CHIEF THAT YOUTHFUL DEMONSTRATORS WERE ACQUIRING ARMS.

4. OIL PRODUCTION CONTINUES TO RISE WITH 5.9 MILLION BARRELS PRODUCED ON NOVEMBER 29. GAS SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR WERE RESUMED TWO DAYS AGO. VANCE

[redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL

November 30, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The File

FROM: NEA - MARILYN MCAFEE

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Dr. Abbas Mirakhor, Chairman of the Department of Economics, University of Alabama, Huntsville, November 29, 1978

Dr. Mirakhor has been in Iran from September 1977 until about a week ago, where he was serving as Chairman of the Department of Economics at Farah Pahlavi University, a department he organized. He is Iranian, but a U.S. permanent resident. He accepted the appointment at Farah Pahlavi to pursue research on OPEC and developments in Iran January 1978 to date.

Dr. Mirakhor seemed a sensitive observer of developments in Iran. While he has spoken with religious leaders (including Shariat-Madari) and with elite Iranians, his principal contacts seemed to be the middle class, Western educated, "silent moderates" who, he says, are holding back and are both afraid to get involved and unsure how to affect the developing cataclysm. Dr. Mirakhor is very Persian in his assumption that the U.S. can influence developments in Iran. His cry was clearly for the U.S. to aid the moderates as the only hope for a long term solution to Iran's problems and the only means to avoid an extremist government of the right or the left. He clearly sees the need for U.S. influence to promote a coalition of the moderates and to help them suggest a strength that would move their numbers from the sidelines into active involvement in politics and government.

Dr. Mirakhor believes that the Shah has better than a 50% chance of weathering the immediate storm. He does not believe that he can prevail, as an absolute monarch, in the long run. He believes the key to resolving the crisis is for the U.S. to advance the cause of the moderates in the ensuing months to ensure the installation of a representative government. This is premised on his assumption that the worsening of the economic situation from strikes and shortages will lead to greater quiescence rather than fury on the part of the masses.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TELEGRAM

1978 NOV 30 PM 1333

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FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL -EXDIS

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11755

ACTION: EXDIS

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ADM
CRU-D

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJ: POLITICAL MODERATES ORGANIZING

SUMMARY: MODERATE GROUP OF PROFESSORS, GOVERNMENT MINISTERS AND OTHERS ARE EVOLVING PLANS FOR ASSISTING IN CREATION OF MODERATE CIVILIAN GROUP SOON AFTER ASHURA. THEY NOTE THEY NEED APPROVAL OF THE SHAH AND OF AT LEAST THE MODERATE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION. THEIR TACTICS ARE EVOLVING.
END SUMMARY

1. MEETING SET UP NOV 29 PRIMARILY TO PROVIDE BRIEFING FOR VISITING CIA OFFICIAL DR. ROBERT BOWIE TURNED INTO WIDER DISCUSSION OF PLANS A MODERATE GROUP HAS FOR ASSISTING IN FORMATION OF A NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. VICE CHANCELLOR MEHDI HERAVI OF NATIONAL UNIVERSITY BROUGHT HIS FRIEND DR. PARVIZ SORURI, DEAN OF NATIONAL UNIVERSITY MEDICAL SCHOOL, FOR DISCUSSION WITH BOWIE AND POL COUNSELOR. REFERRING TO AN EARLIER CONVERSATION

AUTHENT	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:GBLambrakis	11/30/78	1110	MIN:CWNaas

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CONFIDENTIAL -EXDIS
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

ABOUT 10 DAYS AGO WHICH HERAVI HAD WITH POL COUNSELOR, HERAVI EXPOSED HIS GROUP'S PLANS. FOR PAST YEAR HERAVI AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN MEETING REGULARLY TO DISCUSS POLITICAL SITUATION, IN PARTICULAR HOW TO PRESERVE THE POSITION OF MODERATES BEING THREATENED BY POLARIZATION BETWEEN SHAH'S LOYALISTS AND KHOMEINI'S [redacted] OPPOSITION. GROUP BEGAN WITH PROFESSORS BUT HAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE OTHERS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE SINCE BECOME MINISTERS IN GOVERNMENT. THE TEN CURRENT MEMBERS OF GROUP INCLUDE, IN ADDITION TO SORURI AND HERAVI, PRESENT MINISTER OF JUSTICE HOSSEIN NAJAFI, PRESENT MINISTER OF STATE FOR EXECUTIVE AFFAIRS MOSTAFA PAYEDAR, TEHRAN MAYOR JAVAD SHAHRESTANI, PROMINENT COLUMNIST AHMAD AHRAR, JOURNALIST AND HIGH CIVIL SERVANT AHMAD SAMII, AND UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS DR. HASSAN GHOFURI, DR. ABOLFASIAL GAZI, AND DR. HAKAMI.

2. GROUP HAD CONSIDERED GETTING PROMINENT PERSONALITY SUCH AS DR. SORURI'S FATHER, PROMINENT JURIST AND EX-MINISTER MOHAMAD SORURI, TO CALL A MEETING OF 40 or 50 LEADING MODERATES AND DISCUSS CREATION OF A MODERATE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. AFTER DISCUSSING MATTER WITH SORURI, ALI AMINI AND OTHERS, GROUP IS LEANING AWAY FROM IDEA ABOUT SUCH A LARGE MEETING TOWARD FOCUS ON SOMETHING WHICH WILL BRING MORE RAPID ACTION, SO THAT A GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE READY IN THE WINGS TO TAKE OVER FROM

PRESENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT PERHAPS AS EARLY AS A WEEK AFTER ASHURA (I.E., ABOUT DECEMBER 20).

3. GROUP VISUALIZES FOUR OR FIVE EMINENT PEOPLE LENDING THEIR SUPPORT AND PRESTIGE TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THEY HAVE IN MIND SORURI SENIOR, AMINI, ABDULLAH ENTEZAM, DR. MOHAMAD HOSSEIN NAJM (AN ELDERLY RETIRED DIPLOMAT) AND PERHAPS ALLAHYAR SALEH, FORMER LEADER OF NATIONAL FRONT. THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO ADD A PROMINENT CURRENT LEADER OF NATIONAL FRONT IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. THESE MEN COULD SERVE AS A COUNCIL TO A NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT OR AS MINISTERS WITHOUT PORTFOLIO IN THE GOVERNMENT. THEY WOULD ASSIST A PRIME MINISTER IN SELECTING A GOVERNMENT MADE UP OF PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SHAH AND TOP RELIGIOUS LEADERS. ALTHOUGH THEIR ORIGINAL CANDIDATE WAS MAYOR SHAHRESTANI, THEY HAVE NOW DECIDED BETTER CANDIDATE FOR PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE MINISTER OF JUSTICE NAJAFI. HE HAS EXCELLENT STANDING WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS SUCH AS SHARIAT-MADARI, BEING GRANDSON OF A VERY FAMOUS RELIGIOUS LEADER OF ISFAHAN. HE HAS ALSO MADE A NAME FOR HIMSELF REFUSING IN THE PAST TO ACT AS A TOOL OF SAVAK'S GENERAL NASSIRI AND OF PRINCESS ASHRAF.

4. THE FIRST PROBLEM IS GETTING GROUP OF 4 or 5 EMINENT PEOPLE TO AGREE TO SERVE. DR. SORURI, WHO KNOWS THEM ALL WELL (THEY ARE HIS PATIENTS), BELIEVES THEY REQUIRE

EXPLICIT SIGN FROM THE SHAH THAT HE WISHES THEM TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A TASK AND THAT HE WILL MAKE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC GESTURE TO FACILITATE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S WORK. THE GESTURE THEY HAVE HIT UPON RELATES TO PROPERTIES OWNED BY THE SHAH'S FAMILY. THEY BELIEVE SHAH IS WRONG IN GETTING AZHARI GOVERNMENT TO APPOINT A COMMISSION OF THREE JURISTS TO INVESTIGATE ROYAL FAMILY'S PROPERTIES, AS HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED. THEIR INVESTIGATION WILL BE DIFFICULT AND LONG, AND WHATEVER THEY DECIDE WILL HAVE NO CREDIBILITY WITH THE PEOPLE. MUCH BETTER THAT THE SHAH HIMSELF DECIDE, AND ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY, THE RETURN OF SPECIFIED PROPERTIES HELD BY MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY TO THE GOVERNMENT. AFTER ALL EVERYBODY BELIEVES THE SHAH HIMSELF IS BEST JUDGE OF WHERE THOSE PROPERTIES COME FROM, AND IN ANY CASE HOLDERS OF THE PROPERTY WOULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY HURT SINCE THEY PROBABLY HAVE MORE THAN ADEQUATE RESERVE OF FUNDS STASHED AWAY OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. THIS GESTURE WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED BY THE PEOPLE AND WOULD HELP THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THEY TOOK IN POL COUNSELOR'S REMARK THAT SUCH A GESTURE MIGHT STRIKE SOME AS THE SHAH CONTINUING TO "FEED THE ALLIGATORS," BUT THEY THOUGHT IT WAS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE COURSE. SHAH COULD FOLLOW THIS WITH ANNOUNCEMENT HE IS GIVING PAHLAVI FOUNDATION BACK TO THE PEOPLE, AS HE HAS ALREADY PROMISED TO DO BUT HAS NOT DONE.

5. ANOTHER HURDLE IS MECHANICS OF THIS PROCESS. THESE EMINENT MEN WOULD NOT MOVE WITHOUT GETTING PERMISSION FROM THE SHAH FOR WHAT THEY ARE TO DO, AND WOULD NOT THEMSELVES MAKE SUCH SUGGESTIONS OR DEMANDS OF THE SHAH. GROUP THOUGHT THESE IDEAS COULD MOST EFFECTIVELY BE FED TO THE SHAH BY THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, SINCE THE SHAH HAS REACHED A STAGE AT WHICH HE NO LONGER TRUSTS ANY IRANIAN. MOREOVER, THESE CONSERVATIVE OLD GENTLEMEN WOULD NOT TALK BACK TO THE SHAH, OR PRESS HIM. THEIR FUNCTION IS TO LEND PRESTIGE AND GOOD REPUTATION TO MORE DYNAMIC YOUNGER GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD PREPARE THE COUNTRY FOR FREE ELECTIONS.

6. IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY THAT SHAH INVITE THESE PEOPLE TO COME MEET WITH HIM AND GIVE THEM A DIRECTIVE TO ASSIST IN LAUNCHING OF NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AFTER ASHURA. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SHAH HIMSELF SUGGESTED MINISTER OF JUSTICE NAJAFI AS A GOOD CHOICE FOR PRIME MINISTER. OTHERWISE, THERE WAS ALWAYS THE RISK THAT SOME OTHER ADVISER MIGHT GET TO THE SHAH WITH ANOTHER NAME, AND THESE EMINENT MEN WOULD NOT QUARREL IF THE SHAH SUGGESTED THAT NAME. THIS LED TO SOME DISCUSSION OF NAMES, WITH THE HOPE EXPRESSED ON ALL SIDES THAT RIVALRY FOR THE POST OF PRIME MINISTER OUGHT NOT TO ARISE. DUE NOTE WAS TAKEN OF PROBABILITY THAT ALI AMINI, WHO IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING A TALENT SEARCH FOR MODERATES ON BEHALF OF THE

SHAH, MIGHT HAVE DECIDED ON ENTEZAM AS NEXT PRIME MINISTER. SHOULD NAJAFI NOT BE ACCEPTABLE, HERAVI AND SORURI READILY AGREED NAJAFI COULD BE PUT IN AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TO ASSIST ENTEZAM.

7. CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ON SAD STATE OF PRESENT AFFAIRS. SORURI AND HERAVI GAVE EXAMPLES OF SURPRISINGLY EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION AMONG OPPOSITION. WHEN NOT EVEN THE IRANIAN ARMY IS CAPABLE OF SUCH EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION, SUSPICION MUST FALL ON ONLY GROUP IN IRANIAN HISTORY WHICH HAS BEEN WELL ORGANIZED--THE TUDEH COMMUNIST PARTY. HERAVI LIKENED MANY ACTIVITIES OF THE OPPOSITION TO DATE TO THE TACTICS USED BY THE PETROGRAD SOVIETS AGAINST THE KERENSKY SOCIALISTS IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. THEIR AIM IS TO DEMORALIZE THE CIVIL SERVANTS AND OTHER MODERATES. STRIKE ACTIVITIES, RUMOR MONGERING, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND KILLING, ALL WORK TO THAT END. SORURI GAVE AS A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE THE DAY HE ARRIVED FOR WORK AT THE HOSPITAL AT 6 A.M. TO FIND A LEAFLET DIRECTING DOCTORS NOT TO WORK, OR TO WORK VERY LITTLE. THIS LEAFLET HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT TEHRAN DURING THAT NIGHT.

8. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, HERAVI AND SORURI AGREED TO TRY TO DO WHAT THEY WANTED WITHOUT DIRECT EMBASSY ASSISTANCE FOR THE MOMENT. HERAVI IS PLANNING TO SEE NAJAFI AND PUT THE MATTER TO HIM. HE WILL LET NAJAFI BE THE JUDGE OF WHETHER OR NOT HE CAN OBTAIN AT LEAST TACIT APPROVAL

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FROM SHARIAT-MADARI AND SOME OF THE OTHER AYATOLLAHS. SORURI WILL APPROACH AMINI TO SEE IF AMINI WILL NOT ACT AS INTERMEDIARY WITH THE SHAH, EITHER FOR THE GROUP OF EMINENT ELDERS OR FOR HERAVI, SORURI, AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS OF THEIR GROUP TO SEE THE SHAH AND PUT THE PROPOSITION TO HIM. THEY SAID THEY WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH.

SULLIVAN

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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 3773
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6166
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0105
RUEHPT/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 3687
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 7459
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 3464
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4394
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE 6595
RUEHKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 6595
RUEHSB/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4240
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RUEHNAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHIL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9279

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EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR CRAWFORD WITH CODEL BYRD

E.O. 12065: GDS

TAGS: IRAN

SUBJ: IRAN SITREP NO. 27, 11/30/78

ALL ADDRS TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION

A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SHAH HAS VIRTUALLY BEGUN, CONCERNS AND RUMORS ARE RIFE WITH MOHARRAM VIRTUALLY BEGUN. THIS SITUATION IS NOT HELPED BY THE STRIKE [illegible]. THIS, WHICH HAS CRIPPLED THE ALREADY POOR [illegible] AT NIGHT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE BBC HAS [illegible] OF NEWS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE BBC HAS [illegible] A RANDOM TIMES EDITORIAL CALLING FOR A REGENCY [illegible] THE SHAH, WHICH HAS TEHRAN BUZZING. [illegible] WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE SHAH, IT WILL [illegible] GOI DEMAND TO CURB THE BBC PERSIAN

[illegible] THE DECEMBER 1 MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT [illegible] WILL FEATURE AN INTERVIEW WITH

[illegible] THE SOURCE WHO SPENT A NUMBER OF [illegible] SHARIATMADARI TEN DAYS AGO REPORTS

[illegible] RECORDED WILL BE

[redacted]

[redacted] CONFRONTATION;

[redacted] SACRIFICE HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE FOR [redacted] AND

[redacted] MUST REMAIN, SINCE HE RECOGNIZES THE [redacted] GOVERN WITHOUT THE SHAH.

[redacted] CONFIDENCE THAT IF SHARIATMADARI PERCEIVES [redacted] OPPOSITION FOLLOWING ASHURA (DECEMBER 11) [redacted] WITH KHOMEINI WHEN THE ULTIMATE CONFRONTA-

[redacted] OFFER SPOKE WITH PM GENERAL AZHARI NOVEM- [redacted] FOUND HIM IN GOOD SPIRITS. HOWEVER, AZHARI [redacted] APPEARED WORRIED ABOUT HIS OFFICERS, AND FEELS [redacted] TO RETURN TO THEM TO PULL THEM TOGETHER AS A [redacted] POSSIBLY AN INDICATION OF DISSENSION IN THE [redacted] AZHARI ALSO SAID HE WAS BRINGING IN GERMANS, [redacted] TO REPLACE STRIKERS AT POWER PLANTS.

[redacted] WITH SECURITY FORCES ARE REPORTED IN TEHRAN, [redacted] FOUR OTHER CITIES. VANCE

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Tehran, Iran

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ahmad Djadali, IIAF Procurement
Jack H. Shellenberger, PAO

DATE & PLACE: Djadali Residence - December 3, 1978

SUBJECT: Attitudes toward the Shah

DISTRIBUTION: AMB, DCM, POL, POL/MIL, ECON, CONS, OR, ICA/NEA

Background: Early during my tour here, I became acquainted with Ahmad and his family through Ahmad's fiancee who is a secretary at the Voice of America. The Djadalis are a middle class family. His father is a retired civil servant; his sister a university student. Ahmad, himself, has a MA in Political Science from Georgetown and is now doing his military stint as a civilian in the IIAF procurement office with special responsibilities for liaison with Lockheed personnel. He says his work is such that he is best advised not to visit my office or even play tennis at the Embassy. So we periodically get together at the modest apartment of his family off Roosevelt north of the Embassy.

Ahmad is very concerned by what he considers a serious erosion of support for the Shah on the part of the military personnel he sees daily. Stories and rumors are rampant that the generals now in charge are acquiring huge sums in preparation for a fast exodus. Allegiance to the Shah is a temporary expedient on their part; as for the lower ranking military, it is wavering. The root cause of all the malaise is the Shah himself who permitted his family and confidantes to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses. What we are witnessing is a sudden widespread revulsion against the Pahlavi dynasty which no amount of allusion to past contributions (land reform, women's rights, education) can dispel.

An unfortunate byproduct of all this is the alienation taking place between the Iranian people and the USG and foreigners in Iran. Ahmad is genuinely convinced that I and my family are in some peril here, that we should be as inconspicuous as possible. His father chimed in to say that he has no doubt that the Russians are injecting themselves into the situation through the Tudeh. Religion is only a cover for expression of discontent in Iran, both opined.

Interestingly, both are skeptical that incidents of violence around the country are the exclusive work of the opposition. They suspect the military government is behind certain of these incidents to justify their seizure of power.

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Comment: While neither of these contacts represents any institution, and neither has high standing, their views seemed to warrant recounting as reflective of some middle class thinking these days in Tehran.

JHSheilenberger:mh

1978 DEC -4 PM 1:38

TELEGRAM

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	AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL EXDIS

E.O. 11652:
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11843

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/4/08 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, IR
SUBJ: OPPOSITION PROPOSALS FOR DEPARTURE OF SHAH
REF: (A) TEHRAN 11097, (B) TEHRAN 11083

SUMMARY: DR. MINATCHI TOLD EMBOFF PROPOSAL FOR A REGENCY COUNCIL IS BEING PUT TO LEADING KHOMEINI REPRESENTATIVES DEC 4. THEY WILL GO TO PARIS TO CONVINCE KHOMEINI, WITH PRESSURE IF NECESSARY, TO ACCEPT THEM. MINATCHI HAD HEARD RUMOR SHAH MIGHT BE READY TO AGREE TO REGENCY COUNCIL. ALI AMINI HAD TOLD MINATCHI "FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISERS" HAD SAID MILITARY COMMANDERS WOULD NOT AGREE TO DEPARTURE OF SHAH AND SAID IF COUNCIL IDEA ADOPTED, SHAH WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE MILITARY COMMANDER. EMBOFF DENIED U.S. ADVISERS WOULD HAVE MADE SUCH STATEMENTS. MINATCHI SAID OPPOSITION WOULD ACCEPT PRESENT ARMED SERVICES HEADS ON REGENCY COUNCIL. IN REPLY TO MINATCHI QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE SHOULD CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS, EMBOFF SAID ALL PEACEFUL EFFORTS ARE USEFUL AND URGED REALITY OF

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POL:JDStempel	12/4/78	1112	MIN:CWNaas

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POL:GBLambrakis

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SITUATION BE IMPRESSED ON ALL SIDES. END SUMMARY

1. AT MINATCHI'S REQUEST, EMBOFF STEMPEL MET AGAIN WITH DR. NASSER MINATCHI, TREASURER OF COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM AND ASSOCIATE OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI. MINATCHI WANTED TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS AND HEAR ANY LATEST U.S. IDEAS, BECAUSE HE WAS MEETING WITH TWO OF THREE LEADING KHOMEINI AYATOLLAHS OVER LUNCH TO PREPARE THEM FOR TRIP TO PARIS WITHIN NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS. AYATOLLAHS WHO WILL GO TO PARIS ARE MONTAZARI OF QOM AND RAFSANJANI OF TEHRAN (THEY, PLUS TALEQANI OF TEHRAN, MAKE UP KHOMEINI "HIGH COMMAND" WITHIN IRAN, ACCORDING TO MINATCHI). THEY WILL PLACE BEFORE KHOMEINI THE IDEA OF A REGENCY COUNCIL TO REPLACE THE SHAH (SEE REFTELS FOR DETAILS) WHICH WOULD THEN APPOINT A COALITION GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE PREPARED TO "PRESSURE" KHOMEINI TO ACCEPT THIS. ALL OPPOSITIONISTS AND THE SHARIAT-MADARI GROUP IN QOM AND MASHAD HAVE AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH AND SUPPORT SUCH A GOVT.

2. MINATCHI DESCRIBED PAST TEN DAYS' NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALI AMINI AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHARIF-EMAMI WHICH LED UP TO PRESENT SITUATION AND SAID BOTH AMINI AND SHARIF-EMAMI HAD ACCEPTED IDEAS AS VALUABLE ON FIRST HEARING, ONLY TO BECOME STANDOFFISH. (MINATCHI SAID AT FIRST MEETING WITH ~~AMINI~~, LATTER HAD SAID "AMERICANS

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HAVE AUTHORIZED CONTACT WITH YOU." EMBOFF DENIED THIS, AND SAID WE SIMPLY HAD URGED AMINI AND OTHERS TO TALK WITH ALL THOSE INVOLVED.) SOLUTION THAT DID NOT ENABLE HIM TO REMAIN AS CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH AND COMMANDER-in-CHIEF OF THE ARMY. MINATCHI SHOULD NOT RPT NOT LET WISHFUL THINKING MISLEAD HIS GROUP ON THAT SCORE. MINATCHI ADDED NONE OF HIS GROUP REALLY TRUSTED AMINI OR SHARIF-EMAMI IN ULTIMATE ANALYSIS BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID."

3. OTHER PROBLEM WAS SITUATION WITHIN ARMY, WHICH EMBOFF HAD DISCUSSED WITH MINATCHI AT LAST MEETING. ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, AMINI TOLD HIM THAT "FOREIGN MILITARY OFFICERS, WHO ADVISE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES" TOLD AMINI THAT IF SHAH GOES, ARMY COMMANDERS WOULD NOT OBEY WHOEVER FOLLOWED. EMBOFF ASKED IF THAT MEANT U.S. OFFICERS AND MINATCHI SAID AMINI CERTAINLY MEANT IT THAT WAY. EMBOFF FLATLY DENIED U.S. OFFICERS MAKE SUCH COMMENTS, ESPECIALLY TO POLITICAL LEADERS. AS MINATCHI KNEW, HOWEVER, EMBOFF AT LAST MEETING (REF A) HAD EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT MILITARY OFFICERS WOULD WILLINGLY GO ALONG WITH SCENARIO WHICH SAW SHAH'S DEPARTURE. MINATCHI SAID SHAH COULD ALWAYS NAME NEW TROOP COMMANDERS BEFORE HE LEFT, AND IN ANY CASE, THERE WOULD BE LOYALISTS ON REGENCY COUNCIL. HE NAMED FOLLOWING RETIRED GENERALS

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WHO WERE ACCEPTABLE TO OPPOSITION: ASGHAVI, JAM, BATMANGELIDJ, GARZAN AND REZVANI, PLUS RETIRED ADMIRAL MADANI, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS VERY TRUSTED BY THE SHAH, A BRILLIANT MAN, AND SYMPATHETIC TO THE NATIONAL FRONT. WHEN EMBOFF EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT SERVING TROOP COMMANDERS WOULD EASILY ACQUIESCE IN THEIR OWN REPLACEMENT, MINATCHI SAID THAT WAS POSSIBLE, BUT THEN STATED THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY HAVING MEMBERS OF PRESENT ARMED SERVICES ON REGENCY COUNCIL. EMBOFF ASKED HIM QUESTION SECOND TIME, AND MINATCHI SAID THIS WAS TRUE, BASIC POINT WAS TO GET SHAH OUT OF POWER -- ALL OPPOSITIONISTS HAD AGREED THEY COULD SERVE UNDER REGENCY COUNCIL WHICH HAD PRESENT MILITARY LEADERS ON IT. (COMMENT: THIS REPRESENTS MODEST CHANGE FROM PROPOSITION PUT FORWARD IN REFTEL. WHILE IT WOULD NOT MAKE THIS PROPOSAL ANY MORE PALATABLE TO SHAH, IT IS/USEFUL TO KEEP IN MIND.

4. MINATCHI DESCRIBED IDEA OF REGENCY COUNCIL -- IN HIS AND OPPOSITION'S EYES, THIS IS NOT ADVISORY COUNCIL SET FORTH IN AMENDED ARTICLE 38 OF SUPPLEMENTARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 1907. OPPOSITION CONCEPT IS THAT REGENCY COUNCIL AS A GROUP WOULD ASSUME REGENCY IN PLACE OF SHABANOU AND HAVE NO NEED FOR STATUTORY COUNCIL. REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TWO OR THREE GENERALS FROM LIST ABOVE, FOUR CIVILIANS, AND PRESENT CHIEF OF STAFF

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AND OTHER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES "IF THIS WAS NECESSARY." EMBOFF MADE NO COMMENT OTHER THAN TO NOTE THAT THIS PROPOSAL SEEMED UNACCEPTABLE TO SHAH.

5. AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, MINATCHI ASKED IF EMBOFF PERSONALLY THOUGHT HE SHOULD GO AHEAD DISCUSSING PROPOSAL AND EVEN SEND AYATOLLAHS TO PARIS, SINCE IT SEEMED THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT YET FULLY RIPE. EMBOFF REPLIED CONTINUED DISCUSSION WAS PREFERABLE TO VIOLENCE, AND PROBED POSSIBILITY THAT SHARIAT-MADARI AND KHOMEINI LEADERS IN COUNTRY MIGHT BE DRAWN AWAY FROM HARD INSISTENCE THAT SHAH LEAVE. MINATCHI WAS MILDLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH QUESTION, BUT EVENTUALLY OPINED THAT SUCH A SHIFT SEEMED UNLIKELY. HE EXPRESSED HOPE EVENTS MIGHT SHIFT VIEWS ON BOTH SIDES AND HOPED VIOLENCE WOULD NOT ACCOMPANY CONTINUAL POST-CURFEW ACTIVITIES. EMBOFF URGED HIM TO DESCRIBE REAL SITUATION AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE TO AYATOLLAHS, ADDING THAT NONE OF US WANTED BLOODSHED AND THAT THE BEST WAY TO AVOID IT WOULD BE FOR "PEOPLE" TO SHOW A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBILITY AND BASE THEIR OWN IDEAS ON WHAT MIGHT PROVIDE THE STUFF OF COMPROMISE. MINATCHI NODDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD.

6. MINATCHI ADDED RITUAL PITCH THAT U.S. TAKE THIS PROPOSAL TO THE THRONE " TO PAVE THE WAY," AND ACCEPTED WITH GOOD GRACE EMBOFF'S CHIDING THAT HE WAS ONCE AGAIN TRYING TO GET U.S. TO MEDDLE IN IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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OTHER DISCUSSION ON POLITICAL PRISONERS BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.

7. COMMENT: ASIDE FROM ACCEPTANCE OF PRESENT SENIOR MILITARY MEN ON PROPOSED REGENCY COUNCIL, ONLY NEW ELEMENT IS FORTHCOMING PITCH TO KHOMEINI. AS FAR AS WE KNOW, THIS WILL BE ONLY EFFORT IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE FROM ~~HIS~~ opposition's OWN SUPPORTERS TO PRESS KHOMEINI FOR ANY "GIVE" DEVELOPING IN HIS POSITION.

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TELEGRAM

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FROM	CLASSIFICATION
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E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: RDS 12/4/98 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, IR, PINT
SUBJ: MORE STIRRING AMONG MODERATE LEADERS

SUMMARY: HEAD OF TEACHERS'UNION SPEAKS OF FINDING A "THIRD WAY" TO AVOID EITHER RESURGENCE OF SHAH'S POWER OR KHOMEINI VICTORY. HE BELIEVES SHAH MUST GO, HOWEVER, YIELDING TO A REGENCY COUNCIL. THIS IDEA IS CURRENT AMONG NATIONAL FRONT OPPOSITIONISTS TOO. END SUMMARY

1. ON DEC 3 POL COUNSELOR WAS INVITED FOR CONVERSATION WITH MOHAMAD DERAKHSHESH, HEAD OF TEACHERS UNION WHO IS ACTIVE POLITICALLY WITH FRIENDS IN VARIOUS OTHER OCCUPATIONS. DERAKHSHESH WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE NEED HE AND LIKE-MINDED MODERATE OPPONENTS OF THE SHAH FEEL FOR FINDING SOME "THIRD COURSE" WHICH WILL NOT BE THAT OF KHOMEINI. HE AND HIS FRIENDS VISUALIZE THIS AS INVOLVING THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH IN FAVOR OF A

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REGENCY COUNCIL TO BE MADE UP OF HIGHLY RESPECTED MEN -- JUDGES, ETC. THIS COUNCIL WOULD THEN APPOINT REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF POLITICAL LEADERS FROM NATIONAL FRONT, OTHER PARTIES, BAZAARIS, HIMSELF, ETC. WHO WOULD FORM GOVT, PREPARE FREE ELECTIONS AND WAIT FOR NEW GOVT TO COME OUT OF FREELY ELECTED NEW MAJLIS.

2. DERAKHSHESH WAS AWARE OF THIS KIND OF SOLUTION MANY ARE TALKING ABOUT. HE DID NOT SHOW GREAT APPRECIATION FOR EFFECT DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH WOULD HAVE ON MILITARY HIGH COMMAND (THINKING THAT COULD BE HANDLED WITH FORMER RETIRED OFFICERS OF GOOD REPUTE) BUT WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS, AND SEEMED TO BE MODERATELY IMPRESSED, BY PROBLEMS THAT WOULD ARISE IF ARMY CRUMBLED. HE KEPT REPEATING NEED FOR ARMY TO BE "NATIONAL" RATHER THAN OWING ITS ALLEGIANCE TO ONE MAN, THE SHAH. HAVING DONE HIS MILITARY SERVICE AS AN OFFICER HIMSELF IN REZA SHAH'S ARMY, HE EMEMBERED CORRUPTION AND COWARDISE OF TOP OFFICERS. EVERTHELESS, HE GRANTED THE POINT THAT CHANGE IN ARMY MIGHT HAVE TO BE MORE GRADUAL, WHILE IT SERVES AS AN UMBRELLA TO PROTECT BASIC CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.

3. DERAKHSHESH VOLUNTEERED THAT HE FEARED EITHER A RELIGIOUS DICTATORSHIP UNDER KHOMEINI OR A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER ONCE KHOMEINI IS SWEPT ASIDE. HIS OBJECTIVE IS TO START IRAN ON THE ROAD TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC GOVT. HE DID NOT QUARREL WITH POL COUNSELOR'S POINT THAT IRAN WAS HEADED

THAT WAY UNDER SHAH'S LIBERALIZATION PLAN, BEYOND EXPRESSING CONTINUING INABILITY TO BELIEVE ANYTHING THE SHAH SAYS. HE SAID HE OR HIS FRIENDS WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE BRANDED TRAITORS AND LOSE THEIR FOLLOWERS IF THEY ACCEPTED TO WORK IN A GOVT UNDER THE SHAH. HE KEPT RETURNING TO THE POINT THAT THE SHAH MUST GO -- OTHERWISE KHOMEINI FOLLOWERS WILL NOT BE REDUCED IN POWER SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS TO BECOME ACTIVE AND ORGANIZE A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS FOR IRAN.

4. DERAKHSHESH SHOWED HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH MANY TEACHERS, PULLING OUT LONG ROLLED PETITIONS, MANY OF THEM WITH HUNDREDS OF SIGNATURES ON THEM, WHICH HE HAS BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE PROVINCES. IN ONE CASE THE TEACHERS HAD SOUGHT REFUGE IN A MOSQUE AND SIGNED THIS PETITION AFTER FIVE OF THEIR NUMBER HAD BEEN ARRESTED. ALL THE PETITIONS ARE ANTI-SHAH.

5. DERAKHSHESH COMPLAINED OF HAVING BEEN ARRESTED WHEN HE AND HIS PEOPLE TRIED TO PRINT SOME TRACTS AND A NEWSPAPER EARLIER THIS YEAR. HE NOTED THE SHAH HAD MADE A MISTAKE IN APPOINTING SHARIF-EMAMI, WITH HIS IMAGE, AS PRIME MINISTER AT A TIME OF SUCH GREAT CRISIS. SHAH MIGHT HAVE SALVAGED A GREAT PART OF THE SITUATION IF HE HAD APPOINTED A COALITION GOVT INCLUDING SOME OPPOSITION FIGURES. HE INDICATED NEED HE AND HIS FRIENDS FELT TO BE POLITICALLY ACTIVE DESPITE HOPELESSNESS OF POLITICAL

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ACTION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WHILE TEST OF STRENGTH BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND SHAH IS AT ITS HEIGHT. HE AGREED WITH POL COUNSELOR THAT ONCE MOHARRAM PERIOD HAS PASSED IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE SITUATION TO SEE WHETHER COMPROMISE SOLUTION WITH SHAH CONTINUING IN ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE FOR POLITICAL MODERATES LIKE HIMSELF, WHO RECOGNIZE DANGER OF MOB RULE, OR WORSE, SHOULD KHOMEINI OPPOSITION HAVE ITS WAY. HE ALSO TOOK IN (SEVERAL TIMES DURING MEETING) POL COUNSELOR'S POINT THAT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF MODERN IRAN REMAIN FOR ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH AND, BY ENCOURAGING POPULAR BELIEF THAT ROOT CAUSE OF ALL THEIR PROBLEMS IS THE SHAH, EXPECTATION IS CREATED AMONG THE PEOPLE THAT PROBLEMS WILL DISAPPEAR WHEN SHAH GOES, DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN PROBLEMS DO NOT DISAPPEAR COULD REDOUND AGAINST ANY FUTURE GOVT, EVEN ONE OF NATIONAL FRONT OPPOSITION. NEVERTHELESS, DERAKHSHESH EXPRESSED STRONG DOUBTS ANY SOLUTION WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH COULD WORK.

6. COMMENT: DERAKHSHESH IS TYPICAL OF MANY MODERATE LEADERS WHO ARE AFRAID OF KHOMEINI VICTORY AND WOULD LIKE TO FIND A "THIRD WAY." IN DERAKHSHESH'S CASE HE IS CONVINCED THIS WOULD NOT WORK UNLESS SHAH LEFT IN FAVOR OF A REGENCY COUNCIL. EMBOFF IS POSITION VERY CLOSE TO OPPOSITIONIST NATIONAL FRONTERS, AS EXPRESSED BY MINATCHI

TO EMBOFF VERY NEXT DAY (SEPTEL). THEY HAVE CLEARLY BEEN IN TOUCH.

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AIRGRAM

HANDLING	CLASSIFICATION	MESSAGE REFERENCE NO.
	CONFIDENTIAL	A-34

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: AMCONSULS ISFAHAN AND TABRIZ (VIA INTERNAL POUCH)

FROM: AMCONSUL SHIRAZ DATE: 12/6/78

12065:
E.O. ~~XXXX~~
GDS-12/6/78 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-M

TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR

SUBJECT: WHITHER IRAN AFTER MOHARRAM?

REF:

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SUMMARY: (C) Opponents of the Pahlavi regime hop to bring it down during the month of Moharram while the hope in Tehran appears to be that Moha ram will prove the inability of oppositionists t acheive their political objectives without first compromising with the Shah. Both these hopes may be overly optimisitic. The odds, as seen from Shiraz, seem to favor continued confrontation even after Moharram. If this state of affairs does indeed persist, the evolution of attitudes within the military will become crucial. Whatever the ultimate political denouement here, the military will almost certainly figure pominently in it. Our national interests will best be serve by elimination of the unrest which has been so disruptive in recent months. Under the circumstances, the best policy we can pursue may well be to let events reach their natural conclusion with a minimum of attempted manipulation on our part. END SUMMARY

(C) Opposition elements in Shiraz and elsewhere in southern Iran appear to hope that through a combination of strikes and other crippling labor actions, demonstrations and shop closures, and general confron

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CLEARANCES:

tation of the government reaching a culmination during the month of Moharram that the Shah will be driven from his throne and Iranians everywhere will at long last acheive political self-realization. The hope in Tehran, on the other hand, as seen from Shiraz seems to be that Moharram will prove the inability of the opposition to overthrow the Pahlavi regime and that thereafter pressures will rapidly build on opposition leaders to compromise with the Shah.

(C) Both these hopes may be overly optimisitic. Despite rumours of arms shipments clandestinely flooding the country, it does not seem likely that the Iranian military is in any immediate danger of being out-gunned by opponents of the regime. The latter to date have been armed with little more than their zeal, whatever they have found lying in the streets, and an occasional home-made explosive device. Thus, given the current weaponry mismatch and assuming the military is as yet unprepared to take on the job of deposing the Shah for his opponents, the odds are in favor of his being able to hang on for awhile longer if that is his choice.

(C) A coalition government, however, even one including opposition elements, anticipatory to national elections in June would have dubious prospects for success. It is conceivable that some relatively moderate elements opposed to monarchical absolutism (if not monarchy itself) as well as a host of opportunists of all political shades would be tempted to join a coalition government, but those committed to the elimination of the monarchy as an institution almost surely would continue to hold out. This latter group, at least in southern Iran, seems large and determined. Further, given the atmosphere of hostility, suspicion and cynicism which dominates the view of these irreconcilables, it is unlikely in the extreme that any coalition government, even one including certified opponents of the regime, would have much credibility among them. They are inclined to view just willingness to deal with the Pahlavi regime as, ipso facto, a traitorous act.

(C) Under such circumstances, confrontation could easily continue virtually unabated. Those dedicated to the Shah's overthrow would attempt to keep up the pressure on him and what would be perceived as his government. They would most probably focus their efforts on the kinds of economic actions which have proven so disruptive heretofore. At the same time, the government would be attempting to carry out the day-to-day chores of national administration in an environment of

political urgency and economic chaos and to organize national elections handicapped by differing points of view among the coalition members and lack of popular consensus. As the elections approached, the in-fighting among coalition partners would almost inevitably escalate to the point where the coalition itself might be seriously jeopardized. If the elections could be pulled off, it is doubtful (given the present attitudes of hardcore oppositionists) that they would have any more meaning or ultimate utility than the elections which used to be held periodically in South Vietnam.

(C) The evolution of the attitude of the military in coming weeks thus becomes critical. At the moment, senior officers in Shiraz appear to view their mission in very narrow terms. Not long ago Shiraz's martial law administrator described himself as a neutral force standing between the government and opponents who wish to attack it violently. He scrupulously avoided condemning opposition as such, however, claiming it is not his job to judge political issues. These latter require political solutions which, he said, can only be found in Tehran. Such an attitude can be tenable over the longer term only if the required solutions are indeed found. And in the case of Iran that is the rub. If a mutually derived compromise between the Shah and the majority of his people is not possible, an outside force will sooner or later have to impose one. The military, given its natural distaste for political turmoil of any sort and its coercive power, becomes the obvious candidate for this task.

(C) In this instance, assumption by the military of the role of political arbitrator might follow one of two general courses. Conventional wisdom would seem to be on the side of a more conservative approach in which the military simply takes on responsibility for both keeping the peace and seeing to it that the business of government is carried out. This would require much greater direct intervention in areas other than law enforcement than has been the case so far under the Azhari government. The need for legitimacy and perhaps sentiment would seem to favor retention of the Shah, although probably more for window dressing than anything else, under such an approach. However, keeping him on the throne would almost surely mean continuation of considerable popular opposition to the government.

(C) While there are certainly precedents for unpopular military regimes, and some of them have demonstrated remarkable viability, popular opposition is not something that is usual-

ly courted for its own sake. Indeed, members of the military like to be liked no less than anyone else. This fact, coupled with the somewhat messianic role often tempting to military elites in the third world, might prompt the military here to act as an "honest broker" between the Iranian people and the Shah many of them are attempting to overthrow. Such a scenario could entail an invitation from the military to the monarch to take an extended vacation abroad pending resolution of the political situation in Iran, a recommendation that he abdicate in favor of his son and a council of regents, or simply elimination of the Pahlavi dynasty in response to the popular will.

(C) Whatever the ultimate outcome of events here, however, it seems almost certain that the military will figure prominently in it. Our national interests will be best served by elimination of the unrest which has proven so disruptive in recent months. A more central role for the Iranian military in directing government affairs will not guarantee such an outcome, and certainly any attempt on our part to influence the political process in that direction would be fraught with considerable risk. Similarly, despite the Shah's obvious unpopularity, repudiation of him at this point would serve little purpose and most probably would be viewed by many, even among his opponents, as no more than great power cynicism. Nonetheless, it is extremely doubtful that the Shah will ever again be able to exercise the leadership role he once did. Further, it is far from inevitable that the ultimate political denouement in Iran, whether it be in favor of retention of the Shah or something else, would be inimical to our national interests. Under the circumstances, our best policy might well be to urge moderation and accomodation, while remaining alert to the possibility of external interference, but otherwise to let events reach their natural conclusion.

TOMSETH

37

TELEGRAM

1978 DEC -7 PM 12: 30

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/7/98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADERS RELEASED; DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED

SUMMARY: GOI RELEASED KARIM SANJABI AND DARIUS FOROUHAR EVENIN DEC 6. PAIR WILL MEET WITH FRONT LEADERS DEC 7. NATIONAL FRON (INF) WILL PARTICIPATE IN DEMONSTRATIONS SCHEDULED FOR DEC 10 (TASSUA). U.S. PROFESSOR COTTAM RUMORED IN IRAN. END SUMMARY.

1. DR. NASSER MINATCHI CALLED EMBOFF STEMPEL AT HOME AFTER CURFEW DEC 6 TO DISCUSS NEWS T[illegible]T GOI HAD RELEASED KARIM SANJABI AND DARIUS FOROUHAR. MINATCHI CONFIRMED RELEASE AND SAID HE HAD TALKED TO TWO MEN BY TELEPHONE. MEETING OF MAJOR NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS WAS SET FOR LATE AFTERNOON DEC 7 TO DISCUSS NEXT MOVES. MINATCHI NOTED GOI HAD MADE DECISION TO RELEASE PAIR ON DEC 4, AND RELEASE WAS BEING VIEWED AS GESTURE OF GOODWILL, AT LEAST BY MODERATE INF LEADERS. LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) CONTACT TOLD EMBOFF MORNING DEC 7 THAT RELEASE WAS "INTERESTING" BUT DID NOT CHANGE MUCH AND ASKED TO

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OPTIONAL FORM 1[illegible]
(Formerly FS-4[illegible]
January
Dept. d[illegible]

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GET IN TOUCH MORNING DEC 8.

2. MINATCHI SAID INF HAD ALREADY MADE PLANS TO PARTICIPATE IN LARGE DEMONSTRATION BEING ORGANIZED BY AYATOLLAH TALEQANI TO BEGIN AT 9 A.M. DEC 10. ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, DEMONSTRATION WILL BEGIN NEAR SHANAZ SQUARE, AT EAST END OF SHAH REZA AND MOVE WEST, BEING JOINED BY GROUPS WHICH WILL FORM UP AT OTHER LOCATIONS IN CITY. MINATCHI SAID IDEA WAS TO HAVE MASSIVE EFFORT; COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF) HAD PLANNED SEPARATE HUMAN RIGHTS MARCH FOR SAME DAY BUT HAD GIVEN UP IDEA WHEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS OPTED FOR LARGE-SCALE, ALL-HANDS EFFORT. MINATCHI THOUGHT MOST OPPOSITION GROUPS WOULD PARTICIPATE.

3. EMBOFF WAS CALLED FROM LONDON BY JOURNALIST WHO WISHED TO CONFIRM STORY THAT U.S. PROFESSOR RICHARD COTTAM, WHO IS CLOSE TO INF LEADERS, WAS IN IRAN. EMBOFF EXPRESSED IGNORANCE OF MATTER. TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, COTTAM IS NOT HERE. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF DEPARTMENT COULD DISCREETLY CONFIRM HIS PRESENCE IN PITTSBURGH.

SULLIVAN

OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 197
Dept. of Stat

Ali AMINI — IRAN
(Phonetic: ahmeeNEE)

Former Prime Minister

Addressed as:
Dr. Amini

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE

A moderate and an anti-Communist, Ali Amini has been attempting to return to office since shortly after he resigned under extreme pressure following 14 months as Prime Minister during 1961-62. He has no real power base, but he has many friends in the opposition and might be acceptable as the leader of a national conciliation government. Two possibly insurmountable factors working against him are his personal and political estrangement from the Shah for almost two decades and the widespread--though apparently invalid--suspicion in Iran that he is a pawn of the United States. (In truth, he blamed the United States for bringing about his 1962 resignation from office and subsequently commented that this country was a bad enemy and a worse friend.) Recently, the Shah did sound out Amini on the possibility of accepting the prime ministership, but Amini insisted on control of the armed forces and SAVAK (National Intelligence and Security Organization), conditions that would have left the monarch powerless. (S)

Amini's Program

If his past record and recent public and private statements are true indications of his beliefs, Amini would be a reformer rather than a revolutionary, if he became Prime Minister again. He refuses to condone anarchy and would continue martial law--with significantly less resort to force--for an indefinite period. He would take whatever measures were necessary to keep the oil fields operating. He would dissolve the present Parliament and hold new elections to establish a healthy democratic climate in which the needs

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(cont.)

of the people could be met in accordance with the law. He favors a government of technicians but would probably have to include a sampling of politicians and religious representatives if they helped him back to power. Blaming much of the present crisis on ill-conceived economic policies and erratic economic planning, he would probably cut defense spending to finance additional development. He would attempt to adopt policies--such as further land reform--that would encourage a more equitable distribution of the nation's wealth. He would also attempt to halt the flight of capital out of the country. He says he would investigate all charges of official corruption over the past 15 years and prosecute all offenders. In early 1978 Amini was supporting the Shah's continuance in power; by September he was "regretfully" calling for his resignation; and in early November he seemed bent on a constitutional monarchy--at least for the present. (S)

Early Life and Career

Amini has a doctorate in law and economics from the University of Paris. After a series of judicial and governmental financial posts, he was elected to Parliament in 1947. He has served as Minister of National Economy (1950-51), of Finance (1953-55), and of Justice (1955). He was Ambassador to the United States during 1955-58. (U)

When Amini became Prime Minister in May 1961, Iran was in the midst of its most acute political crisis since 1953. He dissolved Parliament, announced sweeping reforms, and arrested numerous military and government officials on charges of corruption. His tenure was a whirlwind of reform with little support from anyone except the Shah--and that was uncertain. Amini accomplished a great deal; but in July 1962, differences with the Shah, a financial-budgetary crisis, civil disorders related to the postponement of elections, and personal exhaustion led to his resignation. (C)

After his resignation, Amini was kept under police surveillance and prevented from opposition political activity--he was threatened with prosecution for corrupt land dealings that apparently

involved his wife and other family members. (He seems to be personally honest.) In the late 1960s, the government sought to discredit him with the old charges of corruption and for serving as an agent for foreign oil companies. He apparently spent the next decade managing and increasing his substantial, inherited wealth and exploring ways to return to power. (C)

Personal Data

Amini, 71, sometimes speaks without considering the consequences, and he may have a vindictive streak. He has a good sense of humor and is an intelligent conversationalist. He has traveled widely in the United States, Europe and the Middle East. His mother was a member of the Qajar dynasty that ruled Iran until the father of the present Shah helped overthrow it in 1921. Amini speaks fluent French and adequate English. (C)

8 December 1978

IRAN

Karim SANJABI
(Phonetic: sanjaBEE)

Secretary General, Executive Committee, National Front (since September 1978)

Addressed as:
Mr. Sanjabi

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE

On 23 August 1978 Karim Sanjabi announced the resurrection of the National Front coalition of the 1950s as the Iran National Front (usually referred to as the National Front--NF). The present NF, while untested in terms of popular support, is the largest and most extensively organized political opposition group in Iran. Sanjabi describes the new NF as a formal organization but not a formal political party. The old NF supported Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq in his power struggle with the Shah. After the downfall of Mosadeq in 1953, many NF members fled the country and moved to Europe or the United States; Sanjabi stayed in Iran. In 1977, after many years of enforced inactivity and in response to indications of political liberalization, he began the task of rejuvenating the NF. (C)

In his August 1978 announcement, Sanjabi bitterly attacked the Shah personally and called his political liberalization program a sham. In later statements he declared that the NF would boycott any future elections unless they were "free," and he demanded an investigation into the fortunes amassed by some Iranians. He said that he had no objection to the continuation of the monarchy--provided that it was a truly constitutional one--and that the government would have to choose between real democracy and military rule. Sanjabi declared that the NF demanded three elements in any future government: nationalism, democracy and socialism. (U)

In October 1978 Sanjabi flew to Paris to see exiled religious opposition leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose following far outnumbers that of the NF. There they issued a joint statement that contained three points: the monarchy must not be

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supported; the "national-Islamic movement" could not approve an illegal monarchy; the government should be based on democratic principles approved by a referendum. Sanjabi returned to Iran on 10 November and issued a hardline statement rejecting any coalition or cooperation with the Shah and the government; he claimed that he had reached an understanding (and he may have formed an alliance) with Khomeini. On the following day he was arrested, a government action that clearly was meant to encourage moderate opposition politicians and to discourage those opposition leaders who were considering overthrowing the Shah. Sanjabi was released on 6 December. (C)

The National Front

The NF is an umbrella organization of several groups whose members are mostly white-collar, middle-class professionals. NF members are generally united in calling for the Shah's adherence to the Consitution of 1906, but they differ widely otherwise. Some are willing to work with the Shah in the hope of obtaining some power in the projected June 1979 elections; others are willing to participate in the elections but want to reduce the Shah's powers substantially; and the most radical members want the Shah to step down. Sanjabi apparently decided to cast his lot with the NF's most radical component, and this decision led to his meeting with Khomeini and his subsequent arrest. (C)

Early Life and Career

Karim Sanjabi was born in 1904. A Kurd, he is a member of the Sanjabi tribe. At the age of 13, he was exiled with other members of the tribe to Baghdad for three years. (During World War II he and some relatives, including his father, were arrested by the British occupation forces; to this day Sanjabi detests the British and the military.) He received a law degree from Tehran University in 1928 and then spent the next seven years in France, where he received a doctorate in law from the University of Paris. (His thesis was entitled *Agricultural Reform in Iraq*.) Returning to Iran, he entered the Ministry of Education in 1935, then moved to the Ministry of Finance in 1940. In the mid-1940s he helped found the Iran Party, which later became a major component of the NF. A

successful and highly paid attorney in Tehran, he became dean of the Law Faculty of Tehran University in 1944 and vice president of that faculty in 1946. (C)

An early supporter of Mosadeq, Sanjabi worked closely with him during the period of his ascendancy. After the Prime Minister was overthrown, Sanjabi went into hiding. Later he was removed from his university position and imprisoned. On his release, he stayed out of politics for a while. He resumed political activity in 1960, however, and became a member of the Central Committee of the Iran Party; he also returned to the university. He was arrested again in 1961, released, rearrested in 1963, and released in 1965. Emerging from this last imprisonment physically and mentally exhausted, he returned to Tehran University as a professor but avoided political activity. He remained out of the limelight until the events of 1978 permitted the NF to regroup after a hiatus of 25 years. (C)

Personal Data

Sanjabi is soft spoken but direct. He speaks Kurdish, French, and Arabic and reads a little English. Sanjabi is married. He and his wife, Fakhri, have three children. (U)

8 December 1978

45

Naser MINATCHI
(Phonetic: meeNAchee)

IRAN

National Front Leader

Addressed as:
Mr. Minatchi

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE

Lawyer and human rights activist Naser Minatchi is one of two "bosses" of the Tehran bazaar, a traditional power base of the Islamic opposition. He is also treasurer of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedom (CDHRF). As head of the board of directors of the Hoseyenyeh Ershad Religious Center in Tehran, he has for some time been a behind-the-scenes supporter of the moderate religious opposition leaders, and he is a close friend of Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari. (The center was recently reopened after being closed five years ago because of speeches made there against the Shah.) (S)

The sensible and moderate Minatchi supported the regime of Prime Minister (August-November 1978) Jafar Sharif-Emami and asserted that the moderate religious opposition should work with the government toward political liberalization. He believes that the Shah is the protector of Iran against anarchy and Communism. In October 1978 he traveled to Paris to see religious opposition leader Ayatollah Ruhollam Khomeini, and he is now looking for a way around Khomeini's extremist demands. He believes that Khomeini's demands can be defused and the Constitution saved if the moderate religious leaders support a program whereby the Shah leaves the country and a council of state takes over that would support a government of national reconciliation with a mandate to hold elections as soon as possible. (S)

Minatchi has long felt that his human rights efforts have left him "exposed," and as "protection" he has been doggedly seeking official US endorsement of his activities. He visited Washington in August 1978 for talks with human rights officials at the State Department. He has been candid and informative with US Embassy officials in Tehran. (S)

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Medhi PIRASTEH
(Phonetic: peeRAsteh)

IRAN

Leader, Constitutional Defenders Front (since August 1978)

Addressed as:
Mr. Pirasteh

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE

Medhi Pirasteh is a flamboyant opportunist. When he founded the Constitutional Defenders Front as his own political group, claiming support from 300 Iranians, he announced that its purpose was "to fight for the cause of effective implementation of the Constitution in compliance with the teaching of Islam." In an October 1978 conversation with US officials, he said that his program included reaching an accommodation with the religious opposition that would separate it from other anti-Shah elements--and presumably ally it with him; pursuing a more effective anticorruption campaign; and reforming bureaucratic procedures in order to benefit the common people. (C)

Pirasteh has good relations with the Shi'a community and claims to have secured the release from jail of several followers of exiled religious opposition leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Pirasteh has wanted to be Prime Minister for many years and allegedly has good contacts in the Palace, but his last important government positions were as Ambassador to Iraq during 1964-67 and to Belgium during 1967-71--posts he himself considered exile. He seems to be well disposed toward the United States, but this attitude may result from a belief that this country has considerable influence in internal Iranian affairs. Some US Embassy officers in Tehran suspect that he is a British agent. (C)

Career

Pirasteh claims to have a doctorate from Tehran University, but he probably has just a law degree. After 14 years in the court system and the Ministry of Justice, he was appointed public

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REASON CGB (1)(3)(7)

prosecutor in Tehran in 1946. He quickly showed a talent for graft, embezzlement, political intrigue, and doing favors for the right people, including several associated with Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister. Entering Parliament in 1948, he proved to be a staunch follower of the Shah during the latter's battles with Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mosadeq. Later, as governor general of Fars (1959-61) and Khuzestan (1962-63), he was an effective administrator with a flair for adopting popular causes. He served as Minister of Interior in 1963. (C)

Personal Data

Pirasteh, about 71, is devious, dishonest, intellectually shallow, long-winded, publicity hungry, boastful and sometimes crude. He is a man of action, however, and he does have a record of some accomplishment. He speaks adequate English, but he is more comfortable using French. (C)

8 December 1978

Ahmad BANI-AHMAD
(Phonetic: bahnee AHmahd)

IRAN

Leader, Unity for Freedom Party

Addressed as:
Mr. Bani-Ahmad

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE

Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, a veteran educator and a member of the Majles (lower house of Parliament) since 1975, resigned his seat as Deputy from Tabriz on 9 November 1978 to protest government policies. A political gadfly, he has been critical of recent governments. He disputed casualty figures published by the government of then Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami after demonstrations in September 1978 and went on a hunger strike that lasted until the government resigned. In October he called for the scrapping of plans to purchase two nuclear reactors from France, charging that corruption and irregularities were involved in the decision to make the purchase. Bani-Ahmad favors the formation of a Cabinet of national unity as a means of returning stability to the country, and he has blamed the government of Prime Minister Qolam Reza Azhari for failing to end internal disturbances. He is politically ambitious and appears to have channels of communication to other political leaders and to the bazaars, traditional Islamic centers of power. (C)

A former member of the now moribund Resurgence of the People of Iran (RPPI) Party, created by the Shah to advance his Shah-people revolution, Bani-Ahmad announced the formation of his own political group in July 1978 but did not announce his withdrawal from the RPPI until August 1978, when he became convinced that he could withdraw with impunity and create his own party. Like other new Iranian parties, his Unity for Freedom Party--leftist with socialist leanings--is largely elitist, has few adherents, and is without a program. In October, while in Rome attending a "Non-Communist Iranian Students Congress," Bani-Ahmad announced that the party would apply for membership in the Socialist International. (C)

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Bani-Ahmad was born into a well-known and respected family in Rezaiyeh. After receiving a diploma in literature from the Rezaiyeh Teachers College, he served successively as teacher, principal and superintendent of various area schools. During the 1950s, following completion of his military service, he was acting manager of the Education Department and director of the Religious Endowments Office. (C)

Bani-Ahmad, about 58, has written three books. He speaks Turkish and English. (U)

8 December 1978

Abdol Karim LAHIJI
(Phonetic: laheeJEE)

IRAN

National Front Leader

Addressed as:
Mr. Lahiji

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE

A leading dissident lawyer, Abdol Karim Lahiji has defended many human rights cases and is a prominent oppositionist member of the Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights. He was briefly hospitalized with bruises in April 1978, not long after he had defended 11 students in a civilian court trial. (C)

CR M 78-16656
8 December 1978

ORIGINAL CL BY 004050
REVW ON 2 Dec 1998
EXT BYND 6 YRS BY 004050
REASON CGB (1)(3)

Mohammad DERAKHSHESH (Phonetic: dehrankSHESH) — IRAN

Former National Union Party Leader

Addressed as:
Mr. Derakshesh

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

Political opposition leader Mohammad Derakhshesh served briefly in 1961 as Minister of Education. In 1973 he was named spokesman of the then newly formed National Union Party, which favored implementation of the Shah-people revolution. Derakhshesh was also once a leader of the now disbanded Mehregan Club and was a close friend of the late Amir Asadollah Alam, former Prime Minister and close friend of the Shah. (S)

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8 December 1978

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EXT BYND 6 YRS BY 004050
REASON CGB (1)(3)(7)

Kazem SHARIAT-MADARI (Phonetic: shareeAHT-mahdaREE) — IRAN

Religious Opposition Leader

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

Kazem Shariat-Madari is an ayatollah (prominent leader) and has long been one of the senior figures in Shi'a Islam. During the 11 months of demonstrations, civil disturbances and riots that started in January 1978, he has emerged as the public spokesman for the religious opposition and as the most influential Shi'a clergyman in the country. In September 1978 Shariat-Madari reportedly declared himself the "sole" Shi'a leader. If he has indeed assumed that title, it will undoubtedly cause friction with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who also claims it. (Khomeini has lived in exile for 14 years; he is an uncompromising foe of the Shah and calls for the end of the dynasty.) The religious community in Iran is more fragmented than Western observers had previously assumed, and jealousy among its leaders is common. These divisions and rivalries may have become less noticeable in the current anti-Shah campaign, but they remain. (C)

Unlike many of his fellow clergymen, Shariat-Madari is not opposed to modernization; he favors the incorporation of selected Western concepts into Islam and insists that he is not against all change. His central complaint against the government centers on Article 27 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907. This article provides for the examination of all legislation by five prominent religious leaders for conformity with Islamic law and implies clerical veto power over both the Parliament and the sovereign. In his drive toward modernization, the Shah has simply ignored Article 27; Shariat-Madari asserts that the spiritual leaders must be able to exercise their legally mandated voice in formulating legislation and supervising its implementation. (C)

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REASON CGB (1)(3)(7)

In the past Shariat-Madari has been more willing to compromise with the Shah than has Khomeini. Caught up in the events of the last three months, however, he seems to have taken a more militant stance. He characterized the military government formed by Gen. Qolam Reza Azhari on 6 November 1978 as no different from its predecessors except in tactics, and he warned of grave consequences unless it was replaced by a civilian government. He has even begun to echo Khomeini's call for an Islamic republic in which the Shi'a clergy would exert great influence and power. He maintains that this form of government would be democratic because the overwhelming majority of Iranians are Muslims. (C)

Early Life and Career

The son of a clerical family, Kazem Shariat-Madari was born in about 1902. He began his early religious education in his hometown of Tabriz and later studied in the Iranian holy cities of Qom and Meshed and the Iraqi holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. In the early 1960s he won recognition as a mojtahed (religious scholar) and then achieved the status of a marjeh (a preeminent clergyman who has the right to command the faithful and whose religious instructions should be followed). Eventually he achieved the title of ayatollah. His main political base was in the Tabriz bazaar, but his influence radiated throughout Tabriz and Azerbaijan--bazaar merchants have contributed heavily to both Shariat-Madari and Khomeini. Shariat-Madari developed a secondary base in Qom, where he now heads a religious school that is one of the most respected in Shi'a Islam. (Qom is a bustling, commercial city southwest of Tehran, as well as a center of pilgrimages and learning; alcohol, gambling, movies, and women in modern dress are not permitted there. It was a clash between religious forces and police in Qom that began Iran's year of turmoil.) (C)

Personal Data

Shariat-Madari is a serene man who invariably dresses in black and light-gray robes and wears the black turban that marks him as a descendant of Ali, the leading imam of the Shi'as. He speaks Arabic and is an expert on Shi'a commercial law. The ayatollah is married; it is not known whether he has any children. (U)

8 December 1978

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CHRGE: STATE 12/8/78
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INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0799
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 1891
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0186
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1780
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4163
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1169
RUEMCD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0620
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3622
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3848
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5010
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0250
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4733
RUEDC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4042
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1178
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1288
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0596
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3271
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3478
RUFHRC/AMEMBASSY ROME 1150
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0774
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUSNAAA/USCINCPAC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12050

E.O. 12065: GDS 12-8-78 (PERET, W.G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL/SECURITY REPORT, DEC. 8, 1978

1. LAST NIGHT CONTINUED RELATIVE LULL IN DISTURBANCES IN TEHRAN. DEMONSTRATION WITH SHOOTING WAS REPORTED IN JALEH SQUARE AFTER CURFEW, BUT VERY LITTLE CHANTING OR SHOOTING WAS REPORTED IN NORTH TEHRAN. ARSONISTS THREW FIREBOMB INTO HOME OF ASST AIR ATTACHE BUT IT FAILED TO IGNITE. FIREBOMB WAS ALSO THROWN INTO BRITISH RESIDENCE BUT DID NO DAMAGE. CONSULATE SHIRAZ REPORTS INCREASED CROWD NOISE AND SHOOTING AFTER CURFEW FOR PAST TWO NIGHTS. LOCAL SECURITY FORCES SAY IT IS ALL TAPE RECORDED BUT THIS IS UNLIKELY, SINCE ELECTRICAL POWER HAS BEEN OUT FOR MUCH OF THIS PERIOD. SOME OF THE DISTURBANCES HAVE BEEN REAL. TROOPS HAVE BEGUN BREAKING INTO HOUSES, APPARENTLY IN PURSUIT OF DEMONSTRATORS. POWER OUTAGES HAVE BECOME UNUSUALLY LONG; LAST NIGHT'S OUTAGE, FROM 2100-0130 AND AGAIN STARTING AT 0330, WAS CONTINUING IN SOME SECTIONS OF TOWN AT MIDDAY. CONSULATE ISFAHAN REPORTS PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION YESTERDAY. BOMB EXPLODED NEXT TO APART OF AMCIT LAST NIGHT. HEAVY GUNFIRE WAS EVIDENT NIGHT OF DEC 5-6 BUT DID NOT RECUR LAST NIGHT. A FEW MORE SHOPS OPENED YESTERDAY, EVEN A BANK. MOST SHOPS REMAINED CLOSED. POWER WAS OF COURSE CUT AGAIN, AS IT WAS IN TEHRAN TOO. CONSULATE TABRIZ REPORTS MODERATELY HEAVY FIRING IN BAZAAR AND GOLFSTAN PARK AREA THIS MORNING.

2. TODAY REMAINS GENERALLY QUIET. NO DISTURBANCES ARE

REPORTED IN TEHRAN. EMBASSY ANNOUNCEMENT THAT DEPENDENTS CAN FLY TO UNITED STATES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE HAS INEVITABLY CAUSED A STIR. WE ARE EMPHASIZING THIS IS NO EVACUATION, BUT NERVOUS AMCIT COMMUNITY IS IN PART DETERMINED TO HEAR WHAT IT WANTS TO HEAR. SPECIAL PAN AM FLIGHT WILL LEAVE AT MIDNIGHT TONIGHT FOR ISTANBUL, CARRYING NONOFFICIAL AMCITS WHO WISH TO LEAVE AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE.

3. TWO DAYS BEFORE SUNDAY, BEING HERALDED AS GREAT DAY OF CONFRONTATION, THERE IS MUCH POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN DIRECTION OF NONVIOLENT COMPROMISE. THESE EFFORTS ARE SIGNIFICANT BUT WE REMAIN SKEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER THEY CAN DEFUSE SITUATION AT THIS LATE DATE. DR. NASSER MINATCHI OF COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM TOLD EMBASSY THAT RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND GOI HAVE AGREED ON PEACFUL SCENARIO FOR SUNDAY--MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES TO PERMIT MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO KEEP IT PEACEFUL AND RELIGIOUS, REPELLING ANY RADICAL ELEMENTS WHO ATTEMPT TO PARTICIPATE. AGREEMENT WAS OBTAINED THROUGH GOOD OFFICES OF ALI AMINI. MARCHERS WILL ASSEMBLY AT EIGHT POINTS: SEYED KHADAN BRIDGE ON OLD SHEMIRAN ROAD; SHAHNAZ SQUARE; SHAHREZA AT OLD SHEMIRAN ROAD (THIS WILL BE THE TALEGHANI GROUP); ARK SQUARE, JUST NORTH OF BAZAAR (THIS WILL BE THE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION GROUP); CUSTOMS HOUSE SQUARE; SHAH SQUARE EAST OF BAZAAR; KENNEDY SQUARE IN WEST TEHRAN, AND VANAK SQUARE. ALL GROUPS WILL HEAD FOR SHAHREZA AT OLD SHEMIRAN ROAD FOR MARCH WEST ON SHAHREZA TO SHAHYAD MONUMENT. MARCH IS EXPECTED TO LAST FROM 0900 TO 1500. (COMMENT: IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING SOME KHOMEINI PEOPLE, IF NOT KHOMEINI HIMSELF, SAYS IT HAS ACHIEVED AGREEMENT WITH REGIME, WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT ABILITY OF SHARIATMADARI OR OTHER RELIGIOUS MODERATES TO CONTROL RADICALS. IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR PROVOCATEURS TO TRANSFORM MARCH INTO BLOODY CONFRONTATION.)

4. IRANIAN PRESS SOURCE, NOT CONSIDERED WHOLLY RELIABLE,
BT
#2050

NNNN

O 081445Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2100
INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0800
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 1892
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0187
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1791
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4164
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1190
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0621
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3623
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3849
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5011
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0251
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4734
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4043
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1179
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1289
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0597
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3272
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3479
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1151
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0775
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12050

CHRGE: STATE 12/8/78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:WGPERETT:JI
CLEAR: 1.POL:GMLAMBRAK
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM USIC
OR ADMIN SY-2
AFOSI DAO

TOLD EMBOFF HE MET YESTERDAY WITH PRIMIN AZHARI, WHO SAID 50 PROMINENT PEOPLE CARRIED LETTER TO QOM THE DAY BEFORE, ASKING AYATOLLAHS TO CALM THE MULTITUDES. SOURCE SAID SHARIATMADARI, GOLPAYAGANI, AND NAJAFI MAY ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE TO THAT EFFECT, URGING PEACFUL, RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE OF MOHARRAM AND CAUTIONING AGAINST DESIGNS OF SUBVERSIVES. OTHER REPORTS WE HAVE (SEPTELS) INDICATE CONSIDERABLE DOUBT IN SHARIATMADARI'S MIND AS TO EXACT ACTIONS TO TAKE.

5. LMI REPRESENTATIVE TAVASSOLI (PROTECT) ALSO REPORTED SIGNS OF ACCOMMODATION TO EMBOFF TODAY, NOTING FOR EXAMPLE, THAT TROOPS HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM HEDAYAT MOSQUE AND OTHERS WHERE OPPOSITION NATIONAL FRONT MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELD. HE CONFIRMED THAT UNDERGROUND CELLS ARE ARMING THEMSELVES BUT DOUBTED THEY WOULD TAKE ACTION.
NATIONAL FRONT BELIEVES GENERAL KHOSRODAD IS ONE OF COMMITTE OF TWELVE CONSPIRING AGANST IT, AND ALLEGEDLY HELPED ARRANGE THE ARSON OF NOVEMBER 5. REGARDING LARGER QUESTION OF POLITICAL COMPROMISE, TAVASSOLI STATED LMI STILL INSISTS ON REMOVAL OF SHAH AS PRECONDITION. HE ALSO HOPED FOR A PEACFUL MARCH ON SUNDAY AND CALLED ON USG "THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF THE ARMY," TO KEEP TROOPS FROM OPENING FIRE. EMBOFF SHARPLY DISPUTED CHARGE OF "CONTROL" AND SAID USG WILL USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT HAS FOR PEACE.

6. AYATOLLAH SHEIKH NOURI OF TEHRAN TOLD ANOTHER EMBOFF THAT RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY WILL ACCEPT SHAH AS CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH. REGARDING SUNDAY HE SAID RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY WANTS A PEACFUL MARCH AND HOPES GOI FEELS THE SAME. A

COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, BUT SINCE OPPOSITION DOES NOT TRUST THE SHAH, USG SHOULD GUARANTEE THE SETTLEMENT. ANOTHER SOURCE HAS TOLD US AYATOLLAH GHOMI OF MASHAD IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE FOR SHAH WITHIN CONTEXT OF A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.

7. COMMENT: ALL THIS SEEMS TO INDICATE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION BACKING AWAY FROM BLOODY TEST OF STRENGTH. PROBLEMS REMAIN, HOWEVER. A PEACFUL MARCH, EVEN UNDER THE BEST SCENARIO, WOULD INEVITABLY INCLUDE BANNERS AND SHOUTS IN FAVOR OF KHOMEINI AND AGAINST THE SHAH. FURTHERMORE, NO WORD HAS COME FROM PARIS THAT KHOMEINI HIMSELF WANTS A PEACEFUL SUNDAY, AND GOI HAS NOT ALTERED PUBLIC STANCE THAT MARCHES WILL NOT BE PERMITTED. EVEN IF TROOPS HAVE NOT ENFORCED TOUGH LANGUAGE OF MARTIAL LAW DIRECTIVES TO THE LETTER, THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY BROKEN UP CROWDS IN TEHRAN UP TO NOW, USUALLY FIRING OVER THEIR HEADS BUT OCCASIONALLY AT THEM. PERSIAN SUBTLETY IS CLEARLY AT WORK, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT IT WILL BE SUCCESSFUL FOR THE GOVERNMENT. SULLIVAN
BT
#2050

NNNN

O 081633Z DEC 78 CHRGE: STATE 12/8/78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2105 DRFTD: POL:STESCUDERO:
BT CLEAR: 1.POL:GMLAMBRAK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 12055 R: POL AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM USICA
OR ADMIN SY-2
AFOSI DAO CRU

E.O. 12065:RDS-4 12-8-88 (ESCUDERO, S.T.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH AYATOLLAH NOURI

REF: A) TEHRAN 11882 B) C-PR-8-40197

SUMMARY: EMBOFF MET WITH AYATOLLAH YAHYA ALLAMEH NOURI AT HOME OF PROMINENT BAZAARI HAJI KASHANI FOR THREE HOURS EVENING OF DECEMBER 7. AYATOLLAH EXPRESSED MODERATE VIEW OF POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO PRESENT IRANIAN POLITICAL CRISIS INCLUDING WILLINGNESS TO HAVE SHAH REMAIN CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH (BUT NOT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES) PROVIDED U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO SERVE AS GUARANTOR OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. WITHOUT CONFIDING SPECIFIC INFORMATION REGARDING DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR ASHURA, NOURI NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE ISLAMIC AND OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS THAT THEY SHOULD BE PEACEFUL. HE URGED SOME OF HIS SUPPORTERS TO STAY HOME RATHER THAN JOIN IN THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. USE ITS INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN THE BEHAVIOR OF THE IRANIAN SOLDIERY. NOURI WAS RECEPTIVE TO IDEA THAT FURTHER MEETINGS SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITH EMBOFF AND BETWEEN EMBOFF AND OTHER IRANIAN AYATOLLAHS. END SUMMARY.

1. EMBOFF OPENED DISCUSSION WITH STATEMENT OF U.S. POSITION IN SUPPORT OF THE SHAH AND OF SHAH'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE RETENTION OF HIS POSITION AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. EMBOFF NOTED THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT ALSO ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY LEADERS. AFTER LONG DISSERATION ON THE STATE OF CONFLICT WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY EXISTED BETWEEN THE MONARCHY AND THE ISLAMIC ESTABLISHMENT IN IRAN, NOURI STATED THAT THE FIRST PREFERENCE OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WOULD BE THAT THE SHAH SHOULD LEAVE AND THAT THE MONARCHY SHOULD BE SUCCEEDED BY AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. HOWEVER, IF THE GREAT POWERS AND OTHERS INSIST THAT THE SHAH MUST REMAIN AS A CONSTITUTIONAL FIGURE WHO WOULD RULE BUT NOT REIGN, THE ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP WOULD ACCEPT THIS. THERE MUST BE A RETURN TO THE 1906 CONSTITUTION, RATHER THAN THE PRESENT VERSION, WHICH HAS BEEN CORRUPTED THROUGH AMENDMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY. THIS WOULD PRECLUDE A ROLE FOR THE SHAH AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES AS THIS AMENDMENT WAS ADDED AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PAHLAVI CONTROL. MOREOVER, THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT TRUST THE SHAH TO UPHOLD HIS END OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL BARGAIN BUT EXPECT THAT HE WOULD USE WHATEVER OPPORTUNITIES ARISE TO RE-ESTABLISH HIS DICTORIAL POWERS. THEREFORE, NOURI PROPOSED THAT THE UNITED STATES, AS THE FOREIGN POWER WITH THE GREATEST INFLUENCE OVER THE SHAH,

ACT AS GUARANTOR OF THE SHAH'S GOOD FAITH IN ANY CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT.

2. PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THROUGH ELECTION OR REFERENDUM, THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT MUST BE DISSOLVED. NOURI SAID THAT ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP, ACTING TOGETHER, COULD ISSUE A CALL WHICH WOULD BE OBEYED BY THE MAJORITY OF SOLDIERS AND LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS, SO THE U.S. SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE MILITARY TO DICTATE THE SHAPE OF AN IRANIAN SETTLEMENT. FOLLOWING DISSOLUTION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT MUST BE BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND ESTABLISH A GENERAL CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE AMONG THE PEOPLE. (SEVERAL TIMES IN THE CONVERSATION NOURI MADE THE POINT THAT, WHILE THE ISLAMIC CLERGY IS IN MANY WAYS THE LEADER OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, THEY ARE ALSO LED BY THE PEOPLE, AND THE CLERGY WOULD QUICKLY BE ABANDONED BY THE PEOPLE IF THEY SHOULD SUDDENLY PROVE TO BE TOO MODERATE OR OTHERWISE OUT OF STEP.) NOURI BELIEVED THE ESSENCE OF ANY TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE A REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF 100-150 MEN WHO WOULD BE "INTRODUCED" TO THE PEOPLE BY THE ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP. THE COUNCIL WOULD BE MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, THE UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY, THE ISLAMIC ESTABLISHMENT, AND "OTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY." ITS MEMBERSHIP WOULD BE CHOSEN BY THE PEOPLE (MANNER NOT PRESCRIBED) AND WHILE ITS DUTIES WERE SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR, IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT NOURI INTENDS THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE PRINCIPAL IRANIAN DECISION-MAKING BODY.

3. NOURI SAID THAT IRANIANS UNDER A CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM WOULD WANT TO RETAIN THEIR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND THE WEST WHILE KEEPING THEIR DISTANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. HE HOPED THAT SOME MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP COULD BE DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE PRICE OF OIL AND THE PRICE OF ITEMS IMPORTED FROM THE WEST BY IRAN, BUT HE DID NOT ELABORATE ON THIS STATEMENT. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, NOURI SAID THAT THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IS NOT CONCERNED BY THE PRESENCE OF SOME LEFTIST ADVISORS AROUND KHOMEINI.
BT
#2055

NNNN

0 081633Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2106
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 12055

CHRGE: STATE 12/8/78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:STESCUDERO:
CLEAR: 1.POL:GMLAMBRAK
OR POL AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM USICA
OR ADMIN SY-2
AFOSI DAO CRU

E.O. 12065:RDS-4 12-8-88 (ESCUDERO, S.T.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH AYATOLLAH NOURI

PERHAPS 97 PERCENT OF ALL IRANIANS ARE MUSLIM AND OF THE FEW WHO CLAIM ALSO TO BE COMMUNISTS, SURELY NO MORE THAN 5 PERCENT, THEIR ALLEIGANCE IS TO A SORT OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM RATHER THAN TO THE PHILOSOPHIC BASIS FOR COMMUNISM. ISLAM RUNS TOO DEEP IN THE IRANIAN PSYCHE TO BE ROOTED OUT IN FAVOR OF COMMUNISM. FEARS THAT THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH WOULD LEAD TO A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN IRAN ARE GROUNDLESS AND HAVE BEEN FOSTERED BY THE SHAH'S REGIME IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE WESTERN SUPPORT FOR IMPERIAL SURVIVAL.

4. EMBOFF THEN ASKED, HYPOTEHTICALLY, WHAT ROLE KHOMEINI WOULD PLAY SHOULD AN AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON CHANGES TO THE IRANIAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE WHICH ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE MASS OF THE IRANIAN POEPLE AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE INTERNAL ISLAMIC ESTABLISHMENT? IF MOST OR ALL OTHER IRANIAN POLITICAL ELEMENTS SHOULD AGREE TO AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH INCLUDES A PLACE FOR THE SHAH CONTRARY TO KHOMEINI'S DEMANDS, WOULD THE INTERNAL ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP GO TO KHOMEINI AND TELL HIM THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, WITH THEIR SUPPORT, REGARDLESS OF HIS POSITION? NOURI, PERHAPS NOT WANTING HIS FOLLOWERS TO UNDERSTAND, REPLIED IN BROKEN ENGLISH, "THAT WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND VERY DIFFICULT. SOMETHING WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE."

5. DEMONSTRATIONS: NOURI TWICE EVADED DIRECT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHEN AND WHERE THE ASHURA DEMONSTRATIONS ARE TO TAKE PLACE. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT THE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT AND ALL ARE AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD BE PEACFUL IN NATURE. (COMMENT: THIS ACCORDS WITH INFO EMBOFF HAS RECEIVED FROM BAZAARIS. IT COULD BE NO MORE THAN A SMOKESCREEN FOR COVERT VIOLENCE WHICH COULD BE BLAMED ON THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, IF TRUE, A CONSCIOUS POLICY OF NONVIOLENCE DURING ASHURA WOULD APPEAR TO BE A STEP BY THE INTERNAL IRANIAN OPPOSITION AWAY FROM THE EXTREMIST POSITION ESPOUSED BY KHOMEINI. END COMMENT).

6. DURING DISCUSSION OF DEMONSTRATIONS, THE GROUP OF 13 BAZAARIS AND YOUTHS IN ATTENDANCE ON NOURI WAS JOINED BY ANOTHER YOUTH WHO REPORTED A TALE OF VIOLENCE RECENTLY COMMITTED UPON AN IRANIAN WOMAN AND HER CHILDREN BY THE TROOPS. THIS INSPIRED KASHANI, WHO IS SOMETHING OF A FIREBRAND ANYWAY (SEE REFTEL A), TO RECOUNT GORY DETAILS OF TWO ALLEGED INCIDENTS IN TEHRAN AND ONE IN THE HERMAN DIS-

TRICT TOWN OF JINOFT IN WHICH SOLDIERS COMMITTED ARTOCITIES. EMOTIONS RISING, THE YOUNGER ATTENDANTS REQUESTED THE AYATOLLAH TO ORDER TO OPPOSE THE TROOPS WITH GUNS. NOURI, WHO NEVER RAISED HIS VOICE DURING THE DISCUSSION BUT WHOSE AUTHORITY, AT LEAST OVER THIS SMALL GROUP, REPLIED THAT SUCH A COURSE WOULD SERVE NO PURPOSE. ACCORDING TO NOURI, THERE ARE THREE POSSIBILITIES ON ASHURA: THE PEOPLE DEMONSTRATE BUT ARE NOT SHOT BY THE SOLDIERS; THE PEOPLE DEMONSTRATE BUT ARE SHOT; THE PEOPLE DEMONSTRATE BY STAYING HOME. NOURI CLEARLY PREFERRED THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE. THE SECOND, HE SAID, WOULD BE SUICIDAL AS THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD REPLY TO GUNFIRE WITH TANKS AND OTHER MODERN HEAVY WEAPONS. "WHEN I ORDER YOU TO FIGHT THE GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS, I WANT YOU TO BE AS WELL ARMED AS THEY ARE." HOWEVER, EVERYONE KNOWS THAT THE SHIA DEMONSTRATE IN THE STREETS ON ASHURA. IF EVERYONE REMAINED HOME THE WORLD WOULD KNOW THAT THIS WAS DUE TO THE TYRANNY OF THE PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME AND THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A GREATER AND MORE EFFECTIVE DEMONSTRATION THAN ANYTHING WHICH COULD BE STAGED IN THE STREETS. THE EYES OF THE ENTIRE ISLAMIC WORLD ARE ON IRAN AND ON THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE FAITH AND THE MONARCHY. IF WE ARE DEFEATED IN IRAN, IT WILL CONSTITUTE A DEFEAT FOR ALL OF ISLAM AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN MUSLIM NATIONS MIGHT BECOME EMBOLDENED TO ACT AGAINST THE FAITH." (COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT THE AYATOLLAH WAS INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF THE ASHURA DEMONSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, AT THIS LATE DATE EXHORTATIONS TO HIS PEOPLE TO REMAIN HOME ON DECEMBER 10 WOULD APPEAR TO BE OF LITTLE USE. END COMMENT.)

7. FINALLY, NOURI EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT VIOLENCE ON ASHURA MIGHT ORIGINATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE COULD IMPERIL ANY CHANCES FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE SHAH TO PREVENT FIRING ON THE DEMONSTRATORS. EMBOFF MADE NO COMMENT ON THIS REQUEST.

8. EMBOFF SHOWED NOURI A LETTER, REPUTEDLY FROM AYATOLLAH KHOI IN NAJAF, URGING THE PECPLE TO BEHAVE WITH MODERATION IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REGIME AND ASKED IF THIS

BT
#2055

NNNN

O 081633Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2107
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 TEHRAN 12055

CHRGE: STATE 12/8/78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:STESCUDER
CLEAR: 1.POL:GMLAMBR
OR: FOL AMB D
ECON-2 PM USI
OR ADMIN SY-2
AFOSI DAO CRU

WOULD AFFECT THE CONDUCT OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS, NOURI CLAIMED THAT THE LETTER IS A REISSUE BY KHOI'S FOLLOWERS OF A TWO-YEAR-OLD ORIGINAL. HE THEN NOTED THAT THE EMPRESS' EARLIER VISIT TO KHOI HAD BEEN ARRANGED BY THE GO IRAQ WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO KHOI. THE AYATOLLAH WAS OBLIGED TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINTS FROM IRANIANS THAT HE ROSE FROM HIS SICKBED TO FIND FARAH AT HIS DOOR AND WOULD NOT HAVE AGREED TO SEE HER HAD HE KNOWN IN ADVANCE THAT SHE WAS COMING. (COMMENT: WHILE REST OF THIS STORY ACCORDS WITH EMBASSY INFO FROM OTHER SOURCES, THIS IS FIRST ASSERTION THAT KHOI LETTER WAS REISSUE BY OTHERS OF OLD ORIGINAL.)

9. HAVING REF B IN MIND, EMBOFF ASKED IF NOURI COULD SUPPLY SOME TRAINING MATERIALS USED AT VARIOUS ISLAMIC THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS IN IRAN. NOURI AGREED TO DO SO IN ORDER TO INCREASEUSG UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM. AGED ABOUT FORTY AND SOMEWHAT PLUMP, NOURI IS A PRODUCT OF THE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS OF QOM, MASHAD, AND NAJAF. HOWEVER, HE ALSO HOLDS TWO BACHELORS DEGREES AND A DOCTROATE IN ISLAMIC LAW FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. HE NOTED THAT SOME 25 YEARS OF STUDY WERE REQUIRED BEFORE HE WAS RECOGNIZED AS AN AYATOLLAH AND THAT, IN ADDITION TO LEARNING, A REPUTATION FOR GOOD WORKS IS ALSO A PREREQUISITE. IN NOURI'S CASE, HE HAS ENDOWED A HOSPITAL, FIVE CLINICS, AND SEVERAL LESSER RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS IN HIS HOME DISTRICT. NOURI IS BY NO MEANS THE STEREOTYPE OF THE OBSCURANTIST MULLAH WHICH EMBOFF HAD RATHER EXPECTED. HE WAS WELL-INFORMED, MODERATE AND CLEARLY IN TUNE WITH OTHER OPPOSITION ELEMENTS. HE WAS IMPRISONED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY WHICH PROBABLY INCREASED HIS STANDING AMONG THE ISLAMIC HIEARCHY. HE WAS PRINCIPAL AYATOLLAH AT JALEH SQUARE DURING BLOODY CLASH ON SEPT 8. REPORTEDLY, HE TRIED TO HAVE CROWD DISPERSE IN FACE OF MILITARY BUT WAS IGNORED. IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TOASSESS HIS IMPORTANCE RELATIVE TO OTHER SECOND-RANK AYATOLLAHS SUCH AS TALAGHANI. HE TRIES TO PROJECT A HUMBLE AIR AND IS NOT ARROGANT IN HIS BEHAVIOR TOWARDS HIS FOLLOWERS. HOWEVER, EMBOFF SUSPECTS THAT MUCH OF HIS HUMILITY IS A SHAM REQUIRED BY HIS POSITION. NOURI IS CLEARLY PROUD OF HIS LEARNING AND THE FACT THAT HE HAS PUBLISHED 17 BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS, SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSLATED INTO EUROPEAN AND ORIENTAL LANGUAGES. HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE STRONG ANTI-ISRAELI VIEWS (AS DO HIS COLLEAGUES) AS EVIDENCED BY HIS PAMPHLET ON ISRAELI "CRIMES" IN LEBANON (POUCHED TO INR/OIL/B BECAUSE IT CONTAINS GOOD PHOTO OF NOURI) BUT ONLY REFERENCE TO ISRAEL WHICH AROSE IN CONNECTION WAS HIS REMARK THAT UNREPRESENTATIVE IRANIAN REGIME HAD DECIDED TO INTERVENE IN WAR IN DOFAR AND TO SELL OIL TO ISRAEL WITHOUT CONSULTING PEOPLE.

10. AT CLOSE OF DISCUSSION, NOURI AGREED TO ASSIST EMBOFF IN MEETING OTHER AYATOLLAHS. NOURI NOTED THAT HE WOULD ALSO WANT TO MEET WITH EMBOFF AGAIN, POSSIBLY FOR SIX OR SEVEN HOURS, ONCE HE HAD HAD TIME TO THINK ABOUT RESULTS OF THIS DISCUSSION. SULLIVAN
BT
#2055

NNNN

10 Dec 78 01703

ACTION:
POL 3
INFO:
AMB
DCM
ECON 2
PM
CG
ICA
ADM
CHU 2
S CAM

NNNNVV ESB035BRA525
RR RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #1262/01 3440004
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 090033Z DEC 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 8622
BT

ACTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 311262/01

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/8/84 (CLEMENT, CARL)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: EGHBAL'S GAME PLAN FOR SAVING IRAN
1. CONFIDENTIAL: ENTIRE TEXT--
SUMMARY: EGHBAL PLANS TO START POLITICAL NEWSPAPER IN WHICH, WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE SHAH AND THE GOVERNMENT, HE WILL FIRST ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIME TO ESTABLISH THE PAPER'S CREDIBILITY, AND THEN SET OUT TO DESTROY KHOMEINI AS INFLUENTIAL OPPOSITION LEADER. EGHBAL FEELS THAT SHAH CAN PLAY USEFUL ROLE IN BOTH IMMEDIATE TIME FRAME AND POSSIBLY DURING NEXT YEAR BY EXERCISING INFLUENCE OVER THE MILITARY, AND AS THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY FIGURE WHILE OTHER POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE DEVELOPED. AT THE SAME TIME, EGHBAL IS QUITE READY TO DUMP THE SHAH IF THIS WILL HELP TO SOLVE THE PRESENT CRISIS. HE IS CONVINCED THAT IF THE MILITARY REMAIN IN POWER FOR 6 MONTHS, THEY WILL REFUSE TO GIVE UP POWER. EGHBAL FEELS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT GENERAL DJAM RETURN AT SOME POINT AND TAKE CHARGE OF THE MILITARY AGAIN. HE SEES PRESENT JUSTICE MINISTER NAJAFI AS EXCELLENT, CLEAN CANDIDATE FOR NEXT PRIME MINISTER, PROVIDING NAJAFI RESIGNS FROM PRESENT GOVERNMENT BEFORE HE BECOMES TAINTED.

2. KHOSRO EGHBAL (PROTECT), BROTHER OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND NIOC CHIEF EGHBAL, VISITED NEA/IRN ON DECEMBER 4 AND 6. HE SAID THAT HE INTENDS TO DO WHATEVER HE CAN TO SAVE THE NATION (BUT MADE NO SUCH STATEMENT REGARDING THE SHAH). HIS GAME PLAN IS BASED ON STARTING UP AGAIN A POLITICAL NEWSPAPER WHICH HE USED TO HAVE DURING EARLY WORLD WAR II DAYS. HE WILL DO SO ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE SHAH AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND CLAIM TO HAVE ENLISTED IMAM JOMEI OF TEHRAN AS HIS EMMISARY TO THE SHAH FOR THIS PURPOSE. FOR THE FIRST FEW WEEKS HE WOULD PLAN ON ATTACKING THE GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIME IN GENERAL IN A VIGOROUS FASHION, AND THE SHAH AS WELL, MORE GENTLY. ONCE HAVING ESTABLISHED THE CREDIBILITY OF HIS PAPER, HE WOULD THEN PROCEED TO HIS REAL PUR-

[redacted] IS TO TRY TO ELIMINATE KHOMEINI AS AN INFLUENTIAL OPPOSITION LEADER. EGHBAL SAID THAT ONCE KHOMEINI'S INFLUENCE WAS REDUCED, THE OTHER MULLAHS COULD BE HANDLED BY BUYING THEM OFF. HE RECOUNTED HOW HIS BROTHER, WHILE PRIME MINISTER AND NIOC CHIEF, HAD ALWAYS SPENT SIZEABLE AMOUNTS OF MONEY ON THE MULLAHS. IN EGHBAL'S VIEW, STOPPING SUCH PAYMENTS WAS GRAVEST ERROR THAT AMOUZEGAR MADE DURING HIS TIME AS PRIME MINISTER. EGHBAL IS CONVINCED THAT ALL OF THIS CAN BE DONE WITHIN THE SPAN OF TWO MONTHS.

3. AFTER HE HAS MANAGED TO CUT DOWN KHOMEINI, EGHBAL WOULD LIKE THE RETURN OF RETIRED GENERAL DJAM TO HIS PREVIOUS POSITION AS CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER STAFF. HE FEELS THAT THIS IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL BECAUSE, IN HIS VIEW, DJAM IS THE ONLY ONE WHO COMMANDS THE RESPECT OF NOT ONLY THE MILITARY BUT THE SHAH AND CIVILIANS AS WELL. HE COULD EVEN SEE DJAM IN THE DUAL ROLE NOW PLAYED BY AZHARI. EGHBAL SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED TO GENERAL DJAM IN LONDON. DJAM HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING TO HURT THE SHAH, BUT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF THE NATION NEEDED HIM. EGHBAL'S PREFERENCE, HOWEVER, IS FOR A CIVILIAN AS PRIME MINISTER, AND HIS PRIME CANDIDATE FOR THAT POSITION IS THE PRESENT MINISTER OF JUSTICE NAJAFI. ACCORDINGLY, TO EGHBAL, NAJAFI IS CLEAN AND HIGHLY RESPECTED. EGHBAL MADE THE POINT THAT IF NAJAFI WERE TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER, HE WOULD HAVE TO RESIGN VERY SOON FROM THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, OPENLY DISAGREEING WITH ITS POLICIES. EGHBAL SAID THAT WHEN NAJAFI TOOK ON HIS PRESENT JOB, HE HAD DEMANDED THAT THE POLICE, SAVAK, AND COURT OFFICIALS BE INSTRUCTED BY THE SHAH TO COOPERATE WITH HIM IN THE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION. THE SHAH HAD AGREED, BUT NOTHING HAPPENED. FOUR DAYS LATER NAJAFI HAD SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION, AND HAD ONLY AGREED TO STAY ON AFTER THE CHIEF OF POLICE HAD ACTUALLY COME TO HIM AND TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE SHAH TO COOPERATE. EGHBAL GAVE THIS AS ONE OF SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF WHAT HE TERMED AS THE CONTINUING INSINCERITY OF THE SHAH IN CARRYING OUT PROMISES AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. EGHBAL SAID THAT IF THE SHAH EVER DID BECOME SINCERE, HE COULD THEN GO ON TELEVISION AND CONVINCE THE PEOPLE OF THIS FACT, BUT THAT THE PEOPLE COULD NOT BE FOOLED.

4. EGHBAL FEELS THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE SHAH DO AT LEAST TWO THINGS:

A) ABOLISH SAVAK AS AN ORGANIZATION, SOME OF ITS FUNCTIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT BY THE POLICE AND THE MILITARY;

B) ESTABLISH BY HIMSELF, RATHER THAN THROUGH THE TEHRAN COMMITTEE, THE AMOUNT OF WEALTH THAT ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS HAVE WRONGFULLY AMASSED, AND CONFISCATE ALL OF THEIR PROPERTY IN IRAN AND TURN IT OVER TO THE PEOPLE. EGHBAL ALSO FELT THAT THE SHAH SHOULD DO THE SAME WITH ALL OF HIS PROPERTY IN IRAN.

5. EGHBAL HEATEDLY MADE THE POINT THAT IF WAS SILLY TO TALK ABOUT ANY NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THERE REALLY COULD BE NO COALITION UNDER THE PERSIAN WAY OF DOING THINGS. THERE WOULD JUST BE CONTINUOUS INFIGHTING AND BICKERING WITHOUT SOMEONE IN REAL COMMAND AUTHORITY. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION BY
#1262

CONFIDENTIAL

10Dec78

[redacted]
[redacted]1262/02 [redacted]0095
[redacted]ZZH
[redacted] DEC 78
[redacted]ZE WASHDC
[redacted]MBASSY TEHRAN 8623

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 311262/02

LEADERS HAD THE CAPACITY TO LEAD THE COUNTRY, AND ADDED THAT IN ANY CASE THEY DID NOT REPRESENT ANY LARGE GROUP OF FOLLOWERS. EGHBAL FELT THAT A RELIGIOUS DOMINATED GOVERNMENT HAD NO CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING.

6. EGHBAL IS VERY MUCH AFRAID THAT IF MILITARY CONTINUE IN GOVERNMENT FOR 6 MONTHS, THEY WILL NO LONGER BE WILLING TO GIVE UP THIS POWER. HE DOES NOT CONSIDER A MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO BE A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS FACING IRAN.

7. WHILE PLACING MOST OF THE BLAME FOR THE WAY THINGS HAVE TURNED OUT ON ALAM AND ROUEYDA, EGHBAL IS READY TO SEE THE SHAH GO IF THAT WILL HELP SOLVE THE PRESENT CRISIS. HE MADE THE POINT SEVERAL TIMES THAT ONE MAN CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO ENDANGER THE FUTURE OF AN ENTIRE NATION. AT THE SAME TIME, IF THIS CAN BE WORKED OUT, EGHBAL CAN SEE A USEFUL ROLE FOR THE SHAH FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND POSSIBLY AS LONG AS ONE YEAR. THAT ROLE WILL BE TO MAINTAIN AUTHORITY OVER THE MILITARY AND TO ACT AS THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY FIGURE WHILE NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE CREATED. EGHBAL DID NOT SEE ELECTIONS BY THEMSELVES AS PROVIDING ANY LASTING SOLUTION.

8. WHILE HE DID NOT IN SO MANY WORDS ASK FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS PLAN, IT WAS NEVERTHELESS EVIDENT THAT HE WOULD [redacted] HAVE SUCH SUPPORT. HE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH [redacted] UPON HIS RETURN TO TEHRAN SOMETIME NEXT WEEK. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#1262

NNNNVV ESA377DPA865
OO RUEHHR
DE RUEHC 0185 3440[illegible]5
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 102246Z DEC 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 364
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 312185

EXDIS

E.O.12065 GDS 12/10/84 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PLANS FOR FUTURE

REF: TEHRAN [illegible]

1. WE HAVE SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL.

-- WILL THE CDHRF REPRESENT OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS IN COALITION DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OR IN CONTACTS WITH THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS? (PAR 3 REFTEL).

-- IF THE SHAH IS TO AGREE TO A REGENCY COUNCIL AND THEN DEPART IRAN IS HE TO BE ALLOWED FIRST TO PICK THE MEMBERS OF THE REGENCY COUNCIL? (PARA 4).

-- IS HE ALSO TO BE ALLOWED TO PICK THE NEW CABINET? (PARA 4).

-- DOES THE CDHRF EXPECT THE US AND UK AMBASSADORS TO PRESENT THE LISTS OF THE CABINET AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO THE SHAH FOR HIS SELECTION? ARE THE AMBASSADORS EXPECTED TO ENDORSE THE LIST AND URGE THE SHAH TO ACCEPT IT? (PARA 4).

[illegible] AND IN THE EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR NEGOTIATING THE PEACEFUL MARCH OF DECEMBER 7 DEMONSTRATIONS TO ALI AMINI; OTHER REPORTS HAVE QUESTIONED [illegible] AND ZAHEDI HAS TAKEN CREDIT.) CHRISTOPHER

[illegible]

EXDIS

01791

ACTION:
DCM-2
INFO:
AMB
POL
ADM
CRU-DUMMY
1/CMH

Return to [illegible]

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12096

O 110848Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2137
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1789
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4178
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0628
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1198
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 1900
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0629
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3630
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3857
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5017
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0257
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4743
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4854
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1187
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1295
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0629
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3278
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3487
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1165
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0783
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC
BT

CHRGE: STATE 12-11-78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: AMB:WHSULLIVAN:MLE
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: AMB-2 DCM POL-3
ECON-2 PM USICA
OR ADM ST-2
AFOSI DAO ISA
SHIR TAPR
RF/19

moderate
Oppn.

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12096

E.O. 12065: GDS 12-11-84 (SULLIVAN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJ: 17 POINT OPPOSITION PROGRAM

1. AT END OF THE DAY DECEMBER 10, SEVERAL PRESS SOURCES OBTAINED TEXT OF SEVENTEEN POINT PROGRAM ALLEGEDLY "ENDORSED" BY DEMONSTRATORS DURING SHAHYAD MONUMENT ASSEMBLY. WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE TO VERIFY FACTS CONCERNING THIS PROGRAM, WHICH WAS APPARENTLY DISTRIBUTED TO PRESS BY ANTI-SHAH GROUPS. THERE ARE SOME REPORTS THAT IT WAS MERELY DISTRIBUTED DECEMBER 10 AND WILL BE "PROCLAIMED" DECEMBER 11.

2. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF PROGRAM AS PROVIDED EMBASSY BY LOCAL PRESS REPRESENTATIVE:
1. KHOMEINI IS THE LEADER
2. OVERTHROW OF REGIME
3. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
4. DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
5. ELIMINATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
6. IMPLEMENTATION OF RELIGIOUS DEMANDS
7. WOMEN'S EMANCIPATION
8. FULL WORKERS RIGHTS
9. END MISUSE OF POWER
10. AGRICULTURAL REFORM
11. FULL SUPPORT OF STRIKERS
12. ANTI-POVERTY
13. SHOOTING AT DEMONSTRATORS IS TREASON
14. CLAIMS THAT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IS BEHIND THE MOVEMENT ARE UTTER NONSENSE
15. MORE ON ISLAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12096

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12096

16. RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
17. STRUGGLE SHALL CONTINUE.

3. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHO DREW UP THIS PROGRAM OR WHO SPONSORED IT AT THE DEMONSTRATION. IT HAS THE HARMARKS OF A KHOMEINI TRACT, BUT IS MORE MODERATE ON SEVERAL POINTS THAN THE USUAL KHOMEINI LINE. IT COULD, THEREFORE, EMANATE FROM THE MORE MODERATE OPPOSITION RIDING ON THE KHOMEINI WAVE. SULLIVAN
BT
#2096

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12096

13 DEC 78

01799

NNNNVV ESB005BRA907
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #3310 3462341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 122304Z DEC 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 8670
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 313310

ACTION

ACTION:
POL-3
INFO:
AMB
DCM
EC-2
PM
OR
ADM
ICA
CRU-2
8/GMH

E.O. 12065: GDS (12/12/84 - PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: IR

SUBJECT: REGENCY COUNCIL

COULD YOU PLEASE GIVE US BY OPENING OF BUSINESS WASHINGTON TIME TOMORROW A STATEMENT OF THE BASIS IN IRANIAN LAW FO, THE IDEA OF THE REGENCY COUNCIL. WE SEE NO REFERENCE TO A REGENCY COUNCIL IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1906 OR THE SUPPLEMENTARY LAW OF 1907. PERHAPS WE DO NOT HAVE A VERSION THAT REFLECTS RECENT AMENDMENTS. IN ANY EVENT, COULD YOU TELL US WHAT IRANIAN LAW PRESCRIBES WITH RESPECT TO A REGENT AND A REGENCY COUNCIL. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#3310

Mohsen PEZESHKPUR
(Phonetic: pezeshkPOOR)

IRAN

Leader, Pan-Iran Party
(since 1948)

Addressed as:
Mr. Pezeshkpur

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE

Mohsen Pezeshkpur helped found the Pan-Iran Party in 1948. In its heyday during the 1960s and early 1970s, it was an ultranationalist, xenophobic, totalitarian organization that reminded many observers of the Nazi Party. Pezeshkpur's group had and probably still has virtually no popular appeal. In 1974, when the government made the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (RPPI) the only legal party, the Pan-Iran Party was dissolved. Pezeshkpur joined the RPPI, but in 1977 he became a member of the Parliamentary Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and criticized the government. In June 1978, charging that the RPPI was responsible for much of "the chaos in Iranian society," he resigned from the RPPI and announced the revival of the Pan-Iran Party. He has continued to criticize the government on a variety of issues. (C)

For a decade beginning during the prime ministership (1951-53) of Mohammad Mosadeq, Pezeshkpur remained an official leader of the Pan-Iran Party but was largely inactive. Returning to the political scene in 1961, he subsequently became the party's sole leader after Daryush Foruhar left to form his own group, the Nation of Iran Party. The government used the party to attack then Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir but otherwise kept it under a tight rein. Thanks to the Shah's consent, Pezeshkpur was permitted to run for parliament in elections held in 1967 and was elected to the Majles (lower house). (C)

Notorious for his chauvinism, Pezeshkpur has long insisted on the "Iranness" of several territories outside the borders of Iran--including the former British protectorate of Bahrain, to

ORIGINAL CL BY 004050
REVW ON 13 Dec 1992
EXT BYND 6 YRS BY 004050
REASON CG3 (1)(3)(7)

(cont.)

CR M 78-16756

which Iran had had a historical claim. In 1970, when the Shah agreed with the British decision to allow a plebiscite in Bahrain (it voted for independence), Pezeshkpur submitted a motion in the Majles censuring the government. Angered, the Shah cut off funds and support to the Pan-Iran Party and let it be known that the group's five deputies would not be reelected. The monarch later relented, however, and Pezeshkpur has continued in the legislature. (C)

Pezeshkpur, about 61, holds a licentiate in jurisprudence from Tehran University and has served as a member of the executive board of the bar association. He has written several articles and a book, *What Do We Want?* He speaks English. (U)

13 December 1978

0 131021Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2174
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12157

CHRGE: STATE 12/13/78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:HG
CLEAR: 1.POL:GBLAMBRAKI
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM OR
ICA (10)

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/13/98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: IR
SUBJECT: REGENCY COUNCIL

REF: (A) TEHRAN 12048, (B) TEHRAN 11845, (C) STATE 313310,

1. REFS A AND B GIVE OPPOSITION VIEW OF REGENCY COUNCIL PROPOSAL IN CONTEXT. THIS IS BASED ON ARTICLE 38 OF SUPPLEMENTARY CONSITUTIONAL LAW, AS AMENDED SEPT 9, 1967, QUOTED IN ITS ENTIRELY BELOW: QUOTE

" IN THE EVENT OF THE TRANSFER OF THE THRONE, THE CROWN PRINCE SHALL PERSONALLY PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS OF MONARCH WHEN HE HAS REACHED TWENTY YEARS OF AGE (TO BE CALCULATED ON THE BASIS OF THE SOLAR YEAR). IF HE HAS NOT REACHED THAT AGE, THE SHAHBANU, MOTHER OF THE CROWN PRINCE, SHALL ASSUME THE REGENCY, UNLESS ANOTHER PERSON SHALL HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE MONARCH FOR THAT OFFICE. THE REGENT SHALL FORM A COUNCIL COMPOSED OF THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HEADS OF BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT AND FOUR OTHER SAGACIOUS, REPUTABLE PERSONALITIES OF THE COUNTRY TO BE SELECTED BY THE REGENT, AND (THE REGENT) SHALL,IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION, ASSUME THE DUTIES OF MONARCH IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNCIL UNTIL (SUCH TIME AS) THE CROWN PRINCE REACHES THE AGE OF 20. IN THE EVENT OF THE DEMISE OR RESIGNATION OF THE REGENT, THE COUNCIL SHALL TEMPORARILY CARRY OUT THE DUTIES OF THE REGENCY UNTIL ANOTHER REGENT--NOT A MEMBER OF THE QAJAR FAMILY--IS APPOINTED BY THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT. REMARRIAGE BY THE SHAHBANU REGENT SHALL CONSTITUTE RESIGNATION (FROM REGENCY). UNQUOTE

2. REGENCY COUNCIL, AS SEEN IN LAW, IS BASICALLY TO ADVISE REGENT. NATIONAL FRONT VIEW IS THAT SHAH WOULD APPOINT REGENCY COUNCIL, THEN DESIGNATE IT, NOT SHABANOU, TO PERFORM REGENT'S DUTIES, THEN RESIGN AND TRANSFER HIS POWERS TO COUNCIL. BASIS FOR THIS IS PROVISION IN NEXT-TO-LAST SENTENCE FOR COUNCIL TO ACT AS REGENT AFTER DEMISE OR RESIGNATION OF REGENT. ACCORDING TO DR. MINACHI, NEW REGENT WOULD NOT BE DESIGNATED UNTIL NEW, NEWLY-ELECTED PARLIAMENT HAD CONSIDERED STATUS OF MONARCHY, THUS LEAVING REGENCY COUNCIL IN POSITION OF EXERCISING MONARCHIAL POWERS UNTIL GENERAL NATIONAL REFERENDUM TOOK PLACE. WHILE THIS WAS NOT EXACTLY THE WAY ARTICLE 38 WAS PROJECTED TO WORK WHEN AMENDED, OPPOSITION SCENARIO APPEARS TO MEET CONDITIONS OF LEGISLATION. SULLIVAN

[redacted]



O 211123Z DEC 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2350
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHRGE: STATE 1
APPRV: DCM:CWNA
DRFTD: POL:STE
CLEAR: POL:GBI
DISTR: POL-3
AMB DCM
ECON-2
OR ADM
AO AFOS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 12500

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH QASHQAI LEADER

1. EMBOFF MET DEC 17 WITH MALIK MANSOUR KHAN QASHQAI, BROTHER OF QASHQAI IL-KHAN NASSER KHAN. THE MEETING WAS NOT PRECISELY ACCIDENTAL BUT BECAUSE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE QASHQAI BROTHERS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN OTHER CHANNELS, EMBOFF MADE NO ATTEMPT TO STEER CONVERSATION IN POLITICAL DIRECTION. HOWEVER, MALIK MANSOUR KHAN, AFTER LENGTHY AND NOT WHOLLY UNBIASED TREATISE ON HISTORY OF QASHQAIS AS WARRIOR NATION, DESCRIBED HIS FAMILY AS SUPPORTIVE OF THE SHAH DESPITE WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO THEM. "I AM NOT AN ORDINARY MAN. I AM A GREAT KHAN, YET I LIVE IN A RENTED ROOM, CANNOT RETURN TO QASHQAI LANDS, AND MY LANDS FROM ISFAHAN TO THE PERSIAN GULF WERE TAKEN FROM ME BY THIS SO-CALLED PARLIAMENT." HE WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF FORMER SAVAK CHIEF NASSIRI, WITH WHOM HE HAD A PERSONAL RUN-IN, AND OF THE LATE COURT MINISTER ASSADOLLAH ALAM, WHO MALIK MANSOUR KHAN FEELS BETRAYED HIS CLASS AND THE MEMORY OF HIS FATHER THE REVERED AMIR SHOKAT-OL-MOLK.

2. MALIK MANSOUR KHAN BELIEVES THAT HIS BROTHER NASSER KHAN, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED TO U.S. FOLLOWING TREATMENT FOR EYE PROBLEM IN MUNICH, MAY SOON RETURN TO IRAN. NASSER KHAN HAS INSTRUCTED HIS FAMILY TO PREPARE LODGINGS FOR HIM WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

3. COMMENT: MALIK MANSOUR KHAN'S BITTERNESS WAS PLAIN, AS WAS HIS DESIRE TO REGAIN WHAT HE FEELS IS HIS BIRTHRIGHT. IF HIS BROTHERS FEEL THE SAME WAY, AND IF THE SHAH IS WILLING TO FORGIVE THEIR SUPPORT FOR MOSSADEGH, A DEAL WOULD PROBABLY BE STRUCK ASSURING THE SHAH THE SUPPORT OF THE QASHQAI CHIEFLY FAMILY, FOR WHATEVER THAT SUPPORT WOULD BE WORTH. SULLIVAN
BT
#2500

NNNN

O 221058Z DEC 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2378
INFO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4102

CHRGE: STATE 12
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEW
CLEAR: POL:GBLAM
DISTR: ECM-2 AMB
CHRON/5

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12538

XGDS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12-19-0P (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINR, IR
SUBJECT: BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARD REGENCY COUNCIL

REF: A) TEHRAN 12042, B) TEHRAN 12[illegible]

1. BRITISH HEAD OF CHANCERY DAVID MIERS TOLD EMBOFF STEMPEL THAT BRITISH HAD RECENTLY HEARD OUT MINATCHI PROPOSAL FOR REGENCY COUNCIL. IN RESPONSE TO MINATCHI PLEA TO BRING THIS TO SHAH, BOTH BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND MIERS HAD TOLD MINATCHI THAT BRITISH WOULD RESERVE ANY COMMENT FOR SHAH AND ONLY IF ASKED BY HIM. MIERS STRESSED TO US THAT BRITISH HAVE MADE NO COMMITMENT TO RAISE MATTER FAVORABLY AND ARE NOT DISPOSED TO SUPPORT REGENCY COUNCIL IDEA NOW, NOR TO INTERVENE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN ANY WAY.

2. MIERS WENT ON TO SAY MINATCHI HAD SHADED THE TRUTH IN PRESCRIBING AMERICAN POSITION TO BRITISH ALLEGING THAT EMBOFF HAD SAID PROPOSITION OF REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD BE RECOMMENDED FAVORABLY TO AMBASSADOR. EMBOFF ASSURED MIERS THAT U.S. WAS NOT FAVORABLY DISPOSED FOR REGENCY COUNCIL AND HAD GIVEN NO SUCH INDICATION TO MINATCHI.

3. MIERS STATED BELIEF THAT MINATCHI IS TRYING TO SELL TO KHOMEINI A REGENCY COUNCIL CONCEPT WHICH MOST CLOSELY FITS THE AYATOLLAH'S VIEWS AND IN TURN IS TRYING TO SELL THE SHAH A SIMILAR, BUT NOT IDENTICAL, FORMULATION I.E. VACATION WITH REGENCY COUNCIL AS INTERIM BODY. MINATCHI HAS HAD NO SUCCESS TO DATE IN EITHER DIRECTION. MINATCHI'S "EXPENSIONS" OR "REINTERPRETATIONS" OF U.S. AND BRITISH REMARKS ARE, IN MIERS' OPINION, SIMPLY SOME PERSIAN LAWYER'S EFFORTS TO BRING SOMETHING OFF. MIERS DID NOT SEEM TOO CONCERNED BY THIS, SAID EMBASSY'S THINKING WAS TO KEEP LISTENING TO MINATCHI BECAUSE AT SOME FUTURE POINT HE MIGHT BE USEFUL.

4. EMBOFF HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED TO MINATCHI U.S. EMBASSY'S "DISAPPOINTMENT" AT WAY BOTH U.S. AND ISRAELI POSITIONS WERE MISINTERPRETED TO OTHER PARTY. OUR FEELING IS THAT IF MINATCHI IS EVENTUALLY TO BE USEFUL, IT WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY BETTER IF HE KEPT HIS TRIAL BALLOONS ON A TIGHTER STRING.

5. SUGGEST DEPT REQUEST RASTEL TO BRIEF SULLIVAN.
BT

[redacted]03Z DEC 78
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC 2180

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12188

APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:ESCUDERO
CLEAR: POL:GBLAKE
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM ECON PM OR ICA SHIRAZ RF/13

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/13/78 (ESCUDERO, S.T.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJ: PROPOSAL FOR RETURN OF NASSER KHAN QASHQAI

1. EMBOFF MET DEC 23 WITH HUSHANG SHAHBAZI, RELATIVE OF QASHQAI CHIEFLY FAMILY, TO HEAR DISCOURSE ON ADVANTAGE TO SHAH OF RETURN TO IRAN OF QASHQAI IL-KHAN, NASSER KHAN QASHQAI. SHABAZI READILY ADMITTED THAT NATURE OF TRIBE HAS CHANGED AS IT BECAME MORE SEDENTARIZED. HOWEVER, HE MAINTAINED THAT NASSER KHAN RETAINS EXTRAORDINARY INFLUENCE AMONG HIS PEOPLE AND AMONG RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN PROVINCE OF FARS. MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO SHAHBAZI, QASHQAI OCCUPIES TRADITIONAL PLACE OF IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE AMONG IRAN'S "THOUSAND FAMILIES" AND HIS RETURN COULD HELP TO BOLSTER THEIR SUPPORT FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM. NASSER KHAN WAS PARTICULARLY CLOSE TO GEN ZAHEDI AND ALLEGEDLY HAD A HAND ALONG WITH ZAHEDI, IN THE DEATH OF MOSSADEGH'S CHIEF OF POLICE, GEN AFSHAR-TUS.

2. SHAHBAZI DESCRIBED NASSER KHAN AS AN INTELLIGENT AND CLEVER KHAN, BUT ONE WITH WEAKNESSES, INCLUDING A LOVE OF MONEY AND A DESIRE TO RETURN TO A POSITION OF HONOR RESPECT AND POWER APPROXIMATING THAT WHICH HE ENJOYED IN THE TRIBAL LANDS PRIOR TO HIS EXILE. NASSER KHAN ORIGINALLY FAVORED THE NATIONAL FRONT BECAUSE, IN THE 50'S, THE SHAH POSED THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE ENJOYMENT BY TRIBAL CHIEFS AND LARGE LANDOWNERS OF THEIR TRADITIONAL PREROGATIVES. AT PRESENT, SHAHBAZI BELIEVES, NASSER KHAN WOULD PERCEIVE RETENTION OF THE SHAH AS CONSISTENT WITH A TRADITIONAL VIEW OF IRANIAN AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND THEREFORE A DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE. AS AN OLD NATIONAL FRONTER, HE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE WELCOMED BY PRESENT FRONT LEADERS, PARTICULARLY AS HE WOULD HAVE NO AMBITION FOR POLITICAL OFFICE.

3. SHOULD NASSER KHAN RETURN, SHAHBAZI BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF HE COULD BE ARRESTED FOR A FEW DAYS TO INCREASE HIS CREDIBILITY. ONCE FREE, NASSER KHAN WOULD BE UNABLE TO OPPOSE KHOMEINI DIRECTLY, NOR WOULD SUCH A CONFRONTATION BE DESIRABLE AS IT WOULD FORCE AT LEAST SOME OF THE OPPOSITION BACK INTO A MORE EXTREMIST POSITION IN DEFENSE OF KHOMEINI. RATHER, NASSER KHAN'S CONTRIBUTION WITHIN THE COUNCILS OF THE OPPOSITION WOULD BE TO ARGUE IN FAVOR OF THE NECESSITY TO RETAIN THE SHAH. IN FARS, AND PARTICULARLY IN CITIES SUCH AS SHIRAZ AND JAHROM, NASSER KHAN'S INFLUENCE COULD HELP MAINTAIN ORDER, ESPECIALLY AS THE BOYER-AHMADI AND THE KHAMSEH CONFEDERATION WOULD BE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE QASHQAI.

4. CLAIMING THAT HE HAS NOT YET APPROACHED NASSER KHAN OR HIS FAMILY ON THIS SUBJECT, SHAHBAZI ASKED IF EMBOFF WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MEETING NASSER KHAN'S BROTHERS FOR FURTHER TALKS. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT HE IS IN NO POSITION TO ASSESS EITHER IMPACT OF NASSER KHAN'S RETURN NOR GOI WILLINGNESS TO HAVE HIM BACK IN IRAN. HOWEVER, AS GOI HAD EXILED HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE, ANY DISCUSSIONS OR AGREEMENTS REGARDING HIS RETURN OUGHT PROPERLY TO FOCUS ON GOI. U.S. WOULD, IN ANY CASE, TAKE NO STEPS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS SUPPORT OF THE SHAH AND EMBOFF THEREFORE DOUBTED THAT SUGGESTED CONVERSATION WITH NASSER KHAN'S BROTHERS WOULD TAKE PLACE UNLESS PROPOSAL WAS OF INTEREST TO GOI.

5. COMMENT: "AS SHAH, OVER THE YEARS, HAS CONSCIOUSLY REDUCED THE POWER OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY WITH NO CONCOMITANT GAIN AMONG OTHER SOCIAL SEGMENTS, HE PRESENTLY FINDS HIMSELF RELYING ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE MILITARY FOR HIS INTERNAL SUPPORT. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS APPEARANCE OF POWERFUL TRADITIONALLY-BASED SUPPORTERS MIGHT PROVE ATTRACTIVE. HOWEVER, GOI WOULD HAVE TO WEIGH CAREFULLY POTENTIAL GAINS OF NASSER KHAN'S PRESENCE AGAINST POSSIBLE IMPACT OF HIS RETURN ON STILL FRAGILE DOMINANCE OF MODERATE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP WHICH APPEARS TO BE MOVING CLOSE TO DISCUSSIONS WITH SHAH ON COALITION/TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. IT HAS BEEN FASHIONABLE, DURING PAST DECADE, TO DOWNPLAY INFLUENCE OF TRIBAL CHIEFS AND OTHER TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS IN IRAN. WITHOUT COMMENTING ON DEGREE OF INFLUENCE RETAINED BY QASHQAI IL-KHANID FAMILY, WE NOTE THAT RESURGENCE OF ISLAMIC INFLUENCE SUGGESTS THIS WAS TOO FACILE AN APPROACH. SULLIVAN
XT
#2188

NNNN

[redacted] DEC 21
[redacted] EMBASSY TEHRAN
[redacted] IMMEDIATE 2419

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12595

DRAFTED: STATE 12/20/78
APPROVED: DOMICWAAS
CLEARED: POL:GLAMBRAKIS
CLASS: NONE
DISTR: [redacted] AMB DCM

STADIS

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 (12/26/88 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: PROPOSED AMERICAN PRO-SHAH GROUP

1. GEORGE NATHANSON, AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN WHO IS WELL CONNECTED IN IRAN, CAME TO THE EMBASSY DECEMBER 13 AND DECEMBER 21 TO DISCUSS THOUGHTS HE IS HAVING ABOUT A PRIVATE GROUP TO SUPPORT THE SHAH. HE IS KNOWN TO THE POLITICAL SECTION AS A BIG OPERATOR WHO HAS BEEN WELL CONNECTED WITH THE COURT HERE, AND FREELY REFERS TO HIS ACCESS AS FRIEND AND CONFIDANT TO EMPRESS FARAH. HE SAW EMBOFF PERETT FOR THE FIRST TIME AND POL COUNSELOR LAMBRAKIS WITH PERETT FOR THE SECOND TIME. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ANOUSHIRAVAN BATMANGELICH, A MEMBER OF THE PROMINENT BATMANGELICH FAMILY WHO SAYS HE ATTENDED SAIS OF JOHN HOPKINS ABOUT [redacted] YEARS AGO.

2. NATHANSON TALKS IN BROAD ENTERPRENEURIAL TERMS OF ORGANIZING A CRASH PROGRAM BOTH FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS AND FOR ECONOMIC GOOD WORKS ON THE SHAH'S BEHALF, TO DEFUSE [redacted]. BOTH MEN TALK IN CONSPIRATORIAL TERMS, BUT STEER AWAY FROM POLITICAL ACTION IN DISCUSSING WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND. RATHER, THEY SAY THEY WANT TO RAISE MONEY FROM PRO-SHAH SOURCES IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE TO LAUNCH HIGHLY VISIBLE SOCIAL WELFARE PROJECTS IN SOUTH TEHRAN AND ELSEWHERE AND PUBLICIZE THEM.

3. NATHANSON MAKES THE POINT THAT HE IS NOT SEEKING USG FINANCE OR SUPPORT, BUT KEEPS GETTING BACK IN TOUCH WITH EMBASSY (HE HAS JUST ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMB AND PERETT WILL SEE HIM). POL COUNSELOR [redacted] ON DEC 21 TO STATE AND REITERATE SEVERAL [redacted] CONCERNS ABOUT WHATEVER NATHANSON'S GROUP DOES, AND TO ENSURE IT IS NOT REPRESENTED AS IN ANY WAY IN-[redacted] BEYOND THAT, POL COUNSELOR COUNSELED [redacted] NATHANGELICH TO CLEAR ALL THEIR PLANS VERY [redacted] WITH SOMEONE WHO TRULY REPRESENTS THE SHAH SINCE [redacted] IRANIAN BUSINESS IN WHICH PRIVATE AMERICANS [redacted] ANYTHING THAT RUNS CONTRARY TO THE [redacted]. HE NOTED THAT AMERICANS HAVE BEEN [redacted] ADVICE TO THE SHAH ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE [redacted] AND HIS OWN DOUBTS ABOUT PROPER [redacted] IS HIS PREROGATIVE. NATHANSON AGREED ON [redacted] BUT FRANKLY WE THINK REITERATION IS [redacted] IS PLANNING A TRIP TO THE U.S. IN [redacted] AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT [redacted] TOUCH WITH ANYONE IN THE U.S. [redacted] WISH TO MEET HIM IN

THAT DIRECTION.)

4. NATHANSON TALKS FREELY ABOUT WILD BUSINESS INTERESTS (PERHAPS EXAGGERATING THEM). HE DROPS NAMES ABOUT PRIVATE AMERICANS AND OTHERS, MANY OF THEM WITH SOME SORT OF UNDER-COVER WORK IN THEIR BACKGROUND. AMONG THOSE AMERICANS AND OTHERS MENTIONED ARE GREGORY LIMA, BRUCE CUTLER, BILL KHOSROW FILIAS, IRANIAN EMIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND DEAN LOCAL BRITISH JOE [redacted] CAMPBELL-COCT. THERE ARE A LOT OF OTHER NAMES, MAINLY MILITARY MEN, FROM [redacted] AGO WHO ARE [redacted].

5. COMMENT: APART FROM THIS SOUNDS TO US LIKE SOMETHING OF AN AMATEUR REPORT TO REPEAT ASPECTS OF 1953. WHILE THE SHAH UNDOUBTEDLY COULD USE FRIENDLY HELP AND ADVICE, WE DOUBT NATHANSON'S GROUP IS THE ONE BEST QUALIFIED TO GIVE IT. WE ARE SKEPTICAL HE CAN ORGANIZE VERY MUCH, BUT IF HE DOES, HIS REPORTS WOULD APPEAR TO WARRANT SOME CAREFUL MONITORING BY THE EMBASSY. OTHER AGENCIES HERE MAY BE INTEREST IN HIM. THEREFORE, IF BATMANGELICH GOES IN TOUCH WITH HIM, SUGGEST PRECHT ASSIST IN CHANNELING HIS REPORTS TO AREAS WHICH WILL MINIMIZE POSSIBLE DANGER TO U.S. IMAGE AT THIS STAGE IN THE GAME IN IRAN. SULLIVAN
BT
#2595

NNNN

LIMDIS

O 271461Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2459

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 12652

CHRGE: STATE 12-27-78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:IAR
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
DISTR: ~~POL-5~~ AMB DCM
EC2 PM OR
CHRON/10

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: MINATCHI ON SADIQI'S ATTEMPTS TO FORM GOVERNMENT

SUMMARY: MINATCHI CONFIRMED THAT ENG MEHDI BAZARGAN AND LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) ARE DISCREETLY SUPPORTING SADIQI EFFORT TO FORM GOVERNMENT. COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF) IS ALSO BACKING SADIQI EFFORT. MINATCHI THOUGHT SADIQI WAS ABOUT READY TO ANNOUNCE CABINET, BUT WANTED TO FOLLOW MOSSADEQ PRECEDENT AND GET MAJLES APPROVAL FOR GOVERNMENT BEFORE TAKING MANDATE FROM SHAH. MINATCHI WAFFLED ON QUESTION WHETHER NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO END STRIKES NOW PARALYSING OIL, BUT THOUGH THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST "SOME" AMELIORATION OF SITUATION. HE DOES NOT SEE SADIQI GOVERNMENT AS FINAL SOLUTION TO IRAN'S PROBLEMS. HE CONFIRMED THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAD URGED THE RELIGIOUS FAITHFUL TO KILL MARXISTS BEARING CLUBS AND DEMONSTRATING AGAINST THEM. END SUMMARY.

1. ON DEC. 26 MASSER MINATCHI MET WITH EMBOFF STEMPEL AT HOSSEINIEH ERSHAD OFFICE DEC 27 FOR REVIEW OF PRESENT SITUATION. IN RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S QUESTION, MINATCHI SAID BOTH LMI AND CDHRF WERE TACITLY SUPPORTING SADIQI EFFORTS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. ENG BAZARGAN HAD MET WITH SADIQI DEC 23 TO ENCOURAGE HIM. HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT SERVE IN NEW GOVERNMENT, BUT ENCOURAGED HIM TO CONTINUE WITH PROCESS. MINATCHI SAID BAZARGAN GROUP BELIEVES IT WAS KHOMEINI'S AGREEMENT NOT TO OPPOSE SADIQI IS SUCCESSFUL. MINATCHI THOUGHT SADIQI WOULD BE ABLE TO FORM GOVERNMENT AND HAD ALREADY SELECTED MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF HIS CABINET. MINATCHI SAID HE KNEW OF ONLY TWO SELECTIONS: MOHSEN PEZESHKPOUR, PAN IRANIST OPPOSITION LEADER IN MAJLES, FOR JUSTICE MINISTER; AND HAMID MOVLAVI, PROMINENT ACADEMIC, FOR COMMERCE MINISTER.

2. ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, SADIQI WANTS TO FOLLOW MOSSADEQ PRECEDENT" AND GET PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL OF HIS CABINET BEFORE GETTING IMPERIAL FARMAN FROM SHAH. [illegible] THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE MATTER WAS BEING [illegible] IN PARLIAMENT IN TODAY'S PRIVATE SESSION. [illegible] OTHER SOURCES ARE LESS CERTAIN THAT CABINET-[illegible] HAVE ALONG AND BELIEVE SADIQI HAS ASKED [illegible] TO GET CABINET TOGETHER. PARLIAMENTARY [illegible]'S SESSION WAS JUST GENERAL DISCUSSION OF [illegible], AND SECOND PRIVATE SESSION WILL BE [illegible].

[illegible] SUPPORT FOR SADIQI EFFORT WENT AS FAR [illegible] HALT FLOW OF PETROL FOR [illegible] WAVERED ON THIS POINT, FIRST SAY-

ING THAT STRIKES WOULD CONTINUE, BECAUSE "PEOPLE WANTED SHAH TO GO; NOT EVEN KHOMEINI WOULD GET POPULAR SUPPORT AS PM IF SHAH REMAINED." (COMMENT: MINATCHI IN GENERAL WAS HARDER ON "SHAH MUST GO" THEME THIS TIME THAN PREVIOUSLY.) HOWEVER, MINATCHI ALSO SAID THAT IF NEW GOVERNMENT GOT OFF TO GOOD START AND GOT TROOPS OFF THE STREETS, THINGS WOULD BE BETTER AND THERE WOULD BE FEWER RIOTS. FOREVER, MINATCHI SAID, SADIQI GOVERNMENT WAS NOT THE FINAL SOLUTION TO IRAN'S PROBLEMS; SHAH WOULD STILL HAVE TO GO. EMBOFF AND MINATCHI AGREED SADIQI EFFORT WOULD BE BETTER THAN VIOLENCE, AND IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT QUESTION BY MINATCHI, EMBOFF SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NO RPT NO CHANCE THAT EITHER ALTERNATIVE WHICH INCLUDED REGENCY COUNCIL AND SHAH'S LEAVING COUNTRY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE EVEN IF KHOMEINI AGREED TO THEM. MINATCHI SAID HE THOUGHT HARD-LINE MILITARY SOLUTION WOULD THEN BE TRIED AND CAUSE LOTS OF BLOODSHED. EMBOFF SAID U.S. DID NOT WANT TO SEE THIS HAPPEN; THAT IS WHY WE FAVORED COALITION GOVERNMENT AND COMPROMISE. MINATCHI NOTED THAT SADIQI EFFORT AS JUST SUCH AN IDEA AND AGREED WITH EMBOFF THAT IF IT WORKED, IT MIGHT MOVE SITUATION AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION AND INTO POLITICS. MINATCHI THEN PAUSED AND ADDED THAT SADIQI COULD HELP SITUATION A BIT BUT WOULD NOT BE THE LONG-RUN ANSWER. ONE POINT OF SADIQI'S PROGRAM, HOWEVER, WOULD BE EARLY ELECTIONS--DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT WITHIN TWO MONTHS AND ELECTIONS "FAIRLY QUICKLY" THEREAFTER. NEW MAJLES COULD THEN DEAL WITH QUESTION OF MONARCHY.

4. WHEN EMBOFF PRODDED MINATCHI ABOUT CURRENT SPATE OF DEMONSTRATIONS, MINATCHI SAID HAPPILY THAT THESE WERE ALL RELIGIOUS GROUPS. EMBOFF THEN QUERIED WHY U.S. EMBASSY HAD BEEN SINGLED OUT DEC 24 FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION? STARTLED, MINATCHI AT FIRST ASKED IF WE WERE CERTAIN THESE WERE NOT SAVAK AGENTS AND WHEN TOLD THAT WOULDN'T WASH, ADMITTED THAT "NOT ALL" RELIGIOUS GROUPS WERE REALLY UNDER FIRM CONTROL. HE FLATLY DENIED THAT RELIGIOUS GROUPS HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH RECENT ASSASSINATIONS IN AHWAZ AND SAID THESE HAD TROUBLED CDHRF. EMBOFF NOTED

BT
#2652

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C O N F I D E N T I A L/LIMDIS TEHRAN 12652

O 271414Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2460
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 12652

LIMDIS

THAT THEY TROUBLED US, TOO. (COMMENT: MINATCHI IS USUALLY NOT VERY WELL INFORMED ON "OPERATIONAL" MATTERS, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE IS EVEN MORE NERVOUS NOW THAN PREVIOUSLY ABOUT PROSPECTS OF VIOLENT ACTS BEYOND CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT.")

5. MINATCHI SAID KHOMEINI HAD INDEED ISSUED EDICT CALLING FOR THE FAITHFUL TO KILL ANYONE WHO ATTACKED RELIGIOUS DEMONSTRATORS WITH CLUBS OR WEAPONS (A CLEAR REFERENCE TO RECENT PRO-SHAH DEMONSTRATORS). THIS HAD THE FORCE OF LAW, COMING FROM ONE WITH KHOMEINI'S RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY. EMBOFF COMMENTED THAT THIS SEEMED AN EXTREME REACTION IN VIEW OF POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IT COULD CAUSE. MINATCHI ADMITTED THIS, BUT SAID THIS SITUATION WAS WHAT MADE PRESENT CONDITIONS IN IRAN SO EXPLOSIVE--KHOMEINI HAD BOTH RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL POWER TO WIELD AGAINST SHAH. IN 1953 SHAH HAD SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT. CONDITIONS NOW WERE DIFFERENT.

6. CONVERSATION ENDED WITH MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF HOPE THAT VIOLENCE WOULD NOT DOMINATE POLITICS. SULLIVAN
BT
#2652

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L/LIMDIS TEHRAN 12652

O 281257Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2469
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 12702

CHRGE: STATE 12/28/78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: ~~POL 3~~ AMB DCM
EC2 PM ICA OR
ADM SY DAO ISF
AFOSI SHIR TAF
CHRON/18

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/28/88 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH OPPOSITIONIST DERAKHSHESH

1. AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY POL COUNSELOR MET WITH HEAD OF TEACHERS UNION MOHAMAD DERAKHSHESH IN HOME OF AN EMBASSY NATIONAL EMPLOYEE DEC 27. DERAKHSHESH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS POLITICAL GROUP, WHICH HAS SEPARATE BUT PARALLEL EXISTENCE WITH TEACHERS UNION: DR. DAVOUD RASSAI, A LAWYER WHO IS RETIRED TEACHER, AND DR. SADEH RABISZADEH, DIRECTOR OF TEHRAN'S LARGEST HIGH SCHOOL (WHO REMAINED MOSTLY SILENT). MEETING, WHICH CAME AT DERAKHSHESH'S REQUEST, WAS FOR PURPOSE OF LAYING OUT TO AMBASSADOR GROUP'S IDEAS. (THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN LAID OUT TO POL COUNSELOR IN PREVIOUS MEETING WITH DERAKHSHESH AND RASSAI A WEEK AGO.)

2. GROUP IS ADAMANT THAT SITUATION HAS EVOLVED TO THE POINT WHERE SHAH MUST LEAVE COUNTRY. EVEN IF KHOMEINI DECIDED SHAH COULD STAY, THE PEOPLE TODAY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. IN ANY CASE, DERAKHSHESH'S GROUP DOES NOT TRUST SHAH'S PROMISES, WHICH HE HAS BROKEN ON MANY OCCASIONS IN THE PAST.

3. IF SHAH LEAVES, THIS IN ITSELF WILL REDUCE SUPPORT FOR KHOMEINI BY 50 PERCENT. THUS KHOMEINI WILL BE TOO WEAK TO ESTABLISH ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND MODERATES SUCH AS DERAKHSHESH WILL HAVE CHANCE TO FORM GOVT WHICH WILL BE DEMOCRATIC, ANTI-COMMUNIST, PRO-WESTERN AND ANTI-CLERICAL.

4. SCENARIO THEY VISUALIZE IS SHAH TURNING OVER HIS POWERS TO A REGENCY COUNCIL. THEY ARE NOT TOO FUSSY ABOUT MEMBERSHIP OF COUNCIL AND HAVE NO OBJECTION TO NAMES SUCH AS ENTEZAM, SOHURI, SALEH, ETC. THOUGH THEY OBJECT TO ALI AMINI. THEY THINK COUNCIL SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF 9 TO 11 PEOPLE, 4 TO 5 OF THEM MILITARY. THE MILITARY SHOULD BE RETIRED GENERALS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN CORRUPTED, NOTABLY GENERAL JAM. THIS COUNCIL WOULD APPOINT NEW GOVT, WHETHER IT BE LED BY DERAKHSHESH OR SOME OTHER OPPOSITION FIGURE. A NEW GOVT WOULD APPEAL TO PEOPLE FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS TO CARRY OUT A SPECIFIC, CLEARLY ENUNCIATED PROGRAM THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD LIKE. FREE ELECTIONS COULD FOLLOW, LEADING TO A PARLIAMENT WHICH WOULD THEN FORM NEW GOVT.

5. THE PROBLEM OF A POSSIBLE MILITARY REACTION TO THIS SCENARIO, THE GROUP HOPED, WOULD BE MET BY SHAH HIMSELF, WHO WOULD RESPONSIBLY INSTRUCT MEMBERS OF REGENCY COUNCIL AND TOP ARMY COMMANDERS TO COOPERATE, RETIRING OR TAKING WITH HIM THOSE TOP COMMANDERS WHO ARE CORRUPT. SHAH'S INCENTIVE WOULD BE HIS HOPE TO PRESERVE HIS DYNASTY IN THE FORM OF HIS SON RETURNING IN A FEW YEARS TO REPLACE REGENCY COUNCIL.

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12702/1

6. GROUP DWELT AT LENGTH ON ITS FEAR OF RELIGIOUS RULE BY KHOMEINI AND THE MULLAHS AND PROBABILITY MANY WOULD FLEE THE COUNTRY IF THAT BECAME A REALITY. GROUP ALSO STRESSED ITS OWN LONG HISTORY OF FIGHTING THE COMMUNISTS, STARTING WITH ITS RESISTANCE TO TUDEH PARTY 30 YEARS AGO (WITH NEWSPAPER "MEHREGAN"). PRESENT POLITICAL GROUP REFORMED ITSELF ABOUT 3 OR 4 YEARS AGO, AT THAT TIME COUNTING SOME 80 MEMBERS. SANJABI, WITH ABOUT A DOZEN OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, HAD ASKED TO JOIN THE GROUP SHORTLY BEFORE IT WAS DISBANDED BY SHAH. SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP SUCH AS NAJAFI AND PAYDAR HAVE RECENTLY BECOME MINISTERS IN SHARIF-EMAMI AND AZHARI GOVTS AND ARE NO LONGER DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE GROUP THOUGH ON GOOD TERMS WITH IT. A COUPLE OF MONTHS AGO GROUP TRIED TO REVIVE NEWSPAPER BY PRINTING FIRST ISSUE OF "AZARDEGAN" BUT DERAKHSHESH WAS ARRESTED AND FURTHER ISSUES WERE NOT PERMITTED. THUS GOVT HAS PREVENTED GROUP'S ENLARGING ITS FOLLOWING WITH WHAT THEY CONSIDER A MODERATE PROGRAM.

7. DERAKHSHESH POINTED OUT THIS WAS SEVENTH TIME HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND SPENT TIME IN JAIL. A FORMER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT AND MINISTER OF EDUCATION IN THE EARLY 1960S DERAKHSHESH TOLD US HE HAS BUILT A RECORD OF STRENGTH AND INCORRUPTABILITY. HE REFUSED PARTICIPATION IN LATER, TAINTED GOVTS. HE HAS MAINTAINED THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY'S SOME 400,000 TEACHERS THROUGH SOME 17 OR 18 YEARS OF POLITICAL INACTIVITY. AS FORMER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT AND HEAD OF TEACHERS UNION, HE MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH THE PROVINCES AND HAS MANY MEETINGS IN HIS HOME, MOST OF THEM CONNECTED WITH HIS POLITICAL GROUP RATHER THAN THE TEACHERS UNION. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT AMONG CALLERS AT HIS HOME ARE NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS SUCH AS SANJABI AND BAZARGAN AS WELL AS KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS SUCH AS BEHESHTI AND A DR. BAHOUAR.

8. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION GROUP STRESSED URGENCY THAT SOMETHING BE DONE AS A FEW MORE WEEKS MIGHT BE TOO LATE
BT
#2702

NNNN

O 281257Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2490
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 12702

FOR THE COUNTRY. LARGE NUMBERS OF STUDENTS HAVE RETURNED FROM EUROPE AND AMERICA OVER PAST WEEK AND ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE AND MORE VIOLENT STREET TACTICS BEING SEEN IN TEHRAN LAST FEW DAYS. THEY HAVE LEARNED THEIR LESSONS ABROAD AND ARE UNDOUBTEDLY BEING COORDINATED BY COMMUNIST PARTY. TUDEH SUPPORTERS ARE NOT NUMEROUS BUT VERY WELL ORGANIZED AND TRAINED TO SELL THEIR POLITICAL POSITION AMONG OPPOSITION GROUPS. THIS GIVES THEM A POWER OUT OF PROPORTION TO THEIR REAL NUMBERS.

9. AMBASSADOR LIMITED HIMSELF TO HEARING THEM OUT, ASKING SOME CLARIFYING QUESTIONS, AND SETTING FORTH U.S. POSITION IN FAVOR OF IRANIAN INDEPENDENCE, A DEMOCRATIC GOVT, AND MODERATE MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT PROBLEM, IF SUCH A SOLUTION CAN STILL BE OBTAINED. SULLIVAN
BT
#2702

NNNN

[illegible]1154Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2486
INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4125
RETNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3549
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12691

CHRGD: [illegible]
APPRV: [illegible]
DRFTD: [illegible]
CLEAR: [illegible]
DISTR: [illegible]

CEROM/16

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/28/84 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS:
SUBJECT: WHITHER OR WITHER SADIQI?

REF: (A) TEHRAN 12648, (B) TEHRAN 12652 (NOTAL),

SUMMARY: CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY EXISTS AS TO WHERE SADIQI STANDS IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO FORM GOVERNMENT. THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE HE HAS HAD LITTLE LUCK IN GETTING CABINET TOGETHER, BUT STORIES PERSIST, ESPECIALLY IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES, THAT HE MAY BE CLOSE TO TAKING THE REINS. SOME OF HIS REPUTED CABINET CHOICES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY THAT THEY WOULD NOT SERVE. EVEN IF SADIQI COULD FORM GOVT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS SERIOUS DOUBT IN MANY QUARTERS IT WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH MUCH. IN WAKE OF GENERAL BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC ORDER IN TEHRAN AND GROWING PRESENT AND PROJECTED SHORTAGES OF KEY ITEMS SUCH AS HEATING OIL AND GAS, IT APPEARS TO EMBASSY THAT TIME FOR POLITICS IS VERY SHORT. END SUMMARY

1. PARA SEVEN REF A SUGGESTS POLITICAL INITIATIVES ARE AT DEAD CENTER FOR MOMENT. PUBLICLY, GHOLAM HOSSEIN SADIQI IS STILL SUPPOSED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO FORM A CABINET TO TAKE OVER FROM GEN. AZHARI'S GOVT. AS A RESULT, AZHARI GOVT IS INCREASINGLY SEEN HERE, EVEN BY ITS OWN MEMBERS, AS A LAME [illegible] ADMINISTRATION. ITS MINISTERS ARE LOATH TO TAKE INDEPENDENT DECISIONS EVEN ON SIMPLE MATTERS. PRIVATELY, EMBASSY HAS HEARD WIDELY VARYING STORIES, ALL FROM GOOD SOURCES, ABOUT SADIQI PROGRESS. MOST OPTIMISTIC SAY HE HAS CABINET NEARLY FORMED (REF B) AND WILL BE READY TO MOVE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. THIS COINCIDES WITH RUMORS GOING AROUND DEC 27 AND 28 THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW GOVT WILL COME DEC 29-31. EQUALLY GOOD SOURCES, HOWEVER, SAY SADIQI HAS HAD MINIMAL LUCK ENLISTING QUALIFIED PEOPLE (I.E., THOSE NOT "TAINTED" BY PARTICIPATION IN PAST 15 YEARS' GOVERNMENTS) AND HAS BEEN ABLE TO LINE UP ONLY FOUR TO EIGHT INDIVIDUALS.

2. A COUPLE OF HIS REPORTED CABINET CHOICES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN COALITION GOVT. MORDAD FARHANGPOUR TOLD CLOSED SESSION OF PARLIAMENT DEC 27 THAT YOUNG, UNTAINTED RADICAL GOVERNMENT IS NEEDED. IN SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE CONVERSATION INSTIGATED BY US HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS READY TO OFFER HIMSELF AS PRIME MINISTERIAL CANDIDATE, THUS SUGGESTING HE WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN BEING SADIQI'S MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AS HAD BEEN TOUTED. MEHDI

AZAR, WHO HAD BEEN ON AT LEAST TWO "LISTS" OF THOSE SOUGHT BY SADIQI, TOLD FRIENDS PRIVATELY HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN ANY POST NOW. FACT THAT RUMORS REGARDING THOSE WILLING TO SERVE ARE SO FEW AND FAR BETWEEN ALSO LENDS CREDENCE TO BELIEF SADIQI IS FACING SERIOUS STRUGGLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE NATIONAL FRONT (INF) LEADER SANJABI HAS PUBLICLY SAID INF NOT INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING.

3. ILLUSTRATIVE OF WASTELAND WHICH IS HALLMARK OF POLITICAL SCENE IS GENERAL BELIEF THAT EVEN IF SADIQI FORMS A GOVT, IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO MUCH IN ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZED OPPOSITION PARTICIPATION. MAZARGAN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI), WHICH IS MAINTAINING BENIGN NEUTRALITY, IS UNWILLING TO SUPPLY EVEN SECOND-LEVEL PERSONNEL FOR SADIQI GOVT. GROWING PUBLIC DISORDERS IN TEHRAN AND VIRTUAL ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF COUNTRY OVER PAST TWO DAYS, PLUS LOOMING DISAPPEARANCE OF VITAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS OVER NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS SUGGEST THAT VERY LITTLE TIME, IF ANY, REMAINS TO INDULGE IN LUXURY OF CABINET BUILDING. EVEN IF SADIQI WERE TO TAKE OVER TOMORROW, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT STRIKES WOULD CEASE INSTANTLY (OR EVEN AT ALL). THIS WOULD LEAVE NEW GOVT WITH SAME UNENVIABLE OPTIONS FACING PRESENT GOVT — HARD-LINE MILITARY CRACKDOWN, OR SILENTLY STEALING AWAY.

4. UNFORTUNATELY FOR THOSE WHO ADVOCATE POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO IRAN'S PROBLEMS, WE ARE NOT CONVINCED TOP POLITICAL FIGURES SHARE SENSE OF URGENCY EMBASSY FEELS SITUATION DEMANDS. WE HAVE HEARD STORIES THAT SADIQI IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE OVER NOW, PREFERING THAT MATTERS BECOME WORSE SO THAT HIS GOVT WILL HAVE A BETTER CHANCE TO SURVIVE. [illegible] WHO HAS HAD EVEN MODDING ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITH TEHRAN STREETS OR ECONOMIC SITUATION OVER PAST FEW DAYS UNDERSTANDS THAT THE FUTURE IS NOW. BREAKDOWN OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FABRIC WILL BE NEARLY COMPLETE WHEN REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS ARE GONE. SULLIVAN
BT
#2691

NNNN

S E C R E T

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ACTION:
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NNNNVV ESB033BRA038
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #7062 3630235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 2923547 DEC 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4170
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0913
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0578
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4059
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8157
RUTAQL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4091
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5548
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 6894
RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4318
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9391
RUHQHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2156
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 8802
BT
S E C R E T STATE 327062

STUTTGART FOR ELG

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/29/84 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 58, 12/29/78

1. TEHRAN WAS QUIETER THIS MORNING THAN IT HAD BEEN FOR SEVERAL DAYS. THE FOCUS TODAY WAS ON THE POLITICAL SCENE WITH THE EMBASSY HEARING FROM A FORMER GOI MINISTER THAT THE AZHARI GOVERNMENT "DEFINITELY WOULD RESIGN DECEMBER 30." ADDITIONALLY, DR. SHAH-POUR BAKHTIAR, NATIONAL FRONT LEADER WITH SOMEWHAT DUBIOUS CREDENTIALS, TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT THE SHAH HAD GIVEN HIM A MANDATE DECEMBER 28 TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT. HE WISHED TO SEE AN EMBASSY OFFICER DECEMBER 30, AND HOPED FOR U.S. SUPPORT. FURTHER, AN AMERICAN PRESS SOURCE REPORTS GREAT ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF ZAHEDI. ALL OF THE INTERLOCUTORS SEEM CERTAIN THE SADIQI EFFORT HAS FAILED.

2. MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS AGREE THAT THE SHAH STILL RETAINS AT LEAST THE POWER TO EFFECT AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A REGENCY COUNCIL WHICH THEY DEMAND. UNDER THIS CONCEPT, A REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD EXERCISE THE SHAH'S

EXECUTIVE POWERS AFTER HE HAS LEFT THE COUNTRY. IT WOULD APPOINT A PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET. THESE OPPOSITIONISTS FEAR THE CHAOTIC SITUATION THAT COULD RESULT FROM AN UNPLANNED DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH.

3. THE FRENCH DOMESTIC NEWS SERVICE REPORTS IN PARIS THAT KHOMEINI HAS BEEN GRANTED PERMISSION TO STAY IN FRANCE WHEN HIS CURRENT VISITOR'S PERMIT EXPIRES NEXT WEEK. THE FRENCH EMBASSY WASHINGTON TELLS US THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE BUT A POSITIVE RESPONSE IS ANTICIPATED. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT KHOMEINI HAS CALLED FOR A DAY OF NATIONAL MOURNING IN IRAN TOMORROW, THE END OF MOHARRAM.

4. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION WAS SCHEDULED TO BE 319,000 BARRELS, APPARENTLY ABOUT THE SAME AS YESTERDAY. ALL PRODUCTION WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE ABADAN REFINERY. ANOTHER PRODUCTION UNIT WILL BE SHUT DOWN DECEMBER 30 CAUSING A FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL PRODUCTION DROP. THE IMPACT IS COMPOUNDED SINCE THE UNIT PROVIDES NATURAL GAS TO ABADAN, WHOSE REFINERY RELIES HEAVILY ON THE GAS FOR FUEL. THE AVAILABILITY OF GASOLINE IN TEHRAN HAS WORSENED.

5. THE OPPOSITION HAS STATED THAT THE OIL WORKERS HAVE OFFERED TO RETURN TO WORK IF: THE GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES THAT ALL PRODUCTION IS USED INTERNALLY, AND PARTICULARLY THAT NONE OF IT IS EXPORTED TO ISRAEL. THE WORKERS WOULD MONITOR DISTRIBUTION.

6. OUR CONSUL IN TABRIZ WAS TOLD BY THE MANAGER THAT HE EXPECTS STRIKERS TO SHUT THE LOCAL REFINERY TOMORROW. STOCKS OF KEROSENE FOR HEATING ARE ENOUGH FOR A WEEK; OTHER PRODUCTS ARE IN SLIGHTLY BETTER SUPPLY. THE OPINION IS UNANIMOUS AMONG ALL THE CONSUL'S CONTACTS THAT THE SHAH MUST GO.

7. THERE WAS ANOTHER PEACEFUL MARCH OF SEVERAL THOUSAND PERSONS IN ISFAHAN. THE MOB WAS IN A HOLIDAY MOOD AND THE SECURITY FORCES KEPT THEIR DISTANCE.

8. GRUMMAN HAS DECIDED IN SHIRAZ TO REDUCE ITS STAFF TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND MOVE REMAINING PERSONNEL ON TO THE AIR BASE. THIS IS EXPECTED TO AFFECT THE F-14 PROGRAM.

9. THE IRAN-AMERICAN SOCIETY IN AHWAZ WAS BROKEN INTO DECEMBER 29 LATE IN THE AFTERNOON BY A CROWD OF ABOUT 70 PEOPLE AND SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE. NEWSOM
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SECRET

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DEC

ACTION

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OO RUQMER
DE RUEHC #8067 3642205
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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4191
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0961
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0610
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4076
RUEEME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8204
RUTAQL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4127
RUEHUT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5574
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 8821
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 6910
RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4323
RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9401
RUHQHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2175
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
BT
S E C R E T STATE 328067

STUTTGART FOR ELG

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/30/78 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 59, 12/30/78

1. SEVERAL THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS TODAY SURROUNDED THE AMERICAN CONSULATE COMPOUND IN TABRIZ, BUT ONLY SOME OF THEM ACTUALLY ENTERED THE COMPOUND AFTER SMASHING THE FRONT GATES. THESE DEMONSTRATORS SET SOME SMALL FIRES, BUT CAUSED LITTLE DAMAGE. THEY WERE REPELLED BY THE IRANIAN SECURITY FORCE STATIONED AT THE CONSULATE WHO USED TEAR GAS AND FIRING OVER THE HEADS OF DEMONSTRATORS TO STOP THEM. REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVED QUICKLY AND THE CROWD WAS DISPERSED. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO ANYONE AND THE CONSUL AND HIS IRANIAN STAFF ARE SAFE AND WELL. THE TURKISH CONSULATE WAS ALSO ATTACKED.

2. THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN CONTINUED "NORMAL," WITH SCATTERED DEMONSTRATIONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH TEHRAN, CAR BURNINGS, BONFIRES FUELED BY GARBAGE AND AUTO TIRES, AND DEMONSTRATORS PLACING ANTI-SHAH LEAFLETS ON CAR WINDSHIELDS. IRANIAN ARMY FORCES GUARDING THE

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EMBASSY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED IN RESPONSE TO RUMORS ABOUT IMPENDING ATTACKS ON THE EMBASSY AND PERIODICALLY FIRE AIRBURSTS TO DISCOURAGE GROUPS OF DEMONSTRATING YOUTHS. AS A RESULT OF GASOLINE SHORTAGE, AS WELL AS THE KHOMEINI-ORDERED "DAY OF MOURNING" (IN MEMORY OF QOM RIOTS NEARLY A YEAR AGO THAT STARTED THE UNREST), TRAFFIC IN TEHRAN WAS LIGHT. THERE WERE LONG LINES OUTSIDE FILLING STATIONS AND KEROSENE MERCHANTS. AS A CONSERVATION MEASURE IRANIAN RADIO AND TV BROADCASTING HAS BEEN REDUCED. RADIO IRAN BROADCASTS HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO PREPARE THE PEOPLE FOR AN EXPECTED SHORTAGE OF BREAD AS A RESULT OF FUEL SHORTAGE-RELATED DIFFICULTIES IN FLOUR MILLS, BAKERIES AND THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR.

3. ACCORDING TO REPORTS FROM OUR CONSUL IN SHIRAZ, NUMEROUS DEMONSTRATIONS ACCOMPANIED BY FIRING BY THE SECURITY FORCES TOOK PLACE IN SHIRAZ -- BUT THIS IS BY NOW BECOMING THE NORM IN MAJOR IRANIAN CITIES.

4. SHAHPUR BAKHTIAR CONFIRMED TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT THE SHAH HAS ASKED HIM TO FORM A CABINET AND NOTED THAT HE EXPECTS TO BE SWORN IN BY JANUARY 3 OR 4. BAKHTIAR CLAIMS THAT HE WILL BE PERMITTED TO NAME ALL HIS MINISTERS, THAT FREE PRESS AND SPEECH WILL BE REINSTATED IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE, THAT MARTIAL LAW WILL BE PHASED OUT GRADUALLY, AND THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS APPOINTMENT WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STATEMENT FROM THE SHAH EMPHASIZING IMPERIAL ACCEPTANCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION WHEREBY HE WOULD REIGN BUT NOT RULE. ACCORDING TO BAKHTIAR, AT SOME POINT AFTER THE NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER, THE SHAH WILL TAKE AN EXTENDED VACATION. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT BAKHTIAR ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE WORKED OUT THE SUPPORT OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI, THE LEADING RELIGIOUS FIGURE IN IRAN. HE WILL SEEK SUPPORT FROM MEHDI BAZARGAN, LEADER OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN. THE NATIONAL FRONT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS OPPOSITION TO BAKHTIAR'S EFFORTS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. THE BAZAARIS ARE DIVIDED ABOUT BAKHTIAR, WHICH IS SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGING. FEAR OF A HARSH MILITARY GOVERNMENT LED BY HARD-LINE OFFICERS MAY RESULT IN SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR AS THE BEST OF A SERIES OF BAD ALTERNATIVES.

5. IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTION TODAY WAS ONLY 231,000 BARRELS, ALL OF WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO THE ABADAN REFINERY. OSCO EMPLOYEES IN AHAWAZ HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO FURTHER THREATS AND, AS A RESULT OF THIS THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE INABILITY TO WORK OWING TO STRIKES, OSCO DEPENDENTS AND SOME EMPLOYEES, AS WELL AS THOSE OF MOST OIL SERVICE COM-

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SECRET

PANIES, HAVE STARTED LEAVING IRAN TODAY ON A SERIES OF CHARTER FLIGHTS, PRIMARILY TO ATHENS. MEMBERS OF OPPOSITION GROUPS ARE IN TOUCH WITH STRIKERS, REPORTEDLY TO WORK OUT THE RETURN TO WORK OF A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF PERSONNEL TO PERMIT PRODUCTION FOR DOMESTIC NEEDS ONLY.

NIOC CHAIRMAN ENTEZAM HAS AGREED TO DEMANDS THAT NO CRUDE OIL WILL BE EXPORTED. HE HAS APPARENTLY ALSO AGREED TO WITHDRAW THE MILITARY FROM OSCO OFFICES AND OIL FIELD FACILITIES. THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO BELIEVE THAT A COMPROMISE CAN BE WORKED OUT WITE THE STRIKERS. VANCE
BT
#8067

S E C R E T

O 311453Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9IACT IMMEDIATE 2567
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12794

CHRGE: STATE 12/31/78
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:HS
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM ECON 2 PM OR CHRON/10

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/31/98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINR, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: MINATCHI VIEWS ON BAKHTIAR EFFORT TO FORM GOVT

SUMMARY: MINATCHI BELIEVES BAKHTIAR WILL SUCCEED IN FORMING GOVT BECAUSE MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WILL NOT OPPOSE HIM AND SOME WILL WORK TO HELP. SANJABI OUTBURST AGAINST BAKHTIAR SEEN AS UNFORTUNATE, BUT IRRELEVANT. BAZARGAN WILL NOT OPPOSE BAKHTIAR, BUT WILL PROBABLY REFRAIN FROM FINAL COMMITMENT UNTIL HE RETURNS FROM SOUTH, WHERE HIS INITIATIVE TO END OIL STRIKE IS PROGRESSING WELL. AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI CONSIDERING PUBLIC CALL OPPOSING VIOLENCE AGAINST FOREIGNERS. SHAHAB FERDOWZ EXPECTED TO BE BAKHTIAR'S JUSTICE MINISTER. END SUMMARY

1. EMBOFF STEMPEL REVIEWED PRESENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITH DR. MINATCHI AT HIS HOSSEINIYEH ERSHAD (RELIGIOUS SCHOOL) OFFICE AFTERNOON DEC 31. MINATCHI THOUGHT BAKHTIAR WOULD SURELY SUCCEED IN FORMING NEW GOVT, SINCE MODERATE CLERGY FAVORED HIS EFFORTS ENOUGH TO REFRAIN FROM OPPOSING HIM. DR. KARIM SANJABI'S BLAST AT BAKHTIAR EVENING DEC 30 WAS UNFORTUNATE, BUT WOULD NOT MATTER IN FACE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS' TACIT SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR.

2. ENGINEER MEHDI BAZARGAN, LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) LEADER WILL ALSO ACQUIESCE IN BAKHTIAR TO EXTENT OF NOT OPPOSING HIM, ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, BUT WILL PROBABLY NOT MAKE HIS FINAL POSITION KNOWN UNTIL HE RETURNS FROM AHWAZ IN TWO OR THREE DAYS. MINATCHI SAID BAZARGAN HAD RECEIVED LETTERS FROM BOTH KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI NAMING HIM PERSONALLY TO HEAD MISSION TO OIL FIELDS. OTHER MEMBERS OF FIVE-MAN COMMITTEE ARE AYATOLLAH HASHEMI RAFSANJANI, ENG. KATIRAHE (PHONETIC), ENG. HASIBI, AND ENG. SABAQIAN. SIGNIFICANCE OF BAZARGAN BEING NAMED PERSONALLY IS THAT THIS GIVES HIM ECCLESIASTICAL NOD WHEN HE WANTS TO FORM GOVT -- PRESUMABLY, SAID MINATCHI, THE ONE WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY SUCCEED BAKHTIAR AFTER NEXT SPRING'S ELECTIONS. MINATCHI ADDED THAT ARDESHIR ZAHEDI HAD REPORTEDLY OFFERED TO SELL A BAZARGAN-LED CABINET TO THE SHAH, BUT THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY OCCUR ONLY IF BAKHTIAR'S INITIATIVE DID NOT WORK OUT AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS DID NOT QUITE TRUST ZAHEDI.

3. MINATCHI SAID COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF) WOULD BE MEETING AT 4 P.M. DEC 31 AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY PUT WEIGHT OF ITS VARIOUS GROUPS BEHIND BAKHTIAR INITIATIVE. MINATCHI WOULD CALL SHARIAT-MADARI WHEN RESULTS OF THIS MEETING ARE KNOWN, AND VISIT HIM IN QOM ON JAN 3 FOR FINAL CEMENTING OF MODERATE SUPPORT OF BAKHTIAR CABINET. IN RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 12794
CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 12794

QUESTION WHETHER CONDITIONS IN STREETS WOULD ALLOW THAT MUCH DELAY, MINATCHI SAID CONDITIONS WERE MUCH BETTER DEC 31 SINCE IT BECAME KNOWN THAT SHAH WAS READY TO LEAVE (COMMENT: IF SO, IMPROVEMENT WAS VERY MARGINAL). IN ANY EVENT, SHARIAT-MADARI WAS CONTEMPLATING ISSUANCE OF AN ELAMIEH (ANNOUNCEMENT) CALLING ON THE RELIGIOUS FAITHFUL NOT TO ATTACK FOREIGN BROTHERS AND SISTERS AND PRAISING STEPS TAKEN TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD AVOID BLOODSHED. IN REPLY TO QUESTION, EMBOFF AGREED THIS WOULD BE A VERY USEFUL WAY TO PERHAPS DEFUSE SOME OF THE ANTI-FOREIGN FEELING WHICH HAD BEEN GROWING IN RECENT DAYS.

4. COMMENT: THOUGH GENERALLY AN OPTIMIST, MINATCHI WAS ABLE TO TICK OFF SEVERAL SOLID REASONS FOR HIS BELIEF BAKHTIAR WOULD SUCCEED, AND HIS OWN ATTITUDE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE VERY MUCH WANTED BAKHTIAR TO FORM GOVT AND THAT MANY OTHER MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS WERE WILLING TO GRACEFULLY ACQUIESCE IN BAKHTIAR EFFORT FOR SAKE OF COUNTRY. IF SHARIAT-MADARI AND BAZARGAN POSITIONS COME CLOSE TO WHAT MINATCHI SAYS THEY ARE, THIS WOULD IMPROVE BAKHTIAR'S CHANCES. MINATCHI SAID HE HOPES TO LEARN OF CABINET NAMES LATER, BUT KNEW THAT JUSTICE MINISTER-DESIGNATE IS SHAHAB FERDOWZ, FORMER JUDGE AND A LEADING PROGRESSIVE LAWYER. SULLIVAN
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#2794

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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 12794
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SECRET/EXDIS

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DE RUEHC #0004 0010041
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O 010032Z JAN 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 9074
BT
S E C R E T STATE 000004

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/31/78 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. WE NOTE PARS NEWS AGENCY AND SHAPOUR BAKHTIAR HAVE STATED THAT THE SHAH PLANS TO TAKE A TEMPORARY LEAVE OF ABSENCE FROM THE COUNTRY AT AN UNSPECIFIED TIME IN THE FUTURE. THIS REPORT HAS ALSO BEEN DENIED IN PRESS STORIES BY SOURCES AT MINISTRY OF COURT AND BY AMBASSADOR ZAHEDI. DO YOU HAVE AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION?

2. IF IT IS TRUE THAT SHAH WOULD LEAVE THE COUNTRY SO AS TO FACILITATE BAKHTIAR'S JOB OF ESTABLISHING A NEW GOVERNMENT, WE WONDER WHY THE SHAH DID NOT AGREE TO THE SAME CONDITION WITH SADIQI, APPARENTLY A STRONGER CANDIDATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP THAN BAKHTIAR. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS. NEWSOM
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SECRET?EXDIS

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[redacted]

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN [redacted]

E.O. 12065: RDS 12-31-98 (ESCUDERO, C.T.) [redacted]
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF JAMSHID HORMOZ, FORMER [redacted]
- IRANIAN STUDENTS FEDERATION [redacted]

1. JAMSHID HORMOZ IS AUSTRIAN-EDUCATED ARCHITECT WHO WAS PRESIDENT OF ANTI-SHAH IRANIAN STUDENTS FEDERATION DURING HIS STUDENT DAYS IN VIENNA. HE WAS IDENTIFIED AS [redacted] WHILE ATTENDING A MEETING OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN EAST GERMANY AND WAS ARRESTED UPON HIS RETURN TO IRAN IN 1971 ALTHOUGH HORMOZ CLAIMS THAT MEMBERSHIP IN THE FEDERATION WAS NOT AT THAT TIME ILLEGAL. ACCORDING TO HORMOZ HE WAS INTERROGATED, TORTURED (INCLUDING BEING THROWN DOWN A STAIRCASE, WHICH LATER REQUIRED AN OPERATION FOR A RUPTURED DISC) AND KEPT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR 14 MONTHS WITHOUT EVER BEING FORMALLY CHARGED. AFTER 18 MONTHS IN PRISON HE WAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL, WITH 22 MINUTES' NOTICE AND NO PRIOR PREPARATION, FOUND GUILTY AND SENTENCED TO 19 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT, WHICH INCLUDED THE 18 MONTHS HE HAD ALREADY SERVED. DURING DECEMBER 31 LUNCH AT HOME OF DR. HORMOZ MEHRABA'I, HORMOZ MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO EMBOFF.

2. CLAIMING THAT HIS VIEWS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF A MAJORITY OF IRANIAN STUDENTS AND THE UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY, HORMOZ STATED THAT THE IDEAL OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRIFE WOULD BE NOT ONLY THE ABDICATION OF THE SHAH BUT THE FORMATION OF A PEOPLE'S COURT TO TRY HIM FOR HIS CRIMES. THE COURT SHOULD BE HELD IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH IRANIAN LAW AND SHOULD PERMIT THE SHAH THE BEST LEGAL COUNSEL IN IRAN OR FROM ANY OTHER COUNTRY WHICH WOULD BE WILLING TO DEFEND HIM. HORMOZ WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE RESULT OF ANY FAIR LEGAL PROCESS AGAINST THE SHAH WOULD BE TO NAIL THAT SUCCESS TO THE WALL (LITERAL TRANSLATION WHICH CONVEYS THE FEELING ACCURATELY). HOWEVER, PEOPLE FEEL THAT THE ESSENTIAL OUTCOME OF THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN IRAN AND THE FORM OF ANY FUTURE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE DECIDED BY VOTE OF THE PEOPLE. [redacted] ONLY CONDITION WOULD BE THAT ANY IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD PERMIT FREE EXPRESSION OF POLITICAL VIEWS.

3. ALTHOUGH HE CLAIMS NOT TO BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND INSISTS THAT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE U.S. PEOPLE, HORMOZ IS CHARACTERISTICALLY OPPOSED TO U.S. POLICY IN IRAN. THE U.S., HE SAID, HAS LEARNED NO LESSONS FROM ITS SUPPORT OF DICTATORS IN SOUTH KOREA, CHILE AND VIET NAM AND HAS REPEATED THE SAME MISTAKES IN IRAN. U.S. POLICYMAKERS HAVE RESTRICTED THEIR CIRCLE OF CONTACTS TO THOSE CLOSE TO THE SHAH AND CONSEQUENTLY THEY VIEWED IRAN THROUGH AN IMPERIAL PRISM. MOREOVER, THE USG HAS FOUND THE SHAH ALWAYS WILLING TO GIVE WHAT IT WANTED AND CON-

SEQUENTLY THE U.S. OVERLOOKED THE MANY CRIMES AND EXCESSES OF THE SHAH AND HIS REGIME. THE IRANIAN PEOPLE ARE NOT YET COMPLETELY CROSSED [redacted] U.S. PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO [redacted] PEOPLE MUST ALL MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR ANY FUTURE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO [redacted] WITH THE U.S.

SULLIVAN

[redacted]

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2613
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 00063

CHRGE: STATE 1-2-7
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
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CLEAR: POL:GBLAMB
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ECON-2 PM
OR SHIP TA
CHRON/14

E.O. 12065: RGDS 1-1-84 (ESCUDERO, S.T.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJECT: MOHAMMAD HOSSAIN KHAN QASHQAI COMMENTS ON BAKHTIAR CANDIDACY AND GENERAL FEREIDUN JAM

1. DURING JAN 1 DISCUSSION WITH MOHAMMAD HOSSAIN KHAN (MHK) QASHQAI IN LATTER'S APARTMENT, QASHQAI IL-KHAN COMMENTED TO EMBOFF THAT QASHQAI FAMILY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR AS PRIME MINISTER UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO GOES BACK TO TIME OF REZA SHAH, AND THE BAKHTIAR AND QASHQAI FAMILIES HAVE FREQUENTLY INTERMARRIED FOR THE PAST150 YEARS. HOWEVER, MHK EMPHASIZED THAT QASHQAI SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR'S GOVERNMENT, SHOULD ONE BE FORMED, WOULD BE MUCH GREATER "IF SHAHPOUR DOES NOT COME WITH EMPTY HANDS." MHK BELIEVES THAT, SHOULD BAKHTIAR ASSUME THE PRIME MINISTRY JAN 3 WITHOUT ANNOUNCING THE SHAH'S IMMINENT DEPARTURE, FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT OR WHATEVER, THE PEOPLE WILL BE DEMONSTRATING IN THE STREETS AGAINST BAKHTIAR BY JAN 6. DURING CONVERSATION MHK RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM GATCHSARAN DESCRIBING DEMONSTRATION THERE BY 3000 BAKHTIARIS AND QASHQAIS AND NOTING THAT SHOULD BAKHTIAR ACCEPT THE PRIME MINISTRY WITHOUT WRINGING CONCESSIONS FROM THE SHAH, THIS WOULD BRING SHAME TO THE BAKHTIARIS AND HIS SUPPORT AMONG THE TRIBE WOULD WANE.

2. ACCORDING TO MHK, THE PEOPLE WILL BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE KEROSENE AND GASOLINE SHORTAGES AND MORE INTERESTED IN BAKHTIAR'S ACTIONS REGARDING SAVAK AND THE ARMY. THE SECURITY ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE DISBANDED AND, IF SOME SIMILAR ORGANIZATION MUST EXIST, ITS NAME MUST BE CHANGED. MARTIAL LAW MUST SOON BE ENDED AND MANY OF THE TOP GENERALS RELIEVED OF THEIR POSITIONS. MHK, WHO IS NOT FOND OF IRAN'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP, PARTICULARLY GEN. OVEISSI, CAUTIONED EMBOFF NOT TO THINK OF IRANIAN GENERALS IN SAME TERMS AS ALLIED WWII COMMANDERS BUT RATHER AS SYCOPHANTS IN UNIFORM WHO OBTAINED THEIR POSITIONS THROUGH LOYALTY RATHER THAN MILITARY ABILITY. EXCEPTION IS GEN. FEREIDUN JAM, WHO MHK EXPECTS TO SEE JAN 2, WHOSE FALL FROM GRACE RESULTED FROM THREE FACTORS:

--JAM'S DESCRIPTION OF ORDER TO FIRE ON 1971 DEMONSTRATORS MARCHING TO TEHRAN FROM KARAJ AS "STUPID". JAM HAD NOT REALIZED THAT THEN SAVAK CHIEF NASSIRI HAD CONSULTED SHAH, WHO WAS THEN IN PAKISTAN, AND OBTAINED IMPERIAL PERMISSION TO FIRE;

--JAM'S OPPOSITION TO PURCHASE OF NEW MILITARY SYSTEMS BEFORE IRANIAN PERSONNEL FULLY TRAINED TO CARE AND MAINTAIN SYSTEMS ALREADY IN HAND. HIS OPPOSITION WAS REPORTED TO SHAH BY GEN. TOUFANIAN AND DR. AYADI;

--JAM'S REMARK, IN PAKISTAN, THAT HE LOVED SHAH LIKE A BROTHER, WHICH THE SHAH FOUND PRESUMPTUOUS.

3. MHK, WHO MET WITH BAKHTIAR THIS MORNING AND EXPECTS TO SEE HIM AGAIN JAN 2, DESCRIBED HIM AS SOMEWHAT TOO PLAIN-SPEAKING FOR A SUCCESSFUL POLITICIAN. ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF RELIGION, WHERE BAKHTIAR MAKES CLEAR HIS DISTASTE FOR KHOMEINI, MHK FEELS BAKHTIAR WOULD DO BETTER TO REMAIN SILENT.

4. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR TO MHK IF BAKHTIAR WILL SUCCEED IN FORMING A CABINET. SANJABI'S DECISION TO READ HIM OUT OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND FEELINGS AMONG MEMBERS OF BAKHTIAR'S IRAN PARTY THAT HE HAS TOO GREAT A TENDENCY TOWARD UNILATERAL, UNCOORDINATED ACTION WILL EAT INTO HIS SUPPORT.

5. HOMAN KHAN QASHQAI, MHK'S SON, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THERE IS LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BAKHTIAR'S PROGRAM AND THE ONE WHICH SANJABI PUT FORWARD. THEREFORE, WHY SHOULD THE SHAH NOT CHOOSE SANJABI, WHO ENJOYS WIDER SUPPORT, AS PRIME MINISTER? HIS FATHER REPLIED THAT, FIRST OF ALL, BAKHTIAR IS NOT A KHOMEINI MAN. SECONDLY, BAKHTIAR APPROACHED THE QUESTION OF THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE DELICATELY WHEREAS SANJABI RAISED IT IMMEDIATELY AND FORCEFULLY IN HIS TALK WITH THE MONARCH. THE MOMENT HE DID SO THE SHAH ENDED THEIR CONVERSATION SAYING THAT THERE WAS NOTHING FURTHER TO DISCUSS.

6. HOMAN ALSO NOTED THE INCREASING REPETITION AMONG TEHRAN'S GOSSIP MILL OF THE VIEW THAT FOREIGNERS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE IRAN AS THEY WILL BE NEEDED TO HELP RUN THE COUNTRY'S ESSENTIAL UTILITIES AND INDUSTRIES AFTER THE SHAH LEAVES. AT THE SAME TIME HOMAN FULLY EXPECTS THAT, SHOULD THE SHAH REMAIN, LATER RETURN, OR SHOULD A CIVILIAN GOVT NOT WORK OUT, FOREIGNERS AND ESPECIALLY AMERICANS WILL BECOME THE TARGETS OF VIOLENT PHYSICAL ATTACK BY GUERILLA GROUPS. BOTH HOMAN AND HIS FATHER BELIEVE THAT THE SHAH IS CLEVER ENOUGH TO ENGINEER
BT
#0063

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TEHR

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN

O 021405Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2614
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00063

HIS RETURN TO IRAN ON THE HEELS OF A MILITARY COUP ONCE A CIVILIAN GOVT HAS BEEN IN OFFICE LONG ENOUGH TO SHOW ITSELF INEPT. MHK DESCRIBED THE SHAH AS THE MOST INTELLIGENT RULER IRAN HAS HAD FOR TWO CENTURIES BUT UNDONE BY TWO FLAWS: HIS INABILITY TO KEEP HIS WORD AND HIS GREED FOR MONEY AND POWER. SULLIVAN
BT
#0063

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL 7 JAN 7

[redacted]
DE RUEHC [redacted] 0031603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051741Z JAN 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 9134
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 000933

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/3/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: KHOSROW GHASHGHAI

1. KHOSROW GHASHGHAI CALLED ON NEA/IRN JANUARY 2 TO OFFER HIS VIEWS OF IRANIAN CRISIS. GHASHGHAI STATED FLATLY THAT NO SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE WHILE THE SHAH REMAINED IN IRAN. HE URGED THE U.S. TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH KHOMEINI'S FORCES WHICH HE REGARDED AS THE MOST POTENT IN THE COUNTRY. HE INDICATED THERE WAS SOME DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY AND THAT HIS FATHER WAS RETURNING TO IRAN IN THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED AND BECOME A SYMBOL OF GHASHGHAI OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH. HE INDICATED ABSOLUTELY NO CONFIDENCE THAT BAKHTIAR WOULD BE ABLE TO FORM A VIABLE GOVERNMENT AND NO SYMPATHY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE'S EFFORTS.

2. GHASHGHAI LEFT WASHINGTON HEADED FOR MUNICH WHERE HE RESIDES.

3. WE REPORT THIS FOR THE RECORD, HAVING NO UNDERSTANDING OF ITS IMPORTANCE FOR IRANIAN OR TRIBAL POLITICS. VANCE
BT
#0933

CONFIDENTIAL

2

GHASHGHAI, Khosrow

S E C R E T

0 030923Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2439
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 00094

E.O.12065: RGDS 1-2-85 (ESCUDERO, S.T.) OE-P
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJECT: BAZAARI VIEWS ON BAKHTIAR CANDIDACY AND ON CONTINUING CONFRONTATION

SUMMARY: PROMINENT BAZAARI REFLECTS EXTREMELY EMOTIONAL HATRED OF REGIME AND ITS (BELIEVED) CRUELTIES. ADVICE TO AMERICANS IS THAT WE SHALL SUFFER FOR OUR SUPPORT OF THE SHAH. END SUMMARY.

1. EMBOFF MET JAN 2 WITH INFLUENTIAL BAZAARI MERCHANT HAJI ALI ASGHAR KASHANI, WHO STATED THAT, AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, BAZAARIS HAVE DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO SUPPORT SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR AS PRIME MINISTER. THEY REGARD HIM AS TOO CLOSE TO THE SHAH AND TOO MUCH AN OPPORTUNIST TO SUPPORT HIM EVEN IF BAKHTIAR PROVES ABLE TO ENGINEER THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE. SHOULD BAKHTIAR BECOME PRIME MINISTER THE BAZAAR WOULD CONTINUE TO BE CLOSED IN HOPES OF BRINGING HIM DOWN AND REPLACING HIM WITH THE ONE MAN WHO, KASHANI FEELS, IS TRULY THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE - KARIM SANJABI.

2. WHEN EMBOFF OPINED THAT CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH IS TRYING TO SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF THE PEOPLE COULD LEAD TO THE COMMISSION IN TEHRAN OF ATROCITIES SUCH AS THOSE RECENTLY PERPETRATED IN MASHAD, KASHANI REPLIED HEATEDLY THAT SUCH THINGS ARE ALREADY TAKING PLACE IN THE CAPITAL. ON DEC 31 A MOB ATTACKED THE HOME OF A SAVAK COLONEL WHO LIVED ON BAHAR STREET. COLONEL WAS TAKEN ALIVE AND DISMEMBERED BY THE CROWD WHILE HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE BURNED IN THE FIRE WHICH LEVELED THEIR THREE-STORY HOUSE. KASHANI CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN THE WRECK OF THE HOUSE AND THE PORTIONS OF THE DEAD MAN'S BODY WHICH WERE DISPLAYED OUTSIDE IT ON JAN 1. IN THE ASHES IN THE BASEMENT, KASHANI SAID INSTRUMENTS OF TORTURE WERE DISCOVERED. WHEN EMBOFF DEPLORED SAVAGERY OF THIS SORT BY EITHER SIDE, KASHANI BECAME EVEN MORE ANGRY. HE RELATED AN INCIDENT IN QAZVIN IN WHICH A CHILD WAS CRUSHED UNDER THE TREADS OF A TANK AND ITS MOTHER SHOT WHEN SHE RUSHED TO ATTEMPT A RESCUE. ALSO HE DESCRIBED THE JAN 2 FUNERAL, WHICH HE ATTENDED, IN BEHEST-E-ZAHRA OF THREE YOUNG IRANIANS WHO ALLEGEDLY DIED DEC 30 UNDER TORTURE IN EVIN PRISON. THE BODIES WERE CARRIED UNWRAPPED ON BIERS AROUND THE CEMETARY SO THAT THE CROWDS THERE COULD SEE THE EXTENSIVE BURNS AND HANDS WITHOUT FINGERNAILS. IT IS PERFECTLY REASONABLE, KASHANI SHOUTED, FOR THE PEOPLE TO ATTACK THE SERVANTS OF A REGIME WHICH IS CAPABLE OF SUCH THINGS. (COMMENT: BY THIS POINT KASHANI WAS VERY ANGRY INDEED. ONE OF THESE DAYS EMBOFF EXPECTS TO SEE HIM FOAM AT THE MOUTH. END COMMENT.)

3. WHEN UNDER CONTROL AGAIN, KASHANI LAUNCHED A LONG PERORATION ON HOW THE BAZAARIS BAY ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY

FOR ALL THESE CRIMES AT FEET OF U.S. FOR OUR LONG-TERM SUPPORT OF OUR PUPPET SHAH (SIC). KASHANI THEN REMARKED THAT GROWING ANGER OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST U.S. COULD LEAD TO ATTACKS ON INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS IN TEHRAN. IN THIS REGARD, HE CAUTIONED EMBOFF TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL AND TO SCALE DOWN HIS ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF EMBASSY COMPOUND.

4. EMBASSY COMMENT: UNFORTUNATELY THE VOICE OF THIS BAZAARI ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE FEELINGS OF EVER LARGER SECTIONS OF IRAN'S POPULATION. EMBASSY IS INUNDATED DAILY BY REQUESTS/ADVICE THAT WE DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE SHAH WHO IS DRAGGING AMERICANS DOWN LIKE AN ANCHOR. SULLIVAN
BT
#0094

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 00237

O 030265Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2717
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00237

CHRGE: STATE 1/5/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:STESCUDERO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON 2 PM ICA
JR ADM SY DAO
AFOSI CHRON

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/5/85 (ESCUDERO, STANLEY T.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF MASHAD UNIVERSITY CHANCELLOR PARVIZ AMOUZEGAR ON BAKHTIAR PRIME MINISTRY AND IRAN'S FUTURE

1. ACCORDING TO PARVIZ AMOUZEGAR, CHANCELLOR OF MASHAD UNIVERSITY, THE IRANIAN UNIVERSITY/INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY, PERHAPS EXCLUDING MANY STUDENTS, IS WILLING TO GIVE A BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE ITSELF. HOWEVER, UNIVERSITY/INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION WILL PRESENT ITSELF ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IF BAKHTIAR'S INAUGURATION IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A STATEMENT BY THE SHAH REGARDING HIS IMMINENT TRAVEL ABROAD FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT AND FOLLOWED VERY SHORTLY BY THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE. IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION HAVE ALREADY CONDEMNED BAKHTIAR, DESPITE HIS MUCH-WELCOMED STATEMENT DESCRIBING THE 28TH MORDAD RETURN OF THE SHAH AS A COUP AGAINST A NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT, AS A COLLABORATOR WITH THE PAHLAVI REGIME. ANTI-BAKHTIAR SLOGANS AND BANNERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SEEN IN MASHAD AND EMBOFF HAS OBSERVED ANTI-BAKHTIAR SLOGANS WRITTEN ON TEHRAN WALLS.

2. AMOUZEGAR, HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW ALI ZIAI, AND HIS SISTER MOKHADDAREH ZIAI ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE PREVAILING IRANIAN SENTIMENT LAYING MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN AT THE FEET OF THE UNITED STATES. WHILE ADMITTING THAT THE U.S. HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO DEAL WITH THE SHAH IN THE PAST, THEY CATALOGUED A SERIES OF U.S. POLICY ERRORS GOING BACK TO THE DAYS OF POINT FOUR PROGRAM AND INCLUDING POOR TARGETING OF CULTURAL PROGRAMS AND EXCHANGES, LIMITATION OF EMBASSY CONTACTS TO PRO-SHAH IRANIANS, ASSIGNMENT OF FORMER CIA DIRECTOR HELMS AS AMBASSADOR, CHANGE OF USIA TO ICA (A MUCH LIKE CIA), LACK OF CONTINUITY AMONG AMERICAN OFFICIALS, AND PRESENT CONTINUING SUPPORT OF USG FOR SHAH WHEN IT IS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT VAST MAJORITY OF IRANIANS DO NOT WANT HIM.

3. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ALL AGREED THAT SHAH SHOULD LEAVE SOON, AMOUZEGAR ET.AL. INSIST THAT IRAN NEEDS THE INSTITUTION OF THE SHAH AND FEEL THAT PRESENT SHAH MIGHT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO IRAN IN A STRICTLY CONSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY [IF HE IS WILLING TO DO SO] ONCE A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS MANAGED TO GET MATTERS IN HAND. THE SHAH HAS, THROUGHOUT PRESENT CRISIS, GIVEN TOO LITTLE TOO LATE AND HE RISKS WHATEVER OPPORTUNITY HE MAY HAVE FOR RETURN, HIS PLACE IN HISTORY AND THE FUTURE OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY IF HE REFUSES TO LEAVE WITH DIGNITY [AND] AVOID WAITS WHERE HE IS THROWN OUT. SULLIVAN

O 061133Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2735
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00268

208 CHRGE: STATE 1/6/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM ICA
CR ADM SY IAC
AFOSI CHRON/15

E.O. 12065: RDS 1/6/94 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) CR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: NEW CABINET PRESENTED

1. CABINET ESSENTIALLY AS REPORTED BY WIRE SERVICES WAS PRESENTED THIS MORNING BY PM-DESIGNATE BAKHTIAR TO THE SHAH. APPOINTS ARE:

-- INTERIOR - BAKHTIAR HIMSELF, INCLUDING CONTROL OVER POLICE, GENDARMINE, AND PRESUMABLY SAVAK

-- WAR - GEN. FEREIDUN JAM (WHO IS ON WAY BACK FROM LONDON)

-- FOREIGN AFFAIRS - AHMAD MIR-FENDERESKI, WHO WAS FIRED BY SHAH AS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IN 1973 REPORTEDLY FOR EXCEEDING SHAH'S LIMITS ON SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS PERMITTED DURING 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.

-- JUSTICE - YAHYA SADEQ-VAZIRI, A LAWYER AND CAREER JUDGE WHO IS KURDISH

-- INFORMATION AND TOURISM - CYRUS AMUZEGAR, FORMERLY SOMETHING OF A LEFTIST, WRITER AND JOURNALIST, NOT CONNECTED WITH FORMER PM AMOUZEGAR'S FAMILY

-- ECONOMICS AND FINANCE - RUSTAM PIRASTEH, INTERNATIONAL BANKER, FORMER CHASE MANHATTEN REP HERE

-- MOHAMMAD MOSHIRI-YEZDI, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, HIGH CIVIL SERVANT IN MINISTRY OF LABOR (INCLUDING PERMANENT DEPUTY) WHO SOUNDS LIKE AN OLD FRIEND OF BAKHTIAR'S

-- AGRICULTURE -- MANUCHEHR KAZEMI, EXPERIENCED IN PRO. BANK MELLI, GRADUATE OF HARVARD IN 1920S, FRIENDLY TO AMERICANS BUT CRITICAL OF THE REGIME.

-- INDUSTRY AND MINES -- ABBAS QOLI BAKHTIAR, A COUSIN OF PM'S WHO IS HIGH CIVIL SERVANT WITH NIOC BACKGROUND, HAVING SERVED IN FAIRLY RECENT POST AS UNDERSECY OF THIS MINISTRY, PERHAPS SENSITIVE ABOUT AMERICANS

-- EDUCATION - DR. MOHAMMAD AMIN RIAHI, PROMINENT EDUCATIONALIST AND JOURNALIST

-- LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE -- MANUCHEHR ARIANA, CAREER CIVIL SERVANT IN LABOR DEPT WHO IS REPORTEDLY COUSIN OF RETIRED GENERAL ARIANA (ONE OF THOSE GENERALS MENTIONED AS ACCEPTABLE BY SOME OPPOSITIONISTS)

-- PPT LUTF-ALI SAMIMI, CAREER OFFICIAL

-- HEALTH - MANUCHEHR RAZMARA, U.S. EDUCATED PHYSICIAN

-- HOUSING - JAVAD KHADEM, VERY ACTIVE CONTRACTOR, CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS, REPORTEDLY EMOTIONAL AND PERHAPS ANTI-AMERICAN.

2. NONE OF APPOINTEES HAS SERVED AS MINISTER BEFORE. JAM AND MIR-FENDERESKI HAVE BOTH BEEN AMBASSADORS. APART FROM OVERTONES OF SOME ANTI-REGIME POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN ONE OR TWO CASES (AMUZEGAR, KAZEMI) CABINET IS COMPOSED OF TECHNOCRATS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE IN AREAS OF EXPERTISE AND (WE GATHER) CLEAN RECORDS ON CORRUPTION ISSUE.

3. CABINET CONTAINS NONE OF THE MORE POLITICAL OPPOSITIONISTS WHO WERE AT ONE POINT RUMORED TO BE JOINING. THESE INCLUDED PEOPLE SUCH AS HEAD OF TEACHER'S UNION MOHAMMAD DERAKHSHESH (FOR ARTS AND CULTURE), ENG. AHMAD MOSSADEGH, MOSSADEGH'S SON (FOR ROADS), AND EVEN PROMINENT CIVIL RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS SPOKESMAN NASSER MINATCHI, ACCORDING TO RECENT RUMORS.

4. NUMBER OF MINISTERS REMAIN VACANT: COMMERCE, CULTURE, PLAN AND BUDGET (IF NOT ABOLISHED), ROADS, ENERGY, SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION, AS WELL AS TRADITIONAL MINISTERS OF STATE FOR THINGS SUCH AS PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND EXECUTIVE AFFAIRS. THERE IS ALSO NO MINISTER OF ENDOWMENT AFFAIRS, AN AREA THAT MIGHT BE TURNED OVER TO THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS WE HAVE HAD.

5. MORE SPECIFIC BIO DATA AS WE DEVELOP IT. SULLIVAN
BT
#0268

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CONFIDENTIAL

O 071100Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2754
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00295

LIMDIS

E.O. 12U65: GDS 1/7/85 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: ANOTHER MODERATE OPPOSITIONIST OPPOSES BAKHTIAR

REF: 78 TEHRAN 127U2

1. HEAD OF TEACHERS UNION AND MODERATE OPPOSITION POLITICIAN MOHAMMAD DERAKHSHESH EXPRESSED TOTAL OPPOSITION TO BAKHTIAR GOVT IN BRIEF PHONE CONVERSATION WITH POL COUNSELOR TODAY, JAN 7. HE DENIED HE HAD EVER BEEN CANDIDATE FOR A POSITION (CONTRARY TO REPORTS EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES LAST WEEK) AND DENIGRATED QUALITY OF MINISTERS. SEVERAL OF HIS GROUP HAD TURNED DOWN OFFERS FROM BAKHTIAR.

2. IF ANY (SUCH AS SAMIMI) ARE MEMBERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES, DERAKHSHESH SAID, THEY WERE FORTH RANK UNKNOWNS. HE KNEW FOR A FACT THAT NEW MINISTER OF EDUCATION (RIAHI) WAS AN ACTIVE SAVAK AGENT; DERAKHSHESH HAD GOTTEN HIM A JOB YEARS AGO WHEN HE WAS AN UNEMPLOYED TEACHER. OTHERS IN THIS SUPPOSEDLY "NEW" GOVT WERE WORKING OFFICIALS UP TO RECENTLY AND MEMBERS OF RASTAKHIZ PARTY. THEIR APPOINTMENTS ARE A JOKE.

3. WHEN POL COUNSELOR ASKED WHAT DERAKHSHESH THOUGHT OF SHAH'S PLANS TO TAKE A VACATION, DERAKSHSHESH SAID HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED. SHAH HAS TAKEN VACATIONS BEFORE, AND COME BACK. THAT IS NOT THE PERMANET DEPARTURE THAT IS NECESSARY.

4. DERAKHSHESH SAID SHAH IS ALWAYS LATE WITH HIS DECISIONS. BAKHTIAR GOVT WOULD HAVE BEEN ANSWER A YEAR AGO, BUT TOO LATE NOW. COUNTRY'S SICKNESS REQUIRES REAL MEDICINE, NOT ROUND WHITE PILLS. HE AGAIN PUSHED HIS GROUP'S POSITION: SHAH MUST LEAVE SO THAT KHOMEINI LOSES MUCH OF HIS POWER, ALLOWING MODERATES OF THE CENTER TO COME INTO THEIR OWN.
5. DERAKHSHESH'S WEEKLY (ON ITS THIRD ISSUE) ATTACKED BAKHTIAR YESTERDAY. SULLIVAN
BT
#0295

NNNN

R 071147Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2756
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00300

CHRGE: STATE 1-7-7
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMP
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBR
DISTR: POL-3 AMB
ECON2 PM I
OR SHIR TA
ISF CHRON/

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-7-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL BROKER IS DISCOURAGED; YET ANOTHER MODERATE POLITICAL GROUP FORMED.

SUMMARY: LONG-TIME POLITICAL BROKER IS DISCOURAGED BY GOI'S CONTINUED INEPTITUDE. HE SEES TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY BECOMING VERY ACTIVE. HIS CURRENT EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TO MOLDING A MODERATE GROUP BEHIND ALI AMINI WHICH WILL BE VEHICLE FOR SUPPORT OF BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT UNTIL ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. EMBOFF MET JAN 4 WITH HEDAYAT ESLAMINIA, POLITICAL BROKER OF SOME YEARS' STANDING WITH WHOM EMBASSY HAS BEEN COMMUNICATING REGULARLY FOR BETTER PART OF A YEAR. HE WAS FRANKLY DISCOURAGED AT TURN OF EVENTS; GOI HAD REMAINED SURPRISINGLY INEPT AT HANDLING CRISIS AND AS A RESULT, TUDEH PARTY ACTIVITY WAS BECOMING MORE WIDESPREAD. HE SAID SEVERAL OF HIS FRIENDS FROM THE SOUTH HAD NOTED OLD-LINE TUDEH ORGANIZERS INVOLVED IN RECENT LABOR DISTURBANCES (COMMENT: THIS SQUARES WITH WHAT WE'VE HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES, AS WELL).

2. ESLAMINIA THEN SAID HE HAD GATHERED A NUMBER OF FRIENDS IN VARIOUS POSITIONS TOGETHER TO FORM A GROUP BEHIND ALI AMINI. THIS GROUP WOULD SUPPORT THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT, BUT PREPARE ITSELF FOR ELECTIONS. HE LISTED THE FOLLOWING AS INITIAL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP: MR. (FNU) FAZAELI, EX-MARDOM PARTY LEADER; ABDUL HOSSEIN TABATABATAI, FORMER SHIRAZ MAJLES DEPUTY; NASSER ZEHTABFARD, DIRECTOR OF ASNAF (PRICE MONITORING GROUP); MANUCHEHR SAED-VAZIRI, FORMER MAJLES DEPUTY PRESENTLY A NEWSPAPER COLUMNIST; MR. HEKMAT YAZDI, A BUSINESSMAN; MR. TEYMOUR AND MR. REZAN, FROM ASNAF; HAJ KARIM HOSSEINI, A BAZAARI WHO SUPPORTS AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI; AND HASSAN KHAN BAYAT, HEAD OF THE FARMER'S GUILD. GROUP WAS MERELY WAITING GO AHEAD SIGNAL FROM ALI AMINI TO FORMALLY ORGANIZE.

3. COMMENT: GROUP IS SIMILAR TO MANY NOW FORMING, AND IF IT TRULY GETS ORGANIZED, EMBASSY WILL REPORT FURTHER. MOST SUCH MODERATE GROUPS, AS OF JAN 7, ARE GIVING SUPPORT TO BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. SULLIVAN
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#0300

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O 081243Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2790
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00367

CHRGE: STATE 1/8/79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:CCM
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
PM ECON
CHRON/8

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: CLERGY ORGANIZING TO HELP STABILIZE PUBLIC ORDER

SUMMARY: DR. NASSER MINATCHI TOLD EMBOFF MORNING JAN 8 THAT NUMBER OF HIS SOURCES INDICATE SHAH'S DEPARTURE IS IMMINENT. IN VIEW OF THIS, TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE FORMED ORGANIZATION TO HELP MAINTAIN ORDER THROUGH TRANSITION PERIOD TO NEW POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS. STATEMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED CALLING FOR CALM. CONCERN REMAINS OVER MILITARY BEHAVIOR. END SUMMARY.

1. DR. NASSER MINATCHI INFORMED POLOFF STEMPEL MORNING JAN 8 THAT CLERICAL LEADERS IN TEHRAN HAVE FORMED A NEW GROUP WHICH TRANSLATES AS "CLERGY LEADERS ORGANIZATION (CLO)". PURPOSE OF GROUP WAS TO HELP MAINTAIN SOCIAL ORDER OVER NEXT FEW WEEKS. MINATCHI SAID HIS PARLIAMENTARY SOURCES SAID NEW GOI WOULD BE PRESENTED TO MAJLES AND CONFIRMED JAN 9, THEN TO SENATE AND CONFIRMED JAN 10. IT WAS STRONGLY RUMORED THAT THE SHAH WOULD LEAVE THE COUNTRY AT SOME POINT FOLLOWING FINAL CONFIRMATION. CLERGY WERE TO MEET AFTERNOON JAN 8 TO WORK OUT PLANS TO CONTROL EMOTIONAL OUTPOURINGWHICH WOULD FOLLOW AND CHANNEL IT CONSTRUCTIVELY IF POSSIBLE.

2. EMBOFF STRONGLY SUPPORTED IDEA, AND NOTED THAT IN EVENT OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE, MILITARY WILL BE VERY EDGY AND BEHAVIOR IN FIRST HOURS AND DAYS WILL BE CRITICAL. MINATCHI SAID HE COULDN'T AGREE MORE, AND COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF) WOULD ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE ALL ITS FOLLOWERS FOR THIS PURPOSE. EMBOFF STRESSED AVOIDANCE OF PROVOCATION WHICH WOULD TRIGGER MILITARY BACKLASH SUCH AS OCCURRED IN QAZVIN AND MASHAD. MINATCHI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PROBLEM VERY WELL.

3. CLERGY WAS ESPECIALLY KEY GROUP, AND CLO WOULD BE MAIN VEHICLE, ACCORDING TO MINATCHI. LEADER WAS HOJATOLLAH SEYED MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI (KNOWN TO EMBASSY AS KEY KHOMEINI LEADER), WITH FOLLOWING OTHER CLERICS AS SENIOR FIGURES: HOJATOLLAHS RAFSANJANI, ABDOLKARIM MOUSSAVI ARDEBILI, AND MOHAMMAD MOFATEH. THEY WERE HOPING TO WORK OUT PLANS JAN 8, THEN BE READY TO MEET WITH AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, WHO WAS EXPECTED IN TEHRAN EVENING JAN 9 OR JAN 10 WITH LATEST SUBTLETIES OF KHOMEINI POSITION.

4. STATEMENT ISSUED IN TEHRAN BY AYATOLLAH TALEQANI JAN 8 WAS ALSO SIGNED BY CLO LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS "QOM TRIANGLE" OF SENIOR AYATOLLAHS. IT CALLED ON PEOPLE TO REMAIN CALM, AVOID INTERFERING WITH SECURITY FORCES, AND CEASE THREATS AND ATTACKS ON FOREIGNERS. NOTICE

WAS PUBLISHED EXTENSIVELY IN PERSIAN PRESS JAN 8, AND WILL APPEAR IN FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS JAN 9. MINATCHI SAID BASIC CLO AND CDHRF LINE IS THAT WHEN SHAH DEPARTS, PEOPLE MUST PROVE THEY ARE DISCIPLINED AND PEACEFUL. MINATCHI HIMSELF IS NOT VERY CONCERNED ABOUT DISORDERLY MOBS, BUT CONCEDES THERE MAY BE PEOPLE ON THE STREETS STIRRING UP TROUBLE. IF SO, RELIGIOUS LEADERS HOPE TO BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THEM NON-VIOLENTLY AS WAS DONE DURING TESUA AND ASHURA MARCHES DEC 10-11. (COMMENT: EMBASSY IS NOT RPT NOT AS OPTIMISTIC THAT MOBS CAN BE SO EASILY CONTROLLED. HOWEVER, EMBOFF WISHED HIM MUCH LUCK IN EFFORT.)

5. MINATCHI EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IF SECURITY SITUATION DETERIORATED, BUT SAID EFFORTS OF MODERATE OPPOSITION ARE BEING AIMED AT SEEING THIS DOES NOT OCCUR. WHEN EMBOFF ALLUDED TO STORY THAT GEN. JAM HAD RESIGNED HIS POST AS MINISTER OF WAR, MINATCHI SEEMED TROUBLED FOR A MOMENT (HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON MATTER), BUT SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL OTHER GENERALS WHO COULD FILL THE BILL, "AND THE PRIME MINISTER KNOWS THEM ALL". HE SPECIFICALLY CITED GENERALS NASS-, ROLAHI, BATMANGELIDJ, REZVANI, AND AGHAVI. MINATCHI PERSONALLY THOUGHT NASSROLAHI WOULD BE BEST CHOICE TO REPLACE JAM, BUT ANY OF ABOVE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

6. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR AND ENCOURAGING THAT MINATCHI AND MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS ARE GIVING CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO POSSIBLE TRANSITION PROBLEMS. WHILE MINATCHI SAYS SHAH MUST EVENTUALLY GO FOR GOOD, MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS ARE NOT DISPOSED TO PUSH THE ISSUE NOW. SHAH'S DEPARTURE ON VACATION OR FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. HE THOUGHT BAZARGAN GROUP (LIBERATION MOVEMENT) WOULD EVENTUALLY SEE IT THAT WAY AS REALITY OF SITUATION EVOLVED. EVEN EXCLUDING BAZARGAN FOR MOMENT (HE IS STILL IN SHIRAZ, BUT RETURNING TO TEHRAN EVENING JAN 8), SIZABLE SEGMENT OF OPPOSITION APPEARS COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL TRANSITION IF SHAH DEPARTS. MINATCHI HAD NO RPT NO CLUES AS TO WHO MIGHT BE NAMED TO REGENCY
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7. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED NEXT MAJLES SESSION POSTPONED TO JANUARY 11, AND SENATE SESSION TO JANUARY 13. HOW THIS DELAY WILL AFFECT OPPOSITION CALCULATIONS, AND ACTIVITY, REMAINS TO BE SEEN. SULLIVAN
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